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PHILLIPS, DANIEL ALVORD. The Transposition of Literary and Rhetorical 
Constructs to Dance Theory and Choreography. (1973) Directed by: 
Miss Virginia Moomaw. Pp. 175. 
It was the purpose of this study to explore selected literary 
and rhetorical constructs as philosophical models for describing the 
aesthetic nature of dance, techniques of choreography, and the theory 
of choreography. Essentially heuristic, the study superimposed these 
constructs, such as metaphor. on dance theory to see if they also 
described the same or similar processes or techniques in dance. It 
was hoped that of the 250 constructs considered, a few would signifi­
cantly enrich the dancer's understanding of his medium. 
Four compatible theories were used as a framework for conceiving 
the study: Langer, Sheets, Ellfeldt-Metheny, and Gendlin. Each con­
struct was stated first as it applied to literature or rhetoric; then 
abstracted enough in terminology so that it would not only apply to 
literature and rhetoric, but other media as well; then this abstracted 
statement, now quite malleable, was applied to the indicated area of 
dance—aesthetics of dance, techniques of choreography, or theory of 
choreography. Professional literature on the constructs and the 
movement-meaning relationship were used to support the philosophical 
developments and conclusions. The study was illustrated through 
Labanotation and pantomimic descriptions where pertinent. 
It was concluded that literary and rhetorical constructs were 
significant in describing similar processes in dance. The results of 
the study were: (1) the majority of the figures transposed described 
processes, ideas or techniques, already known in dance textbooks; (2) 
five constructs emerged so philosophically interesting, that it was 
speculated a complete theory could be based on any one of them. They 
were epiphor. diaphor. enthvmeme. imagery, and apostrophe. (3) The 
study pointed up the startling similarity of the two media (poetry and 
dance), and it was recommended that further reflection and development 
would be warranted in applying the constructs to other media as well; and 
(4) the use of selected constructs as dance terminology might enrich 
the dance field. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
With the proliferation of research in this century into the 
psychological and aesthetic domains of human movement, and the pro­
portional lack of assimilation of this data into the theory of dance, 
the need has arisen for explorations into the theory of dance as an art 
form. The few serious works on the theory of dance only point to the 
monumental need for more philosophical research in the field. Contem­
porary aesthetics only seem to account for general principles in the 
arts and typically ignore the unique problem of human movement as an 
artistic medium of expression. And with the vigorous experimentation in 
the dance field today, teachers and students are in need of a unifying 
body of theory—a philosophical matrix in which dance education and 
aesthetics can develop. 
The typical aesthetics seminar discusses painting, sculpture, 
music, drama, literature, and if there is enough time, dance. The 
same applies to aesthetics textbooks. Recognition of dance as an ar­
tistic medium is recent, compared to the 300 years development of 
musical aesthetics, and not to mention the 2500 years of literary develop­
ment. When people assemble for grass-roots discussions of dance, the 
handicaps crop up: (1) not enough professional literature—that is, 
exposition on the philosophical, psychological, and somatic nature of 
dance; (2) recognition of the interesting problems of dance is not 
widespread, as in other media; and (3) the practicality of experiencing 
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an example of a good dance is limited. Paintings, photographs of paint­
ings and sculptures, texts of dramas, recordings of music--all are more 
feasibly brought into the classroom than a dance. 
Until recently, movement as a medium of artistic expression was 
hardly recognized, and was often the composite of other media--the danc­
ing part of dance being little more than technical virtuosity. Thus, 
development of a theory of dance was obscured with considerations of 
the scenario, the elaborate set pieces, the episodic music, and the 
representational costumes. The "message" of the medium was assumed 
to be the literal theme or plot in the scenario, manifested by a 
bevy of classical cliches and imitative pantomime. 
However, now that the integrity of movement as an artistic medium 
has been established, descriptive philosophy of dance needs to catch 
up, as it were, and fill in the gaps not covered in general aesthetical 
and choreographical theory. The questions that might be asked are: How 
much do existing theories of art include dance? What are the rudiments 
of the medium? What are the rudiments of techniques in working the medium, 
and what is the nature of the medium itself? How can existing literature 
in aesthetics be useful in developing a theory of dance? Of the existing 
literature on dance theory, how much contributes to an internally 
consistent theory and how much is irreducible? What research exists in 
fields outside of dance that might be instructive in realizing a tight 
theory of dance? This study addresses itself to these questions. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this study is to explore selected literary and 
rhetorical constructs as philosophical models for describing the nature 
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of dance, techniques of choreography, and the theory of choreography. 
Basic processes of language and speech have been studied since Gorgias. 
And over the two and one half millenia since, there is a label and 
accompanying literature for practically every kind of stylistical, 
logical, orthographical, or presentational scheme known to man. Could 
these theoretical descriptions of language processes and relationships 
be applicable to dance? Could this wealth of material be rechannelled 
to enhance the dancer's understanding of his aesthetic and choreographic 
theory? 
Analysis 
Two examples should make the purpose of this study clear. The 
stylistic device known as aposiopesis is a failing to complete a 
statement. One normally associates this device with moments of suspense 
or high tension. The implication is that the doer of the action (speaker 
or actor) is so fraught with involvement and emotion that words will 
no longer come. Aposiopesis. then, is the model. The transposition 
would be as follows: (1) The model is failure to complete a statement 
at a moment of high tension, usually resulting in a particular response 
from the audience. (2) Could a suspension in movement, predicated on 
an existing climax, also elicit a similar response from a dance audience? 
As this transposition is one of the more obvious, the answer is yes, as 
Humphrey would testify. 
An aesthetical transposition might run as follows, using simile 
as a model. (1) Simile is a comparison of two things using the words 
"like" or "as," to enhance the meaning or understanding of the first 
term. (For example, "Your ever-turning wit is like a hard-to-open 
4 
peanut butter jar," is a literary simile.) (2) Envision the following 
pantomime, a choreographic simile: A man is hammering a nail without 
the essential ingredients of a hammer, nail, and board. He is an accom­
plished carpenter. Instead of going through the motions normally 
associated with literally hammering a nail, he turns a somersault and 
gives his imaginary nail a whack. He stands up, takes a leap, and 
makes another pound in the air. Three quick turns are executed while 
ten more whacks are made. "Splits" to the floor, and the final whack is 
a tiny one. The idea of an experienced carpenter hammering a nail is 
altered by his antics. People don't really hammer that way (any more 
than an ever-turning wit can actually be a jar of peanut butter). The 
comparison is that of hammering a nail with gymnastic dexterity. 
The above examples were chosen for illustration because they are 
two of the more obvious transpositions, lending themselves to under­
standable and brief discussion. Others such as enthymeme. syllogism. 
imagery, and metaphor indicate a considerably more complex exploration 
and study. This writer fully recognizes that only a small portion of 
dance is pantomimic. 
Further, the two examples illustrate the potential polarity of 
this project. Some of the constructs considered in this paper will be 
found to have "in-the-studio" practicality, such as aposiopesis. Others 
may be of more value as a philosophical scheme upon which criticism, 
discussion, teaching, and learning may proceed. This assumes for the 
moment that a sharp line between the two actually exists. 
Delimitations 
1. This study does not undertake to review the history of develop­
ment of stylistic device, except only in a cursory and illustrative 
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fashion. Perhaps ninety percent of language constructs existent 
today were known by the first century. Succeeding centuries have 
added little to the basic list of Quintilian, and then the additions were 
mostly devotion to detail. 
2. The Renaissance had a passion for distilling basic language 
schemes into copious subspecies that most of the time did not affect 
the underlying scheme. For instance hyperbaton may be parsed into 
anastrophe. tmesis, hvsterologia. hysteron proteron. hypallage. paren­
thesis » and epergesis. Further, there is a Greek, Latin, and English 
word (although some overlap exists) for every device known. This writer 
sees no need to explore endless subspecies that are shoots off the same 
trunk. Some species with true philosophic interest will receive 
special consideration. The rule for choice of spelling will be the most 
well known, regardless of origin. 
3. Often it happens in contemporary literature that several 
theorists are at odds as to what a particular device is or is not, does 
or does not do. One need only glance at the literature on enthymeme to 
understand this. And since this writer is bound to enthymeme. for 
instance, as a model--by definition--the most feasibly transposed theory 
will be used. The writer will make recommendations as to the value of 
others where pertinent. 
4. Since this is a study to enhance understanding of dance, it 
is assumed that all devices will be subservient to this purpose. All 
constructs are conceived, for purposes of this study, as malleable 
models. It may happen that a device would suggest a particular descrip­
tion of dance, but would not fully account for it. In this case, the 
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suggestion would be discussed, and not the literal transposition. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Central to the conception of this study are Langer's ideas of 
discursive and non-discursive symbolism. She states in Philosophy in a 
New Key: 
Language in the strict sense is essentially discursive; it has 
permanent units of meaning which are containable into larger units; 
it has fixed equivalences that make definition and translation 
possible; its connotations are general, so that it requires non­
verbal acts, like pointing, looking, or emphatic voice-inflections, 
to assign specific denotations to its terms. In all these salient 
characters it differs from wordless symbolism, which is non-discur-
sive and untranslatable, does not allow of definitions within its 
own system, and cannot directly convey generalities. The meanings 
given through language are successively understood, and gathered into 
a whole by the process called discourse; the meanings of all other 
symbolic elements that compose a larger, articulate symbol are 
understood only through the meaning of the whole, through their 
relations withî  thê  total ĵ xucture. Their very functioning as 
symbols depends on the fact that they are involved in a simultaneous, 
integral presentation. This kind of semantic may be called "presen­
tational symboliem," to characterize its essential distinction from 
discursive symbolism, or "language" proper. (99:89) 
The apparent paradox of using Langer's ideas for this study is 
resolved when it is recalled that this study is transposing constructs, 
processes and relationships, rather than the entirely different notion 
of translating the meaning of a word into the meaning of a movement, or 
the meaning of a story or play into the meaning of a dance. This dis­
tinction must be kept sharply focused at all times. 
Also operative throughout the study are the ideas of Ellfeldt and 
Metheny as expounded in their excellent article, "Movement and Meaning: 
Development of a General Theory." Stated briefly, they have theorized 
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that all human movement has a semantic significance according to one, 
two, or all of three descriptions. These are defined as follows: 
n. A dynamic somatic form constructed by body masses 
in motion. Kinestructure: v. To create a kine-
struct. 
n. A sensory form created by kinesthetic perception 
of a kinestruct. Kinesceptualize: v. To perceive 
a kinescept. 
n. A conceptual form which is an abstraction of the 
significance or import of a kinestruct and its 
kinescept within the socio-psycho-somatic context 
of a situation. Kinesymbolize: v. To concep­
tualize the import of a kinestruct-kinescept. 
(60:268) 
Stated more simply, although less precisely, a kinestruct might be the 
act of scratching the scalp; the kinescept is the kinesthetic perception 
of that movement; and the kinesymbol is the abstracted significance of 
the movement and its kinesthetic perception within the socio-psycho-
somatic context of a situation. 
Other theories ebb in and out as the discussion progresses. 
However, all the ideas used are either derivatives of Langer or Ellfeldt-
Metheny, or are consistent with their theories. Mentionable are Sheets, 
The Phenomenology of Dance, and various works of Birdwhistell (22,23,24, 
25) concerning pre-kinesics, micro-kinesics, and social-kinesics. Gendlin, 
in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning. provides an excellent 
articulation of the various species of symbolism, which is entirely 
consistent with Langer, Sheets, Ellfeldt-Metheny, and Birdwhistell. As 
Gendlin1s system is too lengthy for summary, pertinent excerpts and 
clarifications will be provided when applicable. 
Kinestruct: 
Kinescept: 
Kinesymbol: 
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Definition of Terms 
The following terms are defined for use in this paper: 
1. Aesthetics. The fundamental grounds upon which concepts of 
expression, structure, and form are described. This term is used 
interchangeably with "philosophy." 
2. Construct. The generic term referring to the figures of 
language and rhetoric. 
3. Discursive symbolism. Symbolism with the following charac­
teristics: (1) permanent units of meaning; (2) fixed equivalences, 
making definition and translation possible; (3) general connotations, 
so that "it requires non-verbal acts, like pointing, looking, or empha­
tic voice-inflections, to assign specific denotations to its terns." 
(99:89) Language, for example, is the most common occurrence of 
discursive symbolism. 
4. Kinescept. "A sensory form created by kinesthetic perception 
of a kinestruct." (60:268) 
5. Kinestruct. "A dynamic somatic form constructed by body masses 
in motion." (60:268) 
6. Kinesymbol. "A conceptual form which is an abstraction of 
the significance or import of a kinestruct and its kinescept within the 
socio-psycho-somatic context of a situation." (60:268) 
7. Literal. A general term referring to something that has the 
characteristics of discursive symbolism. Anything that can be expedi­
tiously expressed with words. 
8. Non-literal. Anything that confounds meaningful expression 
in words. 
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9. Philosophy» The fundamental grounds upon which concepts of 
expression, structure, and form are described. This term is used 
interchangeably with "aesthetics." 
10. Presentational symbolism. Symbolism with the following 
characteristics: (1) no permanent units of meaning; (2) no fixed equi­
valences where definition and translation would be possible; (3) specific 
connotations—symbols whose meanings are understood "only through the 
meaning of the whole, through their relations within the total struc­
ture." (99:89) Presentational symbolism is also referred to as non-
discursive symbolism. 
11. Transposition. The act of using a figure of language or 
rhetoric as the description of a similar process or relationship occurring 
in dance theory or techniques of choreography. 
Basic Assumptions 
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that the "meaning" 
to be found in everyday gesture is the micro-counterpart to fully develop­
ed dance. That is, relationships that hold true for movement concate­
nation in over-the-coffee-table gestures, will also hold true in any 
type of dance. This basic assumption serves illustration purposes only, 
and is not intended as a universal maxim. 
Further, pantomime is seized as a convenient source for illus­
tration. It is fully recognized that only a small portion of today's 
dance is pantomime, or even pantomimic. Nevertheless, for any theory 
to be useful it must apply to everything within the limitations of its 
terms—literal or non-literal. Therefore the use of pantomime for illus­
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tration has yet another purpose in this study: to provide comprehen­
siveness in theory. 
The next chapter undertakes a review of the literature pertinent 
to this study. The considerations have been (1) What literature sheds 
light on the grass-roots relationship between "meaning" and movement? 
(2) What literature exists on the techniques and theories of figura­
tive language? (3) Are there any studies that parallel the approach, 
or hint at the approach of this study? (4) What aesthetical theories 
would most appropriately service this study? Accordingly, the sub­
sections are "The Gesture-Meaning Relationship," "Figurative Language," 
"Parallel Literature," and "Aesthetics." 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Although the professional literature paralleling this study is 
meager, related and supportive literature is abundant. The considera­
tions have been (1) What literature sheds light on the grass-roots 
relationship between "meaning" and movement? (2) What literature exists 
on figurative language? (3) Are there any studies that parallel the 
approach or hint at the approach of this study? (4) In a paper which 
must ultimately rest on aesthetical premises, whose ideas and which 
systems would be the most appropriate as tools for conceiving the detail 
in this study? Accordingly, the subsections are "THE GESTURE-MEANING 
RELATIONSHIP," "FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE," "PARALLEL LITERATURE," and 
"AESTHETICS." 
THE GESTURE-MEANING RELATIONSHIP 
The purpose of reviewing the literature on gesture was to exhume 
the common denominators in the gesture-meaning relationship. This will 
provide the premises for later theorizing and speculation when it becomes 
necessary to work with the rudiments of gestural semantic. The litera­
ture spans many fields of inquiry, including anthropology, psychology, 
kinesics, sociology, philosophy, linguistics, physical education, and 
a host of others. Since the Ellfeldt-Metheny system is being used as a 
theoretical framework, the review is logically organized in that way: 
kinestruct, kinescept, kinesymbol. 
12 
Gesture as Kinestruct 
The reader will recall that in the first chapter, a kinestruct 
was defined as "a dynamic somatic form constructed by body masses in 
motion." (60:268) Ellfeldt and Metheny give the example of raising 
an arm: 
How did he raise his arm? What positions were assumed by the rest 
of his body? How were these positions altered by the raising of his 
arm? What changes occurred in the tension of the muscle fibers in 
his back? In his legs? In his neck? In what ways was the raising 
of his arm related to the total situation in which it occurred? 
(60:268) 
A kinestruct, then, is a movement of the body including the "uncountable 
changes in muscle tension which are synchronized into 'a movement.'" 
(60:268) These changes may be as subtle or gross as the structure of the 
body itself, and we may label any movement or combination of movements 
in an organic pattern, a kinestruct. A subtle twitch of the lower lip 
may be a kinestruct as well as the gross movement of stooping over to 
pick up a needle. Some kinestruc . are larger and more complex than 
others. The physiological and neurological components of movement are 
to be found in countless textbooks on the subject. 
Metheny (116) in Movement and Meaning restates essentially the 
same system developed by the Ellfeldt-Metheny (60) coalition, but empha­
sizes structural, functional, and relational properties of movement. 
For the purpose of this paper the coalition theory is the more service­
able one. 
Founder and pioneer in the field of kinesics, Birdwhistell (22,23, 
24,25) has sectioned the field into various areas of inquiry: pre-kinesics 
"deals with the general physiological, pre-communicational aspects of 
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body motion," (17:12) and with kines, least particles of isolatable 
body-motion. Kines combine to form morphological classes or patterns 
of movement—the concern of micro-kinesics. (17:13) 
Birdwhistell has additionally developed a system of movement 
notation, which is a combination of imitative symbols, defined through 
physiological-kinesiological terminology. Yet at its present stage of 
development (described in Kinesics and Context. 25:257-302), the notation 
system is not useful to this study. 
Birdwhistell's system of kinesics closely parallels in thinking, 
and restates in more specific terms, what the Ellfeldt-Metheny theory 
says, particularly in relation to kinestructs. That is, one might say 
a kinestruct is a number of kines that combine to form a morphological 
class—"He raised his arm," is an example. 
Many others have studied the structural aspects of movement--some 
studies being naive, others developed. Delsarte thought that body move­
ment was best described through direction—particularly in analyzing the 
meaning of a gesture. (48,137,164,167) Laban, alone and with Lawrence 
(92,93,94,95), developed an elaborate system for the analysis and notation 
of movement upon which Hutchinson (83) developed Labanotation. Bacon 
(13), Efron (59), and others in separate works, stated the need for an 
extensive and exacting analysis of movement, and offered criteria, but 
gave no useable systems. And yet a large number of writers too numerous 
to mention have attempted the structural description of movement by 
cataloging and categorizing various gestures and specific movements—an 
approach bound to fail, since it would be impossible to record every 
gesture ever done, or that ever will be done. 
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The genius of the Ellfeldt-Metheny kinestruct is its simplicity 
in theorizing about movement. For it allows any movement to have 
additional non-visual features, no matter how small or large. Coupled 
with Birdwhistell's "kines," the kinestruct completely accounts for 
movements of the human body. 
Gesture as Kinescept 
The kinescept "is felt as a composite of the sensae transmitted 
by the entire kinesthetic sensorium as well as the 'vague visceral 
reports of feeling1 arising from continuous changes in homeostasis as 
the kinestructural response to the total situation is formulated." (60: 
269) A kinestruct may be kinesceptualized at the cortical level, as 
when one recalls "the feel" of a movement; at the cerebellar level, as 
when one goes through the motions of driving, while the mind focuses 
on other thoughts; or at the spinal level, as in reflex actions. (60:269) 
Ellfeldt and Metheny further state: 
But at whatever level neuromuscular interaction is effected, the 
kinescept of the kinestruct is always present, because without it 
co-ordinated movement is impossible. (60:269) 
The uniqueness of the Ellfeldt-Metheny kinescept is that movement is 
perceived in terms of neuromuscular sensae, rather than in terms of 
language. Certainly one can talk about a movement, but that necessarily 
excludes the complex and subtle somatic patterning ever-present in 
movement. 
Gesture as Kinesvmbol 
The great abundance of the literature on gesture and the movement-
meaning relationship is in reference to the symbolical capacity of 
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movement. How does movement mean? What is the meaning of this gesture 
in these different situations? What is the agreement percentage of 
the meaning of a particular gesture in this random sampling of a 
population? The questions are phrased in endless ways—all focusing on 
what, and how, and why. 
The kinesymbol is the conceptualization of a kinescept, again in 
terms of neuromuscular sensae—not words or images. Significance, 
"import" (as Langer might say), or "meaning" is conveyed by the kinesym­
bol—by means of kinescepts. (60:269) An example: John is slouched 
in his chair, head propped on his fist, while the teacher excitedly 
describes the rhyme scheme of a sonnet. As an observer, we would be 
first aware of the kinesthetic import of John's position. No one has 
ever had to tell us that slouching lethargically implies a non-involvement. 
It is a conceptualization of neuromuscular sensae out of our own past 
experience that gives us that feeling about John. When someone asks, 
"What do you think about John?", it is only then that we bring this 
conceptualization to the level of language—madly, wildly abstracting: 
"He looks rather uninvolved." Ellfeldt and Metheny state: 
(X kinesymbol is] an abstraction of a kinesthetic experience which 
contains its own human meaning in its own kinesthetically perceived 
form. This meaning may not be consciously recognized; it may be 
vague, fragmentary, or transient; it may be definite, organized, 
and long-lasting. It may be as functional as the meaning of 
locomotion or as non-utilitarian as 'standing on your head to see if 
you can.' But every kinestruct and its kinescept is a kinesymbolic 
formulation of personal experience which adds one more trace of 
meaning to human life. (60:270) 
A considerable body of literature exists in the field of theatre 
and speech, the majority of which does not zero in on the intricacy or 
16 
the process or the relationship of movement to meaning. Lawson (102) 
divides gesture into three categories: (1) narrative, used for verbal 
conversation; (2) descriptive, used to describe the look, feel, taste, 
smell, and sound of something; an event; or circumstance; and (3) 
emotional, derived from natural emotional expressions which have 
become stereotyped through long years of usage. (102:chap.5) Many 
others think along similar lines. (1,2,93,110,112,131,148) The elocu­
tionists may view gesture as conventional, emphatic, or descriptive-
demonstrative. (7,11,13,35,43,62,84,117) Conventional gesture is move­
ment patterning that has a generally agreed-upon, discursive, meaning 
within a given cultural or sub-cultural group through long years of 
usage. Emphatic gesture is movement that spatially accents a rhetorical 
point. Descriptive-demonstrative gesture illustrates, or is analogous 
to, a spoken idea. To the public speaker, gesture has use only as it 
enhances the message to be delivered: 
By gestures we mean purposeful movements of some part of the body--
head, shoulders, arms, or hands .... Fidgeting with coat buttons 
or aimlessly rearranging books or papers on the speaker's table 
are not gestures; they are not purposeful, and they do not relate 
to the ideas you are expressing. (117:79) 
Other elocutionists concur with little disagreement. (7,11,48,63,105, 
133,144,159) 
The subject of gesture is a small part of the field of non-verbal 
communication (NVC), the total running the gamut from the emotional 
connotations of a church spire to the traffic signal that means "stop." 
Wiseman and Barker (163:209-214) enumerate various qualifications and 
characteristics of NVC. Summarized, these are: 
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(I) NVC denotation units may be subdivided further than verbal communi­
cation (VC) denotation units. (2) NVC is continuous whereas VC is based 
on disconnected units. (3) NVC can indicate two or more events simul­
taneously, whereas VC must indicate events successively in an ordered 
sequence. (4) NVC is temporally flexible whereas VC is temporally 
inflexible. (5) NVC is spatially inflexible, while VC denotation is 
spatially flexible. (6) NVC may be skilled or unskilled, but is usually 
understandable by the responding communicator. VC expression must be 
skilled or it risks becoming distorted. (7) Understanding of NVC is 
based on empathy, whereas understanding of VC is based on prior verbal 
agreement. (8) NVC is learned much earlier in life than VC. (9) NVC 
involves complicated networks whereas VC codification involves only the 
central nervous system. (10) In NVC, actions and objects exist in 
their own right and generally fulfill practical as well as symbolic 
functions; in VC words only function as symbols, not in their own right. 
(II) NVC permits redundancies whereas VC produces fatigue when redundant. 
(12) NVC is generally much more succinct than VC. (13) NVC has more 
emotional appeal because it is closer to structural reality, whereas VC 
exerts an intellectual appeal. The authors cap their discussion by 
reminding "that an individual's response to any situation is dependent 
upon his life orientation." (163:209-214) 
Many writers recognize the "quasi-language" character of gesture. 
(22,23,24,25,35,39,76,99,130,151,158,163) Gesture fitting into this 
category includes the language of the deaf and dumb, the Universal 
Indian Sign Language, as well as the more simple, monosyllabic gestures 
of the hitchhiker and the "Winston Churchill victory sign" (alias peace 
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sign, "two," and the cub scout salute). The distinguishing characteris­
tic of these types of gestures is their inherent intellectual meaning 
through their symbolical spatial pattern. Meltzer in his article 
"Mead's Social Psychology" (109:8fn) draws a further distinction between 
signific and symbolic gesture: 
A sign stands for something else because of the fact that it is 
present at approximately the same time and place with that "some­
thing else." A symbol, on the other hand, stands for something else 
because its users have agreed to let it stand for that "something 
else." Thus, signs are directly and intrinsically linked with 
present or proximate situations; while symbols, having arbitrary 
and conventional, rather than intrinsic, meanings, transcend the 
immediate situation. (109:8fn) 
Beginning with Darwin (51), many have explored the field of 
emotional expression through body movement. He states: 
(1) Certain complex actions are of direct or indirect service 
under certain states of mind, in order to relieve or gratify certain 
sensations, desires, etc.; and whenever the same state of mind is 
induced, however feebly, there is a tendency through the force of 
habit and association for the same movements to be performed, though 
they may not then be of the least use. (51:28) 
(2) When the sensorium is strongly excited, nerve-force is generated 
in excess, and is transmitted in certain definite directions, depend­
ing on the connection of the nerve-cells, and partly on habit . . . . 
(51:29) 
Young (165) contributes to the understanding of this concept in stating 
that certain states of mind have definite patterns, as the rage pattern, 
the grief pattern, etc.: 
In human grief there is a disturbance of normal respiration . . . . 
The flexor muscles dominate the extensors so that we commonly speak 
of the person as being "bowed over" with grief. (165:254) 
Ax (12) concludes in his study on the physiological differences between 
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fear and anger that "there is considerable specificity in physiological 
response patterns." (12:442) Arnold (9) corroborates this finding in 
his excellent review of emotional theory and personality. (9:220-226) 
Young continues, maintaining that, 
. . . the nervous system is organized in such a way that primitive 
reactions of the phylogenetically older (lower) parts are prevented 
from playing a dominate role in behavior by the inhibitory action of 
the younger (higher) centers. (165:265) 
The point is that human beings would move in relatively predictable pat­
terns in response to emotion if it were not for the inhibitory effect of 
the cerebral cortex. Krout (91) states: 
Autistic gestures originate in conflict situations of which they 
become symbolic, as proved by the emotional freightage of their 
stimuli .... The theory of autistic gestures is that, in the 
presence of conflict and blockage, there may be an escape of impul­
ses into effector-systems which, were the impulses uninhibited, would 
provide normal outlets for them. (91:120) 
Turner's (154) study concluded that emotional and physical qualities 
presented in abstract form in dance will be readily recognized. (154:220) 
Blake's (29) study concluded that even though his subject could not 
exactly and precisely identify "emotional movement" (the inhibitory in­
fluence of the cerebral cortex?—Blake does not speculate), they were 
able to "identify certain characteristics and use them logically and 
consistently." (29:64) 
Thus, individual personalities, cultural, and sub-cultural deter­
minants wield different inhibitions and may affect primitive patterns in 
infinite ways. For instance, men in American society are taught that 
crying in public (or at all) is not manly (the higher center dominating 
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the cry impulse as a result of cultural determinancy); whereas in China, 
for instance, "men weep as readily as women on appropriate occasions." 
(165:184) So meaning in gesture may be at least influenced by emotional 
response patterns, but various other factors must be considered. 
According to Schachter and Singer (132) the state of mind of the 
emoter as well as the observer is a crucial factor in determining the 
meaning of "emotional gesture:" 
Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has 
no immediate explanation, he will label this state and describe his 
feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him. To the extent 
that cognitive factors are potent determiners of emotional states, 
it should be anticipated that precisely the same state of physiologi­
cal arousal could be labeled "joy" or "fury" or "jealosy" or any of 
a great diversity of emotional labels depending on the cognitive 
aspects of the situation. (132:398) 
Landis (97) agrees: "... the correlation between any given facial 
expression and a standard emotion would be low" (97:341); so does 
Carmichael (38), stating that meaning in facial expression is an iso­
lated part of a total body pattern. (38:133) Ellfeldt and Metheny (60) 
girder their theory of movement along the same lines: 
The kinescepts of similar kinestructs may thus have very different 
emotional-intellectual Import as kinesymbols for different people, 
depending upon the meanings. both obvious and subtle, in the situa­
tions in which they were experienced. (60:271) 
On the other hand, Kline and Johannsen (89) suggest that, 
. . . the capacity for recognizing the emotions is latent or untrain­
ed; it is suggested that the untrained condition may be due to lack of 
adequate opportunity for judging emotional expressions in modern 
life, and the failure to integrate specific language responses with 
particular emotional expressions. (89:426) 
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They add, however, that most people respond readily to training in recog­
nizing emotions through movement. Lynn and Lynn (106) have found a 
definite independent relationship between hand-dominance and involuntary 
smiles. (106:261-262) Frijda (70) summarizes thus: "To specify the 
behavioral attitudes in terms of emotions, situational cues or situational 
suppositions based on experience are necessary." (70:153) 
Geldard (71), Cannon (36), Dunlap (58), Davitz (53), and Frank (68), 
as well as others, have investigated various parts of the body involved 
in betraying state of mind: parts of the face, the skin, the tongue, 
vocal chords, the lungs, and the throat muscles. 
Mawer (112), Darwin (51), Feldman (66), and Whittick (158) have 
raised the possibility of meaning in gesture having a link with deep-
seated instincts. For instance, "the instinct to make the hand as wide 
a shield as possible for protection," might account for the same gesture 
done in situations which do not physically threaten. (112:135) 
"One of the reasons English-dubbed foreign films often seem flat 
is that the gestures don't match the language." (52:128) It is prudent 
to recognize that cultural and sub-cultural determinants influence 
gestures, but do not necessarily codify, pattern, or categorize gesture in 
a particular group of people. Ruesch and Kees (130) make the point 
lucidly: 
Most persons interested in movements can identify Individuals belong­
ing to certain national, cultural, occupational, or social class 
group. The sailor's rolling gait, the Prussian officer's clipped 
movements, the catlike motions of certain Pacific islanders are well-
known stereotypes. It is not surprising, therefore, that numerous 
attempts have been made to relate gestures and movements to racial 
types. The aim has always been to single out movements that inves­
tigators thought to be characteristic of their hypothetical norms. 
The complete failure of these attempts to establish genetically 
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determined and racial linked movement types was to be expected. The 
attempt to link gesture and movement to particular cultures was not 
much more successful. (130:21-22) 
Bateson (17) comments: 
. . . different cultures vary in the extent to which they exploit 
or rely on any one mode of communication, and the same observed 
material may be shown by analysis to belong to different levels of 
the total system in different societies. (17:200) 
Efron (59), Barnouw (16), Oxenford (121), and Ruesch and Kees (130), as 
well as others (3,4,22,25,39,49,56,66,76,81,120,141,147,151,152,158), 
discuss cross-cultural gesture and at the most suggest general character­
istics of particular cultural types. All recognize, however, the need 
for flexible interpretations. For instance, Chao (39) maintains that 
shaking the head from side to side means "yes" in some Arab countries. 
(39:116) LaBarre (96) provides an even more illustrious example: 
Urination upon another (as in a famous case at the Sands Point, Long 
Island, country club, involving a congressman since assassinated) is 
a grave insult among Occidentals, but is part of the transfer of.power 
from an African medicine man in initiations and curing rituals. 
(96:56) 
Suamarv 
The purpose in reviewing the literature on the gesture-meaning 
relationship has been to determine the elements involved when gesture 
means. It is not necessary, for purposes of this study, to take a con­
clusive stand on the various aspects. It is only necessary to identify 
that such and such a factor is relevant. Therefore, the accumulated 
research seems to indicate the following summary. 
Human gesture is movement of the body that serves the purpose of 
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the communication of a discursive or non-discursive meaning (whether 
communication was intended or not). Gesture usually excludes movement 
of those muscles responsible for speech (although illogically). Gesture 
is characterized by fluency, continuity, temporal flexibility, spatial 
inflexibility, and spatial pattern. Factors which may influence meaning 
are part of the body involved; simultaneity; the type of motion (ellip­
tical, lineal, sinuous, etc.); the speed (tempo) and force (dynamics) of 
the movement; the involvement of large or small muscle groups; personal 
physicality; personal experience; state of mind; instinct; the functions 
of symbol, sign, analogy, and autism; social situations; physical 
environment; cultural and sub-cultural determinants. These movements may 
be communicated to the perceiver visually, auditorily, tactily, and less 
frequently, olfactorily. 
FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 
The spectrum of literature on figurative language spans 2500 years 
of literary development. The two peaks of this extensive gamut are un­
questionably classical antiquity and the Renaissance, the latter being a 
reduplication of the former. Since the natural organization of the material 
on figurative language gravitates to these peaks, the following review 
concentrates on the five important classical writers on figurative lang­
uage, and the three schools of rhetoric-poetic in the Renaissance. 
Specific sources on the various figures will be introduced in conjunction 
with the transpositions. It is hoped this approach will simplify and 
clarify relevant material—this first overview providing perspective for 
the later focus on detail. It is further hoped that the dance-oriented 
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reader will find this review interpretive and enlightening. The writer 
has attempted to provide the dance-oriented reader with a "sense" for 
the complexity of such a subject. The reader is referred to the glossary 
of terms in the appendix (p. 161) for detailed description of the various 
figures encountered in this section. 
Figurative Language in Antiquity 
Since man first learned to speak, figurative language has probably 
transported meanings that ordinary language often is incapable of expres­
sing. And from the earliest times figurative expression has been an 
integral part of everyday speech. Yet in casting overall schemes of 
rhetoric, different theorists have assigned different roles to figura­
tive language—from a thin simplicity to a copious embellishment. Aris­
totle, Cicero, Quintilian, Longinus, and the Ad C. Herennium, have been 
selected as representative of the classical concern for figurative lan­
guage because their works have had the greatest influence on later ages, 
particularly the Renaissance; and each of the rhetors implicitly indicates 
the opposed roles in which later ages have cast the figures. Discussion 
of these five theorists is organized according to contrast, and from 
major to minor writers, rather than chronologically. It is hoped such an 
approach will not only clarify, but also connect these theories more 
naturally to the Renaissance. 
The term "figure of speech" is a generic one. Different authors 
at different times have parsed the figures into various species. Authors 
rarely agree on the true classification of the figures—if there is one. 
Theorists are bound to proceed inductively; some believe that there are 
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figures still undiscovered and unnamed. Indeed, any recurrent pattern 
in spoken or written language, with enough devotion and pedantry, could 
be given a name. 
For purposes of this paper, Quintilian's definitions will be used. 
Figurative language consists of tropes, figures of speech, and figures 
of thought. A trope "is the transfer of meaning from the natural one to 
another, or of an expression from its natural position to another." (104: 
1,219) A figure of speech or thought consists "in conforming our speech 
to a pattern removed from the common and ordinary." (104:1,219) Hot 
debates have raged over the minute distinction between tropes and figures, 
and even Quintilian remarks that the distinction is not an easy one. 
Figures of speech or thought usually do not include considerations of 
rhythm, although there is sometimes overlap and interaction. 
Figures of speech and thought are diverse and many, ranging from 
repetitions of a word to entire structures of a speech. Some figures are 
a normal part of every day speech (as enclosing side comments in paren­
theses) , to highly complex and extensive systems of thought, such as 
making a speech based on a syllogism. There is no formula of construction 
that would apply to all the figures at once. Some are as common and easy 
to construct as giving an example, and others involve careful premedita­
tion. Figurative language is embellished language. 
Pre-Aristotelian figures and Aristotle. Gorgias of Leontini in 
Sicily (born 496 B.C.; 18:300) is credited by most scholars as the 
"inventor" of the figures of speech. Gorgias is outstanding in that he 
rejected formulations of principles, arrangement, and syntax, and concen­
trated his efforts in rhetoric on figures. Most authors agree that the 
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Gorgian figures include parison (also called isocolon), homoeoteleuton, 
homoeoptoton. antithesis, anaphora, alliteration, and assonance. (149:10) 
When he visited Athens in 427 B.C. he astonished his audiences with his 
use of figures—for his speeches were founded on rhythm, ornament, and 
a conspicuous lack of logic. Gorgias was the first to make Athenians 
aware of the possibilities of figurative language. (149:10) 
Isocrates, student of Gorgias (born 436 B.C.; 18:302), naturally 
came under the influence of the Gorgianic style (which was later to be 
associated with the "grand style"). Approaching with moderation the 
Gorgian habit of borrowing freely from poetical device, Isocrates empha­
sized a balanced use of figures. (149:10) isocrates could be represen­
tative of what was later to be called the "middle style." 
The spectrum between Gorgias and Isocrates—from a moderate use 
of figures to a particularly excessive one—was the stylistic climate in 
which Aristotle (born 384 B.C.; 18:303) wrote his Rhetoric and Poetics. 
That Aristotle's contemporaries were too artificial in their use of 
figures is evidenced in Aristotle's numerous reprimandings of the arti­
ficiality and excess of Gorgias and other rhetors. (45:1,190,192,199) 
Clarity and propriety in diction and structure are central to 
Aristotle's conception of style, attested to by his continual reference to 
integration in style. Although he begrudgingly allows style the office of 
elevating prose (45:187), he summarily rejects style for its own sake. 
The reason for the existence of style is to make evident the logical 
structure of persuasion—its most important function. (123:29;14:31) It 
is significant for later comparison that he regards the enthvmeme as the 
device for persuasion, rather than any stylistic elaboration. Style, 
Aristotle maintains, must always aim at the golden mean. (45:191) 
Aristotle emphasizes three tenets of good figurative style: 
metaphor, antithesis. and actuality. (45:208) Metaphor. in his Rhetoric 
(45:208-212) and Poetics (64:41-44), is the generic term for many types 
of figurative language. His concept of metaphor includes figures later 
classified into separate categories. 
According to Aristotle, proportional metaphor (see later discussion, 
pp. 65-66) is the most effective. (45:208) The obvious similarity between 
analogical metaphor and simile is corroborated when he states that for 
a proportional metaphor to be effective, it must be capable of being 
restated in simile. (45:193) A requisite of good metaphor is actuality: 
it should put the event "directly before our eyes." For instance, "He's 
a regular giraffe in the 100 yard dash," illustrates actuality. Obscurity 
and generality are subversive to clarity. (45:191) Another requirement 
of good metaphor is that it imply a certain activity. Aristotle remarks: 
It is a metaphor indeed, to say that a good man is "four-square," 
since both the good man and the square are perfect; but the metaphor 
suggests no activity. There is, on the other hand, a sense of 
activity in the expression, "with his vigor fully blooming"; and 
similarly in, "thou, roaming as free as a sacred bull." (45:211) 
Aristotle additionally favored prosopopoeia« antonomasia, and peri­
phrasis. all of which tend to promote vividness; and antithesis, isocolon. 
homoeoteleuton. anaphora, epistrophe. polysyndeton, and asyndeton, which 
emphasize balance in periodic structure and affect prose rhythm. (85:32) 
He classifies hyperbole as a kind of metaphor that promotes liveliness. 
(45:216) Although he warned against the figures zeugma and parenthesis 
as promoting an undesirable ambiguity (another of his four faults in 
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bad style; 45:194), he delighted In deliberate ambiguity (particularly 
the puns antanaclasis and paronomasia; 45:195;80:32), for there "is an 
added element of surprise." (45:212) Surprise, according to Aristotle, 
promotes liveliness of metaphor. (45:211-213) Apophthegms and proverbs, 
hybrid species of metaphor for Aristotle, promote liveliness of thought. 
(45:212-216) He further counsels against the vices tautology, solecism, 
and all types of strange (archaic, obsolete) words that result in obscur­
ity. (45:190) He concludes his consideration of rhetorical style, which 
applies to his concept of poetic style, with the following: 
If the style is prolix, it will not be clear; nor yet if it is too 
compressed. Plainly, now, the midway is befitting. And the means 
we have discussed will make the style give pleasure: the happy 
blending of customary with unusual terms, and rhythm, and the per­
suasiveness that comes from appropriate feeling. (45:219) 
Cicero. Although Aristotle only suggests a stylistic trinity of 
plain, middle and grand (86:112-113), Cicero (born 106 B.C.; 18:306) 
definitely makes the classification. And as Kennedy (cited by Reid, 127: 
118) has pointed out, such a division is rather fundamental to any 
developed system of style. (127:118) If Aristotle were to have chosen 
one of Cicero's styles as best suited to persuasive discourse, it most 
likely would have been the plain style. For Cicero actively campaigned 
against the "attici," who stood for plain and lucid language, a studied 
neglect of rhythm, and an infrequent use of emotional appeal. (78:297) 
As Hubbell (80) mentions in his article, "Cicero on Styles of 
Oratory," perhaps Cicero's greatest contribution to oratory is his connec­
tion of the three styles of oratory with the three functions of oratory: 
instruction, charm, and persuasion. (80:185) And although Cicero 
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emphasizes more than once that the ideal orator should have a mastery of all 
three styles and be able to adapt them at will to varying types of 
audiences, the grand style is definitely the highest achievement: 
. . .  I  a l l o w e d  t h e  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  e l o q u e n c e  t o  t h a t  m a n  o n l y  w h o  w a s  
able, in a style more admirable and more splendid, to amplify and 
adorn any subject he chose, and whose mind and memory encompassed 
all the sources of everything that concerned oratory. (145:67) 
Cicero's four requisites for attaining eloquence are correct 
diction, lucidity, ornament, and appropriateness of style. (125:31,73) 
These requisites are not a modification of Aristotle's central principles 
of clarity and appropriateness, but are a substitution for it. (123:31) 
Cicero dismisses consideration of purity and lucidity as rather simple-
minded, stating that, 
. . .  i t  i s  n o t  o u r  t a s k  t o  t e a c h  o r a t o r y  t o  a  p e r s o n  w h o  d o e s  n o t  
know the language, nor to hope that one who cannot speak correct 
Latin should speak ornately, nor yet that one who does not say 
something that we can understand can possibly say something that we 
shall admire. (125:31) 
And Pomeroy states: "To Aristotle's emphasis on clarity, Cicero opposes 
amplification through ornamentation." (123:31) Therein lies the basic 
difference between the two conceptions of style. Style to Aristotle is 
important inasmuch as it allows the logical structure of argument to func­
tion effectively. (14:31) Overuse of stylistic ornamentation can thwart 
the rhetor'8 purpose. Cicero, on the other hand, is practically anti-
Aristotelian: 
. . . the hearer's mentality corroborates the proof, and no sooner 
is it uttered than it is sticking in his memory, whereas that passion­
ate style searches out an arbitrator's emotional side rather than 
his understanding, and that side can only be reached by diction 
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that is rich, diversified and copious, with animated delivery to 
match. (145:357) 
Grandiloquence, for Cicero, is primarily got through the embellishment of 
ideas—achieved through figurative language, prose rhythms, and periodic 
sentences. (123:31) So it is natural to find an extensive list of 
stylistic devices in Cicero—totaling more than ninety. 
As with Aristotle, Cicero regards the metaphor as one of the most 
useful of tropes (Cicero was the first to imply a difference between trope 
and figure). And Cicero recognizes the usefulness of metaphor taken as 
a generic term (78:374-375), although he mentions metonymy, catachresis. 
hypallage. and allegory as species of metaphor. 
Of the two classes of figures—of speech and thought—that Cicero 
enumerates, figures of thought are more important: "The whole essense 
of oratory is to embellish in some fashion all, or, at any rate, most 
of the ideas." (78:409) Among the figures of thought he includes 
epexergasia (at which Aristotle had hinted; 45:217), meiosis, irony. 
mycterismus. dialysis, anacoenosis. pragmatographia. maxim, paradigma, 
and epilogos. It is interesting to note that the maxim, example, and 
enthymeme are all central to Aristotle's logical structure of rhetoric. 
Cicero merely relegates them to the class of figures of thought—along 
with approximately thirty-nine others. 
Included in his list of figures of speech are the various species 
of word repetition; similarity of case endings; antithesis, climax, and 
asyndeton: figures of omission; and others. But it is predominantly the 
metaphor that carries the weight of figurative diction: 
[Figures) will be so plentiful that no word will fall from the orator's 
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lips that is not well chosen or impressive; there will be metaphors 
of all sorts in great abundance, because these figures by virtue of 
the comparison involved transport the mind and bring it back, and 
move it hither and thither; and this rapid stimulation of thought 
in itself produces pleasure. (78:407) 
So for Cicero, the embellished grand style was not only the height 
of persuasion; not only did figurative language make the logical structure 
clear and lucid and appropriate and then go a step further to palatability 
and luxury; but the ideal grand style gave aesthetic pleasure jLn itself 
by virtue of its embellishment. (123:32) Where Aristotle ended with a 
fatherly caution, Cicero began as a rudiment to eloquence. Aristotle and 
Cicero would have had much to say to each other. 
Quintilian. Quintilian (born ca. 35 A.D.; 18:309) stands for the 
successful assimilation of Aristotelian and Ciceronian theories of style: 
figurative language is a necessary manifestation of excellence in prose. 
(104:1,201-202) Aristotle's requisites of clarity and propriety as the 
result, and Cicero's argument that it is basic, are in some measure 
synthesized in Quintilian's maxim that clarity grows out of propriety. 
(104:1,199) But Quintilian stresses clarity: 
To me clearness is the first essential: correct words, regular 
order, no long-drawn-out ending, nothing lacking and nothing super­
fluous; thus will our discourse be approved by the learned, under­
stood by the uneducated. (104:1,201) 
Yet, for Quintilian too, ornament (through figurative language) is neces 
sary for true eloquence: 
I come now to ornament. which the orator must use; for only to speak 
correctly and clearly wins trifling reward. The unskilled often can 
manage invention, and little learning is needed for arrangement; but 
the speaker by skilful ornament seeks approval of a wider audience 
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and fights not merely with effective but with flashing weapons. 
(104:1,201-202) 
Where Cicero had been content to enumerate the figures, Quintilian 
takes great pains to discuss the psychological and stylistic functions 
of figures. (50:112fn) Perhaps if Aristotle had had the store of figures 
that Quintilian did, he might have discussed the psychological implica­
tions of the figures. 
Quintilian considers figurative language under seven headings: 
(1) clarity; (2) embellishment; (3) amplification; (4) "striking 
thoughts"; (5) tropes; (6) figures of thought; and (7) figures of speech. 
Representative figures will be mentioned here rather than the endless 
list of Quintilian's. According to Quintilian, clarity is the natural 
outcome of propriety. (104:1,199) Excess threatens clarity: 
Some from a false notion of splendor wrap everything in a host of 
idle words and link this series with others beyond the compass of 
mortal breath. Some work to acquire this vice .... (104:1,201) 
It is evident that Aristotle and Quintilian to this extent agree in con­
cepts of clarity. 
Echoing Cicero, Quintilian believes the ability to embellish is 
the mark of an accomplished orator. (104:1,201) But it should be 
appropriate to the topic under discussion: dignified, adequate in expres­
sion, unaffected, arranged well, and have a tempered simplicity. (104:1, 
201-208) Quintilian remarks: 
We should be ashamed to demand payment of a loan in rolling periods 
or show poignant emotion about water leaks or work up a sweat over 
the return of a slave. (104:1,202) 
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Great care should be taken in choosing proper words, in coining words, 
and in metaphors—"without propriety ornament is nothing." (104:1,202) 
In avoiding inadequacy of expression, he cautions against the 
use of such devices as tautology and epanalepsis: but yet periphrasis is 
regarded as a virtue. Avoidance of cacozelon is related to the sincerity 
of ethical presentation; anoiconometon and cacosvntheton. and a mixture 
of dialects (sardismos) are all regarded as vice. He suggests for "bril­
liant touches" such devices as simile, emphasis and aposiopesis; for 
simplicity exergasia and epexergasia. Aristotle, although he doesn't 
name epexergasia. does describe it. (45:217; 104:1,205-206) 
Amplification and minification are achieved through ascending 
incremental description, comparison, reasoning, and by grouping. Quin-
tilian discusses the end of each of the methods rather than suggest 
specific figures. (104:1,208-210) But yet he does cite hyperbole as 
one means of achieving amplification, where Aristotle considers hyperbole 
as a "metaphorical liveliness." 
Quintilian mentions that "striking thoughts" (sententiae) were 
carried to excess by his contemporaries. (104:1,210) Sententiae may 
take the form of gnome, noema, clausula, enthymeme. epicheirema. or epipho-
nema. It will be recalled that Aristotle mentions proverbs and apophthegms 
as promoting liveliness of thought. (45:212,215-216) Again it is inter­
esting to point out that where enthymeme is crucially central to Aristotle's 
complete system of logical proof in rhetoric, enthymeme in Quintilian's 
theory (and the related epicheirema—an expanded syllogism) finds a 
humble place in the class of "striking thoughts." (104:1,210) Indeed, 
one of the major contributions to rhetorical theory was Aristotle's 
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enthvmeme. (10:134;86:99) 
As with Aristotle and Cicero, metaphor is the finest of stylistic 
devices: "§Ietaphof| cannot be commonplace, low, or unpleasant but adds 
to copiousness of language by interchange and sees that its own proper 
name is given to every object." (104:1,212) Quintilian also cites four 
categories of metaphor, different from those of Aristotle and all 
involving species of substitution (animate for inanimate, etc.). (104:1, 
213) And Quintilian discusses svnechdoche and metonymy separately from 
metaphor. as well as many other tropes. 
Concerning figures of speech and thought, Quintilian refers the 
reader to Cicero's discussions, adding here and there a criticism of 
Cicero's rather primitive discussion of and confusion between the 
figures of speech and thought. Then Quintilian continues to amplify 
and discuss the functions of the figures. That Quintilian often mentions— 
sometimes quotes—Cicero, illustrates extensive influence, if not large 
agreement. But probably the most striking difference is that Quintilian 
has the air of a teacher, Cicero that of a professional. Indeed, Quin­
tilian seems to be the prudent synthesis of Ciceronian and Aristotelian 
attitudes toward style. 
The minor writers. The treatise On the Sublime has been ascribed 
to Longinus since the sixteenth century, and speculation assigns its 
date of composition to be sometime during the first century A.D. (129:1; 
18:309) Written in Greek, it was composed under the Roman Empire (129:37), 
and yet it drew from Greek, Roman, and Hebrew literatures for examples. 
Roberts (129) remarks that "taken as a whole, it is the most striking 
single piece of literary criticism produced by any Greek writer posterior 
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to Aristotle." (129:36) 
Although the subject of the treatise is largely on style, it is 
broad-minded. (129:25) For Longinus does not forget that greatness of 
style "must ultimately rest on a much wider basis." (129:33) Prerequi­
site to sublime writing are five precepts: (1) grandeur of conception; 
(2) passion; (3) figurative language; (4) noble diction, affecting 
figurative language; and (5) elevated composition. (129:57-59) Longinus 
devotes thirteen chapters to figurative language, describing many more 
figures than he actually names. It is evident that Longinus lines up 
with Cicero in that tumidity and frigidity must be avoided. In fact, 
he remarks,". . . a figure is at its best when the very fact that it is 
a figure escapes attention." (129:95) Yet copiousness is clearly the 
most sublime language. 
Among the figures, he includes apostrophe. questions and interro­
gations, asyndeton, hyperbata. polyptota, hyperbole, and metaphors. And 
unlike Cicero, Longinus cautions in the use of metaphor: "The proper time 
for using metaphors is when the passions roll like a torrent and sweep 
a multitude of them down their resistless flood." (129:121) And as Quin-
tilian did, Longinus attempts to discuss the uses, effects, and proprieties 
of the figures—with examples. 
Longinus seems to be operating from an Aristotelian basis with a 
Ciceronian superstructure. Fundamental to discourse should be reality 
and truth: "... nature is the original and vital underlying principle 
in all cases . . . ." (129:45) Yet, echoing Cicero, Longinus maintains: 
The effect of elevated language upon audiences is not persuasion 
but transport. At every time and in every way imposing speech, with 
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the spell it throws over us, prevails over that which aims at per­
suasion and gratification. Our persuasions we can usually control, 
but the influence of the sublime brings power and irresistible might 
to bear, and reigns supreme over every hearer. (129:43) 
In another passage Longinus remarks (underlining added): 
Imagery is able in many ways to infuse vehemence and passion into 
spoken words, while more particularly when it is combined with the 
argumentative passages it not only persuades the hearer but actually 
makes him its slave. (129:89) 
Like the treatise On the Sublime, the authorship of the Ad C. 
Herennium has not been undeniably established. The Middle Ages attributed 
the work to Cicero, which was discounted in the fifteenth century. Although 
there is wide attribution now to Cornificius, Caplan (37) recommends 
ascribing the work to an unknown author. (37:ix) Speculation assigns 
the date of composition somewhere between 86 and 82 B.C. (18:307) 
Book four of the Ad C. Herennium. the oldest extant Latin work 
concerning style, accounts for half of the entire treatise. The author 
manages to discuss and illustrate sixty-five figures of speech and thought, 
in spite of the fact that names for the figures were not, at the time 
of composition, stable in Latin. (37:xxi) In referring to the plain, 
middle and grand styles, the author makes it clear that each gains 
"distinction from rhetorical figures." But each increment has a faulty 
counterpart: grand, inflated or swollen; middle, slack or drifting; 
plain, meagre. (18:267) 
Prerequisite to good style are proper taste, artistic composition, 
and distinction. Taste calls for correct Latinity and clarity; avoidance 
of barbarisms and solecisms: and the use of current and proper terms. 
Artistic composition emphasizes consistency and avoids hiatus, excessive 
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alliteration, homoeoptoton. hyperbaton, and transplacement (excessive 
repetition of words). Distinction is arrived at solely through figura­
tive language—figures of diction and figures of thought. (18:269-275) 
Figures of diction include all the Gorgianic figures; figures of repetition; 
various species of puns; maxim: hypophora; apostrophe; asyndeton; and 
aposiopesis. Tropes include antonomasia; nine species of metonymy; 
periphrasis; hyperbaton: six species of metaphor: catachresis; three 
species of allegory; synechdoche; and hyperbole. Figures of thought 
include example, antithesis. comparison and emphasis through various 
figures of diction. (18:275-409) The discussion of each figure includes 
an illustration, and conment on its use, effect, and abuse. The whole 
fourth book proceeds on the order of a handbook--crack organization in 
an easily-followed outline form. 
Summary. Aristotle's Rhetoric was the first adequate formulation 
of a rhetorical design. Rhetoricians before had concentrated on emotional 
appeals and stylistic excess on the one hand; or at the other extreme, they 
had placed too much emphasis on dialectic structure. Aristotle felt 
obligated to push all elements back into their proper perspective, 
perhaps at the sacrifice of a developed and comprehensive theory of style. 
He anticipated Quintilian, however, in at least two ways: (1) Aristotle 
urged stylistic device to be a function of clarity and propriety; and (2) 
he made the first primitive attempt to base rhetorical theory (including 
figurative language) on psychology. Aristotle and Cicero each symbolized 
what the other was campaigning against. And with over three hundred 
years of the development of figurative language at his disposal, Quintilian 
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seems to have recquisitioned the best of Aristotle and Cicero. The 
ubiquitous authors of the Ad C. Herennium and On the Sublime, no matter 
how bald and jejune they seem to be at times, do display a peculiar 
mix of Aristotelian prudence and Ciceronian flair. 
The stylistic theories of Quintilian and Cicero have the ring 
of real integrity—consistent fidelity to belief and observation. On 
the Sublime and the Ad C. Herennium don1t seem to have the sense of 
development, or experienced authority. In fact, there is the opinion 
that the Ad C. Herennium is a product of class notes. But in spite of 
any shortcomings that any one theory may have, the modern student cannot 
help but gape at the enormous insight these ancients had into the eddies 
of expression. They had such profound insight that after 1500 years, 
Renaissance theorists couldn't add anything new except illustrations 
and mnemonical devices for remembering the names of figures. 
Figurative Language in the Renaissance 
Emerging from the dank, brawling Middle Ages—troubadours, Dances 
of Death, mystery plays, the march of wars, famine and superstition— 
the rebirth of humanism opened Europe like an April morning laughing at 
Winter. The attitude that life was a "thurghfare ful of wo" waned from 
the persistent movement of the Renaissance northward from Italy. Flour­
ish and pomp in the courts swung wide; the advent of gunpowder antiquated 
hand-to-hand combat; the piquancy and challenge of the New World made 
men restless; and the rediscovery of Greek and Latin classics kindled the 
humanistic spirit and everywhere there was a new feeling in the air. 
The fall of Constantinople in 1453 sent Greek scholars fleeing 
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into Italy and Europe with ancient manuscripts. A complete copy of 
Quintilian appeared in a dusty tower in a Swiss monastery. (104:11,22) 
De Oratore and the Orator were brought out from an old cathedral chest— 
the impact was immediate. (15:44-45) During the Middle Ages rhetors had 
known only the De Inventione written by a youthful Cicero, and the Ad, C. 
Herennium. wrongly attributed to Cicero. Brutus was unknown during the 
Middle Ages. (149:19) With the invention of the printing press in the 
fifteenth century, Renaissance classicism entrenched itself: text, 
translations, and adaptations of classical writers were widely available. 
(15:9) 
The rise of the vernaculars. Like all living languages, Latin 
had evolved during the Middle Ages. And the Renaissance scholars dis­
covered just how far it had evolved from the pure Latin of Cicero. Call­
ing for a sharp break with medieval decadence, many scholars advocated a 
return to Augustan Latin, which, ironically, contributed to the eventual 
death of Latin as the common ground for ordinary speech. Led by Lorenzo 
Valla in his Elegantiae (1471), they studied the forms and style of Latin 
in the "great period." (15:5;41:102) 
Yet, Dante and Chaucer had prefaced the rise in the dignity of 
the vernaculars, and it wasn't so much that Latin waned, but that the 
vernaculars gained in popularity. Baldwin (15) observes: 
The language of literature, medieval experience had learned, must be 
the language of communication. So it had long been in Latin; so it 
had become, within medieval conditions, in Tuscan, French, and English. 
No subsequent change through Greek, or humanistic Latin, or even 
printing, more affected the outlook and direction of literature than 
the medieval rise of the vernaculars from literary acceptance to 
literary eminence. (15:6) 
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Dante, Petrarch, and Bocaccio bolstered the reputation of Italian; 
Joachim du Bellay's Deffense et illustration de la langue francaise 
argued the dignity of French as a literary transport (15:32); Chaucer 
had already demonstrated the brilliance of English; and Malory, More, 
and Spenser coaxed the full-blown acceptance of English. (15:27-38) 
For Renaissance theorists the common ground for rhetoric and 
poetic was style, as it had been since the Second Sophistic in the 
Late Empire. And as in the Middle Ages where rhetoric and poetic had 
often been confused and merged, Renaissance poetic was largely rhetoric. 
(15:189;41:99) Clark (42) comments: 
In the artistic degeneracy of late Latin literature both rhetoric and 
poetic paid less attention to structure and other elements which 
distinguished them, and more attention to style, which they had in 
common. Moreover, under the influence of sophistical rhetoric, 
preoccupied with style, poetic and rhetoric practiced the same 
rhetorical artifices. As a result Virgil might be either an orator 
or a poet. (42:99) 
With the rediscovery of Cicero's works cults of ,,Ciceronians,, developed. 
The answer to bracing the vernaculars was in the imitation of great 
models (like Cicero) and in the embellishment of the vernaculars with 
stylistic texture. (42:99-100) 
The Latin handbooks. With the rediscovery of Quintilian's 
Institutio Oratoria camean immediate effect on education. (104:1,22) 
The establishment of St. Paul's School (1518) where John Milton was 
eventually to be educated, was embued with Quintilian educational 
doctrine through and through by way of Erasmus (1466-1536). (41:100-101; 
104:11,22) His De copia verborum ac rerum (Paris, 1512), largely Cicer­
onian yet mitigating in Cicero's use of figures, became one of the most 
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widely used textbooks during the Renaissance, particularly in England. 
(149:20) Erasmus defines and illustrates the most frequently encountered 
figures in the De copia; De ratione conscribendi epistolas (Cologne, 
1522) gives even less consideration to the figures. However, his 
Ciceronianus sive de optimo dicendi genere clearly reflects the 
truncated Ciceronian. (149:21) He explains in a letter: 
Even if I could attain perfection in portraying the figure of 
Ciceronian phrase, I should prefer a style of speaking more genuine, 
more concise, more forceful, less ornate, and more masculine. And 
yet, though ornament at ion has been lightly considered by me, I should 
not spurn elegance when it comes of its own free will. However, 1 
have not time to polish what I write. (149:21) 
Erasmus was one of the earliest enunciators of the sane precept: "Write, 
write, and again write." Other writers were to advocate more extreme 
measures in the use of figurative language. 
The German humanist Fhilippus Melanchthon (1497-1560) followed 
Cicero and Quintilian in his study of rhetoric and the figures. (149:20; 
85:13;75:508) His Institutiones rhetoricae (Haganoa, 1521) and Elementa 
rhetorices (Wittenberg, 1531) provided later authors with source material. 
Elementa rhetorices contains approximately forty figures of thought 
classified according to divisions of logic (definition, division, cause, 
contraries, similitudes, genus, circumstances, and signs). (85:38) He 
states that figures will support argument or illuminate language accord­
ing to its application in the prose. (85:38) Yet unlike Mosellanus, 
Melanchthon referred the reader to Cicero and Quintilian for a fuller 
discussion of the schemes and tropes. (47:548) 
Fetrus Mosellanus (1493-1524), German professor of Greek at Leipzig 
University, published Tabulae de Schematibus et Tropis Petri Mosellani, 
42 
which, although not as readable as Erasmus' De copia. enjoyed considerable 
influence on English grammar schools. The work concentrates mainly on 
style. (47:548) Joannes Susenbrotus1 Epitome Troporum ac Schamatum 
(Zurich, 1540) was basically an amalgam of Mosellanus and Melanchthon, 
including a collection of 132 schemes and tropes. During the latter 
half of the sixteenth century it replaced Mosellanus as a standard 
grammar-school rhetoric. (47:548-549) Many of Susenbrotus' definitions 
are taken directly from the Ad C. Herennium, in spite of the fact that 
he cites Cicero, Quintilian, Erasmus, and Melanchthon as sources. (140: 
3-4) 
Championing certain Renaissance causes for order and tidiness, 
and a caustic departure from Aristotelian rhetoric, was Peter Ramus 
(Pierre de La Ramee) and his protege Omer Talon (Audomarus Talaeus). 
"Dissatisfied with the repetitiveness and vagueness that prevailed in the 
teaching of the subjects of the trivium. Ramus distributed the traditional 
parts of rhetoric between logic and rhetoric." (47:552) In Dialecticae 
institutiones (1543) the area of logic in the trivium subsidized inventio 
and disposition and to rhetoric was assigned elocutio and pronuntiatio. 
Memoria was simply ignored. (149:22;47:552) Ramus was responsible for 
only the one treatise on logic, but his collegue Talon published and 
disseminated the counterpart to the Ramist viewpoint: Institutiones Ora-
toriae (Paris, 1544) 
That rhetoric and dialectic were distinct from one another is 
fundamental to Ramus' thinking—and fundamentally contrary to the Aristo­
telian tradition. Ramus felt that a large part of the error and confusion 
in the arts had sprung up from scholars mistaking the proper subject 
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matter of the arts. (47:552) Therefore a neat and groomed division of 
traditional rhetoric seemed desirable—necessary. Since pronuntiatio 
"perished from neglect" in the Institutiones Oratoriae of Talon, rhetoric 
is almost entirely given over to a consideration of the tropes and 
figures. The Ramistic conception of rhetoric and dialectic, in its 
passion for sharp delineation, encouraged thinking of rhetoric in terms 
of "models conceived of as existing in space and apprehended by sight, 
rather than in terms of voice and hearing." (135:240) Thus, 
. . . figures have to do largely with the sound of words—among the 
figures are anaphora and other verbal repetition, rhythmic movement, 
and the quasi-acoustic effects of exclamations and apostrophe (fig­
ures of "sentence"). Hence, shying away instinctively from sound, 
and thus from figures, Ramist rhetoric will declare in favor of 
tropes when a choice between tropes and figures has to be made. 
This is a declaration against sound in favor of (silent) thought; 
but thought is conceived of in terms of (ornamental) structure, with 
the aid of a spatial model (turnings). (135:241) 
English rhetorics. Joseph (85) has remarked that the works of 
English rhetoric are original in little more than their illustrations. 
English sources principally depend upon Erasmus, Melanchthon; Ramus, 
Talon, Hosellanus, Susenbrotus; those in turn drew from Cicero, Quintilian, 
the Ad C. Herennium. and ultimately Aristotle, Isocrates, and Gorgias. 
(85:16) Joseph maintains that the English rhetorics are representative 
of three factions current in Renaissance Europe and England: the tra­
ditionalists, the Ramists, and the figurists. 
Preeminent among the traditionally oriented writers is Thomas 
Wilson (162), who published The Rule of Reason, Conteining the Art of 
Logike (London, 1551), and The Arte of Rhetorique (London, 1553). 
Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique is true to the classical conception of 
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oratory and sets forth what Bowers (162) terms a "sensible discussion 
of Ciceronian rhetorical doctrine." (162:v) Comprised of three 
sections, invention receives considerable emphasis in Book I, Book II 
developing methods of organization, narration, division, proposition, 
and conclusion. Book III discusses elocution, with consideration of 
eighty tropes and figures. (162:vi;85:35) Emphasized are the figures 
of amplification. 
For this was the outstanding need of the age—skill in expressing 
ideas in a language which was just coming into general use—not 
alone skill in elaborating and enlarging the bare statement, but 
skill in intensifying, making more striking and effective what one 
had to say. (156:111) 
Wilson's great contribution, according to Wagner (156), rests in his 
re-assembling of lost, strayed, or stolen doctrines of rhetoric. (156: 
108) By using examples from previous rhetors as well as many illus­
trations from English history, Wilson domesticated Ciceronian precepts 
and "rendered the text attractive to Elizabethan readers." (162:viii; 
149:28) 
Other traditionalists include Richard Rainolde (126), author of 
The Foundacion of Rhetorike (1563); Leonard Cox, The Arte or Crafte of 
Rhethorvke (London, ca. 1530); Raphe Lever, The Arte of Reason (London, 
1573); and Thomas Blundevllle, The Arte of Logick (London, 1599). (85: 
13-14) Patterned similarly to Mosellanus' De Primus apud rhetorem 
exercitationibus praeceptiones (Cologne, 1523), Rainolde's work is the 
only one that even gives a cursory treatment of the figures, and 
those only in relation to model orations. (149:30) Except for some 
of the illustrations, Rainolde's book is largely derived from Aphthonius' 
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Progymnasmata. a Greek work dating from the fourth century. (85:17) 
Cox's work is predominantly a reworking of Melanchthon's sections on 
invention. (85:16) The traditionalists are in the main Aristotelian 
in that they give relatively equal hearing to the traditional five 
parts of rhetoric. (85:16) And figurative language, if functional 
at all in the rhetorical scheme, is cast in the role of vehicle rather 
than an end in itself. 
As would be expected, the Ramistic school presented pairs of 
treatises—one on logic, another on rhetoric. The followers of the 
Ramistic orientation include Dudley Fenner, The Artes of Logike and 
Rhetorike (Middelburg, 1584); Abraham Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike 
(London, 1588), and The Arcadian Rhetorike (London, 1588); Charles 
Butler, Rhetoricae libri duo (Oxford, 1629); and John Hoskyns, Direc­
tions for Speech and Style (ca. 1600). (85:14) Talon's Institutiones 
Oratoriae. it should be noted, also enjoyed wide acceptance itself in 
English grammar schools. (149:22) 
Predictably, Fraunce's The Arcadian Rhetorike. for instance, is 
surrendered entirely to the figures of words and tropes. And since 
both Talon and Ramus insisted that the figures of thought based on 
the processes of dialectical investigation should be considered as 
belonging to logic (135:221), they are not included in the book. 
Fraunce includes only ten figures of thought (which appeal to the emotions): 
exclamation, apanorthosis. aposiopesis. apostrophe, prosopopoeia. 
addubitation. communicat ion, praeoccupation. sufference. and graunting. 
(135:221) For the Ramists logic and rhetoric must necessarily be 
studied together—for even though theoretically they believed it expedient 
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to have an un-messy ordering, in practice logic and rhetoric were 
inseparable. And although the Ramistic coverage of the classical 
canons of rhetoric is somewhat loyal to tradition—the difference 
resides in the perhaps arbitrary separation for purposes of study. 
Many of the contemporaries of the Ramistic persuasion criticized such 
an arbitrary division as an oversimplification—which it was. Yet, 
the Latin works of both Ramus and Talon, as well as the Ramistic 
English works, entrenched themselves in the grammar schools for that 
very reason—it made it easy for the beginner to grasp the subject. 
And, indeed, by the end of the sixteenth century the Ramistic school 
"had scored a complete triumph over the German-Lutheran school of 
Melanchthon and Sturm." (47:553) 
Sympathizing with Susenbrotus, the figuris*:#' conception of 
rhetoric was entirely by way of schemes of language and tropes. Yet 
as Joseph (85) points out, this can be deceiving: 
A closer examination of their work, however, shows that their 
concept of figures is so inclusive as to omit little of what has 
ever been included in a theory of composition, for the approximately 
two hundred figures of speech which they distinguish represent an 
analysis of practically every aspect of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. 
(85:17-18) 
The figurists include Richard Sherry, A Threatise of Schemes and Tropes 
(London, 1550), and A Threatise of the Figures of Grammar and Rhetorike 
(London, 1555); Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (London, 1577; 
second edition, 1593); George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie 
(London, 1589); and Angel Day, The English Secretorie (1586; the second 
edition of 1592 included "a declaration of tropes, figures, and schemes."). 
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Richard Sherry's work, the second rhetoric to be published in 
English, leans heavily on Mosellanus, Erasmus, Cicero, Quintilian, and 
the Ad C. Herennium. Sherry (139) campaigned for recognition and 
development of the English vernacular. (139:x) And although the work 
is poorly written with superficial treatment, artificial divisions 
of figures, and minus four-fifths of a broad view of rhetoric, it did 
provide English readers with a classification of the figures and a 
source for the figures "which would lend ornateness to the expression 
of an idea." (139:vii-viii) 
The chief source of Peacham's Garden of Eloquence is Susenbrotus. 
The theme is the achievement of a copious, amplified, ornate style. 
The most important source of examples for Peacham was the Bible, and 
secondly Cicero—although Peacham relied on many: Aristotle, Plato, 
Horace, Pliny, Seneca, Ovid, Chaucer, Gower, and "the new Shepherd's 
calendar," to name only a few. (122:21) Peacham (122) included all 
the figures that Susenbrotus had, with an additional fifty-odd more, 
bringing the total in the first edition to 184 figures, more than any 
other work in the history of style. (122:11;85:35) It is interesting to 
observe that between 1577 and the 1593 edition attitudes toward the 
figures changed, and in the 1593 edition Peacham pared the number of 
figures down to 165. (135:219;85:35) 
George Puttenham's (124) Art of English Poesie contains an ex­
tensive treatment of the figures in the third book, "Of Ornament." 
Although Puttenham admits that they pertain to oratory, he proceeds to 
demonstrate their application to poetry, giving examples from poetry. 
Puttenham tried to give many of the figures English names--although 
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never popular—and divided the figures into three groups: the "auri­
cular" appealed to sound; the "sensable" served "the conceit only"; 
and the "sententious" served "both the ear and the mind." (149:35) 
The first was to be used by the poet only; the second by both the poet 
and orator; and the third by the orator only. (149:35) The nephew 
of Sir Thomas Elyot, Puttenham says that he is seeking by his "nouel-
ties to s&tisfie not the schoole but the Court." (149:34) His illus­
trations are drawn from Sidney, Dyer, Raleigh, Wyatt, Surrey, and others. 
Foreign sources were digested thoroughly to emerge as Puttenham's. (149: 
35) Taylor (149) remarks: "When he names the figures, soraismus 
becomes mingle-mangle; epizeuxis, cuckowspell; hyperbole, loud lier." 
(149:36) Of the 121 figures which Puttenham defines, 107 have been 
traced to Quintilian. (42:91) 
Angel Day, carrying on the medieval vogue of letter-writing, 
developed some thirty methods of writing letters. (135:225) In his 
second edition of The English Secretorie, Day included a consideration 
of tropes and figures, taken mainly from Susenbrotus1 Epitome troporum 
ac schematurn. Marginal notes point out rhetorical devices in the examples 
included. (135:225) 
Conclusion. Renaissance Europe and England abounded in not only 
original copies of the classical writers, but good translations and 
adaptations. Clark (42) notes that the predominant method of Renaissance 
grammar schools was memorization: Greek and Latin verse; classical 
works on rhetoric; and English works and textbooks on rhetoric. (42:168; 
85:38) Often the tropes and schemes were themselves woven into mne-
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monical rhymes. (42:126-168) The rigors of the Renaissance grammar 
school would make the modern student weary. 
The works mentioned here are only highlights of the formidable 
list of sources available to the Renaissance writer. There were also 
the minor authorities, such as Lupus, Romanus, Rufinianus, Capella, 
Fortunatianus, Diomedes, Donatus, Bede, Blount, Sturm—the list is 
endless. With the wide ascension of the rhetoric of stylistic device, 
often the arbiter of good prose or poetry was use of ornament. (146: 
107-113) The importance of figurative language fluctuated during the 
sixteenth century, but by "-the end of that century figurative language 
enjoyed respected authority in the grammar schools, the universities, 
even the Elizabethan audiences. 
In spite of all the fervor and excitement over stylistic gadgetry, 
the Renaissance authors presented nothing that was strikingly new— 
except in illustrations, sub-divisions of species of figures, and the 
coining of new names for old figures. Disagreement among the proper 
names for a particular figure was common. For instance, while Puttenham 
had been inventing cute little mnemonical names to replace Latin and 
Greek terminology, Peacham was calling epiphora what other rhetoricians 
had called epistrophe. Even the classical writers often didn't agree: 
inversio. permutatio. and immutatio are all the same figure. Tudor 
rhetoricians certainly did not lack industry in their gleaning, yet 
many figures were left untouched—clausula, diabole. epagoge. hypo-
strophe. metabole. and others. (149:36) 
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PARALLEL LITERATURE 
As might be expected, the number of studies relating specifically 
to the transposition of rhetorical and literary constructs to the 
aesthetics or choreography of dance is dismal. The peculiar problem 
that dance has, is being able to talk about dance in specific terms. 
The teacher must usually show, or resort to allegorical epicycles in 
order to explain various features about dance. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to find the analogy between dance and language often used 
as a tool for explanation. "Metaphor" is often referred to, apparently 
indicating that dance has a mystical, magical leprechaun that somehow 
achieves sublime kinesthesia. Generally the discussion ends there. Or 
another example: How many teachers have said that a dance phrase is 
like a sentence? Hutchinson (83) even organizes "elements" of movement 
according to nouns, verbs, and adverbs. Nouns are the body and its 
parts; verbs include action and stillness; adverbs include time, dynamics, 
manner of performance, rotation, etc. (83:19) But these passing comments, 
to be picked like berries throughout the dance literature, are not 
pertinent to this study. They only illustrate the need for a descriptive 
terminology about dance. 
Munro (119) has written a book titled The Arts and Their Inter­
relations . in which he has attempted to compare the various activities 
that could be classified as art. This includes taxidermy and embalming 
beside dance and sculpture. Bases for comparison are medium, process 
and technique, nature of the products, as well as other related considera­
tions. He eventually arrives at a systematic classification of 400 arts 
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and types of art. Obviously the book is too general to be of use to 
this study. 
Kirstein (88) in Movement and Metaphor. and Zorn (166), in 
Grammar of the Art of Dancing, have both used a teasing title. Kirstein 
utterly fails to go beyond calling dance an "incomparable metaphor of 
humane possibility." (88:17) Zorn states: . .a Grammar of the Art 
of Dancing is a system analogous to those employed in teaching the 
language of drawing . . . (166:15) He then enumerates various 
basic positions of the feet, arms, and body. 
Blackmur (28) touches on the gestural content of language, 
stating that poetry achieves sublimity when the original gestural 
content is accounted for in the structural features of a poem. McLuhan 
(114) in Understanding Media has stated that the arts today function as 
a meta-metaphor of sorts: "And art . . . has the power to impose its 
own assumptions by setting the human community into new relationships 
and postures." (114:242) 
Wheelwright (157), in Metaphor and Reality, views metaphor as 
a semantic process not only to be found in language, but copiously 
about us in painting, music, and sculpture. Embler (61) speaks in 
similar veins in Metaphor and Meaning: "Patterns, shapes, and outlines 
express inner thoughts and feelings, give body and form to beliefs and 
doubts, hopes, ideals, needs." (61:14-15) 
Going a little further afield in consideration of parallel 
studies, perhaps other studies and works could be mentioned—yet to no 
purpose. For the process of transposition is by no means a unique 
one. Heuristic explorations are common. The literature pertinent to 
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this study is in relation to the separate elements involved in 
transpositions. 
AESTHETICS 
Since the.nature of language and dance are necessarily quite 
different, transposition of the terms of one to the other must be 
transacted on a higher plane of abstraction where they are not so 
different. This might have been done in several ways: (1) Both 
language and dance could have been translated into the terms of any 
number of established aesthetics, but the shortcomings of this 
approach are that most general aesthetics do not account for the 
peculiarities of the dance medium—the human body and its unique 
inherent semantical implications. (2) Another primitive approach 
might have been to force established terms in dance into the matrices 
of rhetorical and literary constructs—naive and wholly unsatisfactory. 
(3) Practically the only approach left open was to focus on the process 
of symbolism, and the path of a "meaning" from referent to perceiver, 
via symbolism—something both media have in common. 
Langer's (98,99,100) theory was chosen for several reasons: (1) 
she makes a distinction between discursive and presentational symbolism 
that is clear and precise; (2) she was one of the first theorists to 
consider the unique problem of the aesthetics of dance (among other 
firsts); (3) Langerian-influenced writers have extended and developed 
many of Langer's original ideas; and (4) whether by coincidence or not, 
Gendlin (72) articulates a theory of symbolism compatible with Langer's. 
Although Langer's theory alone would not be sufficient for conceiving 
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this study, her theory in combination with later developments makes it 
precisely eligible. This section of the chapter, then, will attempt 
an overview of the operative theories in conceptualizing this paper. 
The fundamental rubric upon which all other theories used in 
this study articulate, is found in the following quote from Philosophy 
in a New Key: 
Language in the strict sense is essentially discursive; it has 
permanent units of meaning which are combinable into larger units; 
it has fixed equivalences that make definition and translation 
possible; its connotations are general, so that it requires non­
verbal acts, like pointing, looking, or emphatic voice-inflections, 
to assign specific denotations to its terms. In all these salient 
characters it differs from wordless symbolism, which is non-discur­
sive and untranslatable, does not allow of definitions within its 
own system, and cannot directly convey generalities. The meanings 
given through language are successively understood, and gathered into 
a whole by the process called discourse; the meanings of all other 
symbolic elements that compose a larger, articulate symbol are 
understood only through the meaning of the whole, through their 
relations within the total structure. Their very functioning as 
symbols depends on the fact that they are involved in a simultaneous, 
integral presentation. This kind of semantic may be called 
"presentational symbolism," to characterize its essential distinction 
from discursive symbolism, or "language" proper. (99:89) 
The Ellfeldt-Metheny theory of movement is conceived in the 
sense of being a "presentational symbol." Their theory has been 
reviewed earlier in the chapter and does not need repeating here. 
Langer states further that a dance does not consist of movements 
qua movements, but of the vital import of those movements: 
The primary illusion of a dance is a virtual realm of Power—not 
actual, physically exerted power, but appearances of influence and 
agency created by virtual gesture. (98:175) 
Predicating her theory on dance as illusion, Sheets (138) has 
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developed a phenomenological aesthetic of dance In The Phenomonology of 
Dance. Sheets emphasizes that for a dance to be perceived, it is the 
created illusion, a form-in-the-making, that must be lived. Further, 
our ability to "pre-reflectively intuit" a dance is predicated on our 
everyday habit of exactly the same thing. She states: 
In an affective context of everyday life, a pre-reflective awareness 
of the body and the body in movement is supported bg actual feeling. 
In dance, a pre-reflective awareness of the body and the body in 
movement is supported bjr the form of a feeling. (138:46) 
Phenomenologically, then, dance is an illusion, whose form is spatially 
unified and temporally continuous. And as an illusion of force, it 
must be perceived as a form-in-the-making. "The actual components of 
force which underlie the illusion of force are plastic, and as such, 
are transformed into qualities of movement as a revelation of force." 
(138:57) And finally she states: 
Dance is developed according to its own logical demands. It need 
not follow the exact shifts in intensity, the exact durations, the 
exact sequence of flow in the form of the actual feeling of which 
it is symbolical. The sheer form is a plastic form because it is 
abstracted from the continuum of feeling and affective consciousness 
of everyday life. It is created and presented as a concrete and 
significant form in its own right: it is a form which is complete 
in and of itself. (138:67) 
In this brief consideration of Sheets' theory, the writer has tried to 
emphasize the ideas most pertinent to this study. For a fuller under­
standing of her description of dance, it is suggested her book be read. 
Her book is a far more explicit discussion of her topic than a summary 
could hope to attain. 
Gendlin (72), in Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, has 
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enumerated seven modes of symbolism, which "do not reduce to each other 
and cannot be 'reconciled' with each other." (72:90) These are (1) 
direct reference; (2) recognition; (3) explication; (4) metaphor; (5) 
comprehension; (6) relevance; and (7) circumlocution. Each will be 
briefly touched upon here. 
Direct reference is an Individual's "reference to a present felt 
meaning, not a reference to objects, concepts, or anything else that 
may be related to the felt meaning itself." (72:94) The distinguishing 
feature of symbols involving direct reference is that there is no con­
ceptualization in the symbolic process. Gendlin explains that a "felt 
meaning" is the "directly felt, experiential dimension" of the signifi­
cance of something to us. (72:1) 
Besides logical schemes and sense perception we have come to 
recognize that there is also a powerful felt dimension of experience 
that is prelogical, and that functions importantly in what we 
think, what we perceive, and how we behave. (72:1) 
For instance, in trying to remember how we fixed the television last 
week, we ask ourselves, "Was it this?" or "Was it that?" No, these 
suggestions don't fit the feeling we had when we fixed it last week. 
Or, if indeed it was "this" or "that," we cry, "Yes, that's it," because 
the felt meaning of how we did it coincides with our suggestions. Or, 
to use Gendlin's example: 
Consider the sentence: "Democracy is government by the people." 
Now, note your experiencing in reading the words. Probably you 
have taken the words in, felt that you know some of their meaning. 
Probably, you did not pause to make the meaning of democracy 
explicit to yourself in words. Rather, the merely felt, implicit 
meaningfulness you experienced was sufficient for you to understand 
what was said about democracy. 
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If you now try to define the term, you can observe what you do. 
In attempting to define it, you concentrate on your felt sense of 
its meaningfulness. Words to define it will arise, as it were, 
from this act of concentration on the felt meaningfulness. (72:91) 
Direct reference then is a symbol that directly refers to a 
felt meaning. It performs the function "of marking off or specifying 
'a1 feeling, and thus making our attention (our reference) to it 
possible." (72:97) He further comments, "symbols function as markers, 
pointers, or referring tools that create 'a,* 'this,* or 'one' feeling 
by referring to 'it.'" (72:100) 
Recognition "refers to the case where symbols adequately 
conceptualize." (72:100) That is, recognition symbols "call forth in 
us" felt meanings. "Zenobia" (the name of the cat I petted today) is 
the symbol (in quotation marks) for calling forth the felt meaning, the 
significance to me of a particular gray cat. "In recognition the symbols 
appear to mean independently." (72:102) For instance, we see our 
friend flapping his hand at us: we have the felt meaning of "goodbye-
ness." 
Explication, Gendlin explains, is description: 
In discussing recognition we have been speaking of symbols as 
presented to us first. Felt meaning was called out in us by symbols 
and did not occur unless symbols performed this function. However, 
felt meaning, once it is called forth, can itself be prior to other 
symbols that can explicate the felt meaning. (72:106) 
For instance, I utter the symbol "Zenobia," which calls forth the felt 
meaning of the furry gray cat. Now that I have the felt meaning of the 
furry gray cat in my mind, other symbols occur to me, capable of 
further symbolizing this felt meaning in more articulate terms: playful, 
57 
mischievous, capricious, and soft. Or, once I have the felt meaning of 
"goodbyeness," I may recognize the reason my friend has his lips 
curled under and is shuffling away. "... Symbols follow upon symbols 
endlessly in this way. However, felt meaning functions in each transi­
tion!" (72:107) Yet important always to bear in mind is that a 
symbol can be anything—a word, an object, a number of objects, a situa­
tion, a feeling, a human movement—anything that fulfills the roles of 
symbols here discussed. 
The metaphor "applies the symbols and their ordinary felt meaning 
to a new area of experience, and thereby creates a new meaning, and a 
new vehicle of expression." (72:113) 
. . . the symbols of the metaphor have two different felt meanings— 
the old one, in general use, and the new one, in the metaphor. The 
old, felt meaning of the symbols is that of recognition. The symbols 
"mean" because they call forth a felt meaning. With the metaphor 
we turn to a new, higher order. A new kind of relationship of 
"symbolism" is established--now no longer between a felt meaning and 
symbols, but between a complex of felt meaning and symbols on the one 
hand, and some new felt meaning on the other. (72:115) 
Metaphor is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Comprehension is similar to explication, but in a metaphorical 
sense. Gendlin explains: 
Let us say that fan artist] has a felt meaning or many felt meanings, 
and wishes to symbolize them. No extant symbols exactly mean his 
felt meaning. Hence, he seeks to put symbols together in a new 
may so that these symbols will create that experience in fan audience], 
or in himself qua gtudiencej. When he succeeds, he cries out, "Yes, 
that's exactly what I mean!" To invent a metaphor to express a 
prior felt meaning is "comprehension." 
For instance, we might want to choreograph a dance on "goodbyeness," to 
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recreate in an audience the whole host of feelings that accompanied a 
sad farewell, but that a wave of the hand or a shuffling of the feet 
doesn't alone symbolize. So we might invent a theme movement, that 
combined these two movements, as well as one or two additional 
movements that also had a feeling of "farewell." 
Relevance is a short version of the phrase, "relevant felt 
meaning, from out of which symbolization is understandable." (72:128) 
. . . Almost all meaningful symbols require the presence, in a 
person, of many, many relevant meanings or experiences. This fact 
is usually expressed by saying that "past experience" is necessary 
for understanding. The same fact is expressed by saying that one 
must understand the "context." If one does not have the felt meaning 
called "understanding the context," one will only grasp a very 
limited, superficial part of a symbolization. "Context" may mean 
the preceding discussion, the preceding actions, or it may mean 
twenty years of experience shared by some persons, but not by others. 
In all these examples, felt meanings function to make symbolizations 
understandable, yet these symbolizations symbolize only some few 
specific felt meanings, not all those necessary for understanding. 
(72:128) 
Then, for instance, we would take our "goodbye" theme movement, and 
manipulate it; vary the spatial, temporal, and dynamic features of the 
movement, to explore every hue and subtlety of "goodbyeness." 
In circumlocution "a felt meaning is created in a person by means 
of symbols that do not symbolize that felt meaning." That is, a new 
felt meaning is interpolated by circumnavigation with other felt meanings. 
The creation of the felt meaning occurs over many steps, each step 
being a creative modification of the felt meaning (which, at the 
same time, functions as a relevance, from out of which this next 
modifying step is understandable). 
Each of the symbols (Including things, persons, situations, acts, 
and so on) is already meaningful in itself (recognition) and these 
felt meanings Interact (as in metaphor) creatively to produce new 
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felt meanings, that is, modifications of "the" felt meaning being 
gradually created. (72:135-136) 
Art may be viewed as circumlocution in which someone actually 
does arrange experiences for someone else, in order to create in 
him a given felt meaning. (72:136) 
Perhaps to make our dance on "goodbyeness" even more intense, we might 
add a contrasting theme, to intensify the feeling of farewell. This 
might be a very energetic or frenzied movement theme. (This is not 
to imply that circumlocution can then be reduced to "contrast.") 
Here in thumbnail fashion is Gendlin's theory of symbolism, 
which will be of direct service in later chapters. The convenience of 
this theory is that it is not tied to a particular subject matter, but 
is a row of pigeon holes. It is our task now to insert the subject 
matter--words, movements, objects, whatever--as symbols. 
This last section in the chapter attempts to give the reader an 
aesthetical peepshow—an overview of the aesthetical undercurrents 
operative in the inventive sections of this study. But it is pertinent 
to mention other aesthetical literature relating to dance, albeit not 
used in this study. They include the Bauhaus ideas, the thoughts of 
Graham, Humphrey, Wigman, Cohen, Delsarte, Cunningham, Hawkins, Turner, 
and H'Doubler. 
The effect of the Bauhaus movement of the twenties on dance, was 
to focus the choreographer's attention on the spatial-structural features 
of movement design. That is, movement was conceived as composition of 
straight, diagonal, circular, and elliptical lines. (33:1) Further, 
theatre dance was conceived as largely a collaboration of technology 
and the choreographer, which expanded the potential of movement design. 
(134:4) Summarizing the Bauhaus* approach to dance, Schlemmer, choreo­
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grapher of the "Triadic Ballet," noted the following in his diary in 
1922: 
Das Triadische Ballett, Tanz der Dreiheit, Wechsel der Eins, 
Zwei und Drei, in Form, Farbe und Bewegung, soil auch die Plani-
metrie der Tanzflaeche und die Stereometrie der sich bewegenden 
Koerper, jene Dimensionalitaet des Raumes erzeugen, die durch 
Verfolgung elementarer Grundformen wie Gerade, Diagonale, Kreis, 
Ellipse und der Verbindungen untereinander notwendigerweise ent-
stehen muss .... (33:2) 
Although unique, the Bauhaus still remains an approach only. The ideas 
inherent in the movement were never crystallized into a broad movement 
theory. 
Graham and Humphrey, both pioneers in modern dance, articulated 
ideas on movement, but once again never developed them into detailed 
aesthetics. Graham's theory was that all movement comes from the center 
of the body and all movement is comprised of contracting or releasing 
muscles—quite true and a terribly practical notion. And it has given 
rise to an entire dance style respected around the world. Yet, Graham 
has never carried the idea further, nor considered other problems in 
the philosophy of dance. Similarly Humphrey propounded that all 
movement was either a giving in to gravity, or a recovering from gravity—• 
fall and recovery. Again the style is the most outstanding feature of 
the Humphrey school of thought. And although Humphrey wrote her thoughts 
in a book, her purpose was to explain how to choreograph, rather than to 
realize a philosophy of choreography or dance. 
H'Doubler's (77) theory of dance, explained in Dance: A Creative 
Art Experience, is girdered along more traditional aesthetics. Her 
thinking is similar to Dewey's in that dance as art has organic unity. (77: 
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101) Structural features of form—particularly significant form—are 
climax, transition, balance, sequence, repetition, harmony, variety, 
and contrast. (77:108,144) Content is regarded as "artistic emotion," 
being differentiated from normal emotion as "a controlled and selected 
image recall." (77:119) And her terms "representative and manifestative" 
are a parallel to Langer's "discursive and presentational" symbolism. 
Langer's theory, however, becomes the more articulate for dealing with 
this study, if for no other reason than Langer's terms are more limited, 
and everywhere is the feeling of "workable insights." However, H'Doub-
ler has certainly filled a function with her theory in education. 
Delsarte (40,137,164,167), probably one of the first to theorize 
about gesture, developed a complex theory based on the triune division 
of the human being (intellectual, emotional, and physical). (40:281) 
These divisions were in turn restricted through time, motion, and 
space, and all movement followed nine basic laws of gesture. (40:281) 
Although many of Delsarte's ideas are still held to be valid, many have 
been superseded. His expressed purpose in formulating the theory was 
more for pedagogy, rather than philosophical analysis. 
Cohen's (44) "A Prolegomenon to an Aesthetics of Dance" is 
appropriately a popular aesthetics of dance. Explaining that the basic 
expressiveness of movement may be stylized in many different ways to 
produce various kinds of dances, Cohen successfully introduces the 
student to a consideration of the philosophy of dance. But the theory 
is far from developed (she never presumes it is)—disqualifying it as a 
tool for this study. 
Gesture for Wigman (160) was the moving body as well as the still 
human body. Wigman's movement has often been called primordial and 
primitive. But Higman too, as so many other artists, has not gone to 
the trouble of formulating her ideas into a tight theory. She comments: 
"I do not propose to erect a general system for I am a firm believer 
in individual freedom." (160:409) 
Various contemporary choreographers have developed ideas in 
dance, yet none have extended their thoughts into a unified system. 
Cunningham, first experimenter with chance, developed the idea that all 
movement comes out of stillness. This parallel's Cage's philosophy 
that all music comes from silence. (155:6-7) Nikolais' dance often 
utilizes technical means to extend movement expressiveness, and to de-
emotionalize dance movement. (155:9) Hawkins has intimated the 
phenomenologist's view of dance in his comment "The dance of pure fact 
is dance before it is language, before it has meanings." (155:16) 
And many others have contributed opinions and thoughts about dance, yet 
none go so far as to write their thoughts down in a way that could be 
a tool for philosophizing. 
Turner (153,154,155) has attempted to write a philosophical 
description of non-literal dance in her various works. For Turner, dance 
is a sensed experience, "whose value to the perceiver is determined by 
its overall impact on him"—an intuitive impact to be sure. (155:5) 
Turner discusses non-literal dance at length, but succeeds in summarizing 
the state of modern dance, rather than providing an accurate insightful 
philosophy of contemporary dancie. Selected thoughts from the above have 
been used in this study where pertinent. 
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CHAPTER III 
TRANSPOSITIONS: TROPES 
The tropes to be given consideration in this chapter include 
the following: allegory, antiphrasis. antonomasia. asteismus. cata-
chresis. hypallage. hyperbole, irony. metalepsis. metaphor. metonymy. 
onomatopoeia, parody, pathetic fallacy, personification. sarcasmus. 
simile, syllepsis, synecdoche. and transferred epithet. In the 
process of casting these various constructs into higher planes of ab­
straction, it shall be seen that some figures merge to become one 
abstract construct; others completely disappear. The procedure with 
each transposition will be: (1) description of the literary construct, 
with reference to pertinent studies when available; (2) statement of 
a generalized model, which means in most cases abstracting the construct 
sufficiently to exclude its sole literary application; (3) insertion of 
movement as raw material (instead of words), to form the corresponding 
dance construct; and (4) discussion and illustration where appropriate 
(Labanotation and pantomimic description). 
METAPHOR AND SIMILE 
Probably the most common device of figurative language is the 
metaphor. Even after 2500 years, professional literature still does 
not agree on how a metaphor works. Three pertinent theories will be 
discussed: the substitution view, the analogical view, and the inter­
action view. 
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Definition of the metaphor will be delayed until each theory can 
be examined specifically. Loosely described, however, a metaphor is a 
statement, which when read literally, is absurd; when read figuratively, 
makes sense. For instance, "That man across the table from me is a 
pig," is a metaphor. Literally speaking, the man is not a pig at all. 
What we perceive, however, is not the absurdity of the statement, but 
those notions of "pig" that might also apply to the man across the 
table. That is, the man probably is gobbling his food, not wiping his 
moustache, and making noise when chewing. Since we generally are not 
accustomed to speaking in absurdities, our first reaction is to rule out 
intentional absurdity, and in a moment of flash intuition, we perceive 
the "intended" meaning. Other examples of metaphor are, "He has a 
carrot instead of a nose;" "Yeah, that's Jerry. He married a rhino-
cerous;" "It's the Army's special dish—roast tractor-tire." 
A Substitution View 
The substitution view of metaphor is exactly that. "Richard is 
a lion," means the same as "Richard is (brave)." The literal paradox of 
the statement forces (30:361;31:320) the reader to associate the most 
commonplace connotations of "lion" with "Richard." A connotation that 
might occur on mention of lions is "brave." So in our search for logical 
meaning, we substitute the most readily associated connotation for the 
word "lion." The substitution makes the statement forceful, often more 
convenient. (87:227-228;27:454;143:301) The point of similarity in 
the substitution theory is generally the most applicable within the 
context. (27:458;79:434) Since there is no context here, one could 
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tenably make the association of bravery with the lion, rather than 
other possible associations (i.e., that Richard is also a baritone, 
has a wet nose, or licks the side of his face with his tongue). The 
substitution view of metaphor allows the reader to methodically (usually 
instantaneously) retrace the common ground between "Richard" and "lion," 
making the inference that "Richard is (brave)." This view of metaphor 
can be paraphrased, although often at a loss in poetic tension. 
In Philosophy of Rhetoric, Richards' (128) "tenor and vehicle" 
make it equally clear how "meaning" is transferred from one part of the 
metaphor to the other. (128:96-97) The subject is "Richard." The 
vehicle which delivers the point about Richard to the reader is "a lion." 
The tenor, or underlying meaning, is the most conspicuous thing about 
lions—in this case we might say "bravery." Therefore, the tenor is 
"Richard is very, very brave." (90:49-50) 
Wheelwright's (157) discussions are particularly instructive in 
the substitution view of metaphor (underlining added): 
Since the essential mark of epiphor—which is to say, metaphor in 
the conventional Aristotelian sense--is to express a similarity 
between something relatively well known (the semantic vehicle--lion) 
and something which, although of greater worth or importance, is 
less known or more obscurely known (the semantic tenor—the bravery of 
Richard), and since it must make its point by means of words, it 
follows that an epiphor presupposes a vehicular image or notion 
that can readily be understood when indicated by a suitable word or 
phrase. (157:73) 
Others (19,20,107) substantiate that position. 
The Analogical View 
Similar to the substitution view of metaphor. the analogical view 
is closer to an implied or elliptical simile. Black (27) explains: 
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It will be noticed that a "comparison view" is a special case of a 
"substitution view." For it holds that the metaphorical statement 
might be replaced by an equivalent literal comparison. (27:455) 
Consider "He has an iron will." The metaphor moves in a slightly 
different way here, since the meaning most available is that, "as iron 
is hard, unbreakable, and resilient, so his will is tenacious, uncom­
promising, and enduring." The analogical view of metaphor "provides a 
more elaborate paraphrase," a ratio that is literally true of both 
poles in the metaphor at the same time. The substitution view impli­
cates a single, usually obvious, common ground. (27:456) For a concise 
discussion, the reader is referred to Dickie (57). 
It is important to note that both modes of metaphor involve 
metaphoric transference of meaning—epiphor. Qualities associated with 
the subsidiary subject are made to enhance one's understanding of the 
principal subject. The vehicle operates to enlarge comprehension of 
subtleties in tenor. The context generally tells us which is the 
principal subject and which the subsidiary. That is, we generally would 
not take connotations that occur to us about Richard, and apply them 
to a lion (i.e., that lion has a charming smile, wears stylish clothes, 
and has a way with words). That merely compounds the absurdity. 
The Interaction View 
So far the transference of meaning has been in one direction. 
The bravery of lions enhances our understanding of Richard, and the 
attributes of iron enhance our understanding of "his will." Diaphor. 
or the interactional view of metaphor. has transference in both direc­
tions: "two thoughts of different things active together and supported 
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by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their 
interaction." (128:93) For example, in 
My country 'tis of thee 
Sweet land of liberty 
Higgledy-piggledy my black hen. 
(157:78) 
there is very little similarity, common ground, or analogical relation­
ship between the two parts of the metaphor. Yet through their juxta­
position the poet manages to convey an anti-patriotic meaning. Each 
part has a "system of associated commonplaces, . . . but the important 
things for the metaphor's effectiveness is (sic) not that the common­
places shall be true, but that they should be readily and freely evoked." 
(27:458) Wheelwright (157) describes this type of semantic movement 
as "fluid" language rather than "block" language (90:4): "Here the 'move­
ment' (phora) is 'through' (dia) certain particulars of experience (actual 
or imagined) in a fresh way, producing new meaning by juxtaposition alone." 
(157:78) The reader is forced to connect the two ideas. (128:125) 
There are commonplace connotations associated with the movement 
of the human body. The body bends in the middle when we want to sit, 
extends when we want to reach something. Most bodies do this. Most 
bodies are not capable of isolated rib-cage shifts, multiple turns, 
or balancing on the metatarsals of one foot for any length of time. 
Also it is evident that there is a homogeneity of connotations attached 
to different parts of the body—the head thinks, the hands possess 
dexterity, the leg kicks, the pelvis sits. That is, the pelvis does 
not think, the elbows don't have alarming dexterity, and heads normally 
don't kick. One could call the front of the body more "vital" than its 
opposite—perhaps even more compelling. We can't fly and we normally 
maintain upright stances. Under special circumstances we allow our­
selves to be prone—sleeping, fixing the car, sun bathing. And most 
people can perceive if someone does not wish to be prone (as in tripping: 
"Are you hurt?"). In short, commensurate with circumstance there is a 
normal range and repertoire of human movements. This could be called 
"movement normality," the edges of which admit to penumbra. 
Human gesture, the reader will recall, can forage from instinc­
tive and "autistic" gestures, to highly complex systems such as the 
deaf and dumb sign language. It includes the monosyllabic thumb of 
the hitchhiker along with cutaneous communication (blushing, perspiring, 
etc.). Gesture appeals to all the senses, including the kinesthetic 
sense, although only rarely the olfactory or gustatory. Gesture includes 
mimesis, symbolic, and signific gesture, all of which are affected by 
situational cues, motivation, personal experience, social situations and 
environment. And all this in turn is subsidized by cultural context. 
Gestures can be as diverse as winking an eye, a happy walk as opposed to 
a sad walk, slouching in a chair, kicking the ground in disgust, or 
smiling. And it is relatively easy to feel a cluster of connotations 
attaching to a smile, or the wink of an eye, through convention, exper­
ience, or inference based on situational cues. But it is important to 
recognize that we may not always be able to verbally describe the meaning 
of a gesture, even though the meaning is clear to us. For instance, a 
sigh from someone waiting in line may imply impatience. But the word 
"impatience" may not account for the whole host of other fleeting 
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connotations that may also be present. In other words, most gestures 
in ordinary experience make sense to us—not always in a verbal way, 
as the word "peace" might be a synonym for the gesture representing 
it, but in the countless ways that gestural nuances support everyday 
communication. 
And coursing through our use of gesture is an intuitive syntax 
that guides us in understanding the gestures of our associates: there 
is a cluster of proprieties attached to gestures—even gestures that have 
never been done before. One need only envision a priest sticking out 
his tongue in a juvenile manner during high Mass. (We would think, 
"That doesn't make sense—is he going mad?") Teachers learn the differ­
ence in attention of a student slouched on the lower spine, and a 
student sitting erect, with one knee periodically bouncing. A nervous 
speaker communicates his insecurity through nuances in the voice and 
autistic quirks of movement, subtle gestures that are involuntary. 
Relying on experience and the specific situation, humans have no 
trouble in communicating feeling apart from words. 
The successful metaphor in language is predicated on paradox. 
When literally read, the metaphor is absurd. But when the appropriate 
associations are made, the metaphor has the potential of force, surprise, 
specificity, and freshness. One could say the potential of metaphor 
articulates on the literal use of language. The question now to be 
addressed is, what is the literal use of movement? The answer is the 
"normality" associated with the movement of the human body. (The head 
thinks, the fingers are dextrous, etc.) We can depend on others under­
standing our gestures, provided we move in ways commensurate with the 
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body structure, the social situation, our culture. Even with gestures 
that have never been done before, if the cluster of connotations that 
surrounds them supports the meaning in a normal way (the counterpart 
in language is "in a literal way"), we generally are able to intuit 
what is being emphasized. The primary distinction between movement 
in everyday life, and movement in dance, is that dance movement is not 
normal, but predicated on normality. 
Choreographic Epiphor 
Recalling that epiphor is the transference of meaning in one direc­
tion, consider the following example. A mime is sitting on a table. 
Another mime walks toward him on stage, and puts his hand out as if to 
shake hands. The mime sitting on the table, instead of responding with 
his hand, puts his foot in the other mime's hand, and then they proceed 
to shake "hands." People don't actually shake hands like that. Yet 
there is enough residual "normality" for us to recognize it as "a hand­
shake with qualifications." There is a transference of meaning involved. 
As the use of "lion" colors our perception of "Richard," so the use of 
the foot colors our perception of the handshake. Connotations of feet 
(perhaps calloused, cold, smelly, stubby toes, etc.) are added to 
connotations of "handshake," to give an entirely different meaning. 
In the literary epiphor. we depend on a substituted word having 
a relatively discrete cluster of connotations. Generally we are certain 
which connotations are to be associated, if the metaphor has been 
skillfully written. (That is, we know that the connotation of "having 
a mane" is not the connotation of lion that was intended to apply to 
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Richard.) In dance, "discreteness" of connotations is usually controlled 
by the use of thematic movement, costumes, dramatic approach (although 
this approach is fast becoming superseded by other modern forms), and 
other devices such as these. Yet denotation of movement is still not 
conventionalized, as words are. Conventionalized meanings are found 
in pantomime, through mimesis and conventionalized gesture. We must 
conclude therefore, that the choreographic epiphor works with discrete 
units of meaning generally found in pantomime. Yet the epiphor very 
often is operative in non-pantomimic dance. And the way it is operative 
is the same way that we cast adjectival metaphors, such as "He has an 
inky brain." (We know that isn't literally true.) 
Notice the rhythmic pattern of theme A in Figure 1. Suppose this 
were a theme of movement and its manipulation comprised the first part 
of an A-B-A dance. Assume for illustration that the rhythmic pattern 
was manipulated in such a way that there was no doubt in associating 
the rhythm with the theme. A cursory glance at the B theme will show 
that it is a contrasting theme. In the final meshing of the two themes, 
could not epiphor account for the resultant meaning? The explanation of 
how the meaning is transferred might be described by (1) the first the­
matic section established a semantical connection between the rhythm, 
and the "semantic aura" of the theme movement; (2) the theme B movement 
was in direct semantic contrast to the meaning of theme A; (3) by juxta­
posing the rhythm of theme A on movement of theme B, the transference of 
residual meaning of theme A via rhythm is added to the meaning of theme B 
movement, thus providing an example of-non-mimetic, choreographic epiphor. 
And if one removes oneself from the above train of thought, and reflects 
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on what an A-B-A form in reality accomplishes, it will be discovered 
one of the achievements of the final meshing is semantic tension, force, 
freshness, and surprise--an exact parallel. The transposition works 
intuitively, as well as logically. 
One must remember that the basis for the success of the choreo­
graphic epiphor. as illustrated above, rests in establishing a "relative 
normality," a semantical status quo for the first theme. That is, we 
must have been sensually impressed with the relationship between the 
kinesthetic semantic of the movement of theme A, and its rhythm: a 
kinesymbol must have been created that is in tune with a felt meaning. 
Only then may we reason that semantic tension results in the later 
juxtaposition. As MacCormac (107) points out: "Word combinations can 
only be judged to be metaphors if we know what is the normal meaning of 
each term." (107:242) And once more it is wise to remove ourselves 
psychologically from the argument presented, and examine intuitively what 
in reality happens: is any one theme capable of becoming a kinesymbol, 
that remains in our sensibility long enough to be contradicted by a 
second theme, and then finally be juxtaposed with a contrasting theme? 
The evidence of course is in the nearest A-B-A dance or variation 
thereof (A-B-A-C-A, A-B-AB, AB-CB-ACA, etc.). 
Does this argument then mean that any contrast in movement is an 
epiphor? We can only answer yes, when we add the qualification "if 
there is absurdity otherwise." It was noted earlier that metaphor was 
predicated on paradox. The absurdity of a statement forced us to make 
the semantic association. It would seem to apply also in dance. For 
example, we could envision a woman, moving very slowly and successionally 
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on stage. Wham—enter the man in mid air with virility. We can certainly 
sense the contrast, but it is difficult to sense transference of mean­
ing in one direction or the other. We would need more familiarization 
with one or the other themes, and then see them juxtaposed. We must 
be able to sense transference of meaning. 
Another question might be asked--what constitutes absurdity in 
dance? We are not speaking of absurdity in the "slap-stick, pie-in-the-
face" sense, but sensing that an on-going, form-in-the-making is not 
kinesymbolically consistent. Sensing an "un-fitness," an inconsistent 
explication (in Gendlin's sense) of the meaning-aura of the movement, 
is absurdity. Most people remember having told a student, or having 
been told by a teacher, "that phrase just doesn't fit—it's not right;" 
or "the sound of this word grates on our sensibility;" or "that's not 
part of your theme movement, and you have given no indication that you 
will start another theme, or deal more with this new element." All of 
these comments were most likely prompted by sensing absurdity, or, the 
microcounterpart to absurdity, unfitness. 
Metaphor, as MacCormac (107) points out, is intentional absurdity, 
but with a very specific purpose. The juxtaposed elements are compati­
ble enough that semantic transference can take place. It is the surface 
absurdity that forces us to make the association, and which gives us 
the sense of freshness and surprise. 
Choreographic Diaphor 
Just as in the written diaphor. the choreographic diaphor is 
supported on a "mutual interaction" of semantics. Each movement in dance 
has a "felt meaninĝ 1 attached to it—a very specific felt meaning that is 
in part moulded and shaped by the movements around that one movement. 
We perceive a dance as a continuum of felt meaning. That is, we are 
not aware of dancer A doing this particular thing with his arm, while 
dancers B, C, and D are doing something else. We see through this, as 
Langer might say, to perceive the "vital import" (the felt meaning) of 
the dance. When the person next to us sneezes loudly, the form-in-the-
making—the illusion—is broken for that instant, and the continuum of 
felt meaning is interrupted. 
As we are perceiving the form-in-the-making, we are at the same 
time perceiving a "forward development" of felt meaning, an explication, 
as Gendlin would say. We do not know what the final development will 
be, but each new felt meaning that is added to the forward flow is 
perceived iji light of the accumulated felt meaning to that point, and 
the new felt meaning jUi turn alters the accumulated felt meaning to 
that point. That is, the felt meaning in us as audience, is constantly 
being shaped, altered, and made more articulate, and made very specific. 
When a new movement does not contribute to the "forward develop­
ment" of felt meaning, we say the dance has not been sensitively choreo­
graphed, or we perceive a break in the illusion. But we still have the 
urge, the instinct, to try to fit this unfitting movement into the 
flow of meaning in a logical way. The sense of developing meaning is 
stronger than the temptation to distraction. And so in an instantaneous 
flash of perception, we try to make the felt absurdity consistent. We 
reshape the accumulated felt meaning at that instant to resolve the 
apparent absurdity and thus to continue the consistent flow of meaning. 
Diaphor. then, is the operative in shaping the felt meaning we 
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are perceiving. It will be recalled that transference of meaning in 
diaphor is in two directions. That is, portions of felt meaning in 
each of two juxtaposed elements replace each other. They "interact" to 
form a new felt meaning. It will be seen, then, that diaphor is quite 
common in dance, because it does not depend on discreteness of felt 
meanings. That is, in epjphor. we must be able to sense an absurdity 
articulating on a previously established, or intuitively logical felt 
meaning. Epiphor transfers a connotation from one element to another, 
always assuming, however, that each of the two elements have a fairly 
defined (in terms of felt meaning) denotation, as in language. The 
diaphor takes the felt meanings of the two elements—at that moment in 
time and space--and they interact to form a new meaning. 
This of course opens the door for allowing degrees of absurdity 
by which diaphoric tension is accomplished. On the one end of the spec­
trum is the completely absurd "dance of the absurd," where the dance 
consists of absurdly diverse elements, as in Cunningham's "Winterbranch." 
"Dance by chance" has the device of absurdity built into it by virtue of 
chance—there is no premeditated development of felt meaning. Although 
one must note that although many dances begin on the premise of chance. 
what emerges from chance operations is then manipulated consciously by 
the choreographer. Yet the roots of the dance still remain in chance, 
with varying degrees of subsequent development. On the other hand is 
the normal, common, non-dramatic, non-literal, purely kinetically realized 
dance. As in Figure 2* the felt meaning of dancer A's movement interacts 
with the felt meaning of B's movement, and vice versa. We can easily 
sense an "unfittingness" if we stop to analyze it. The interaction is 
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mutual, and we are at once assaulted with interaction of design, dynamics, 
felt meanings of body parts, and rhythm. The repetition of A's right-
arm movement makes it one of the focal points of the interaction. 
The next thing that occurs in the discussion is, "Oh, diaphor 
is merely contrast, or counterpoint, or contrasting themes—that's 
simple." To reduce diaphoric interaction to such pigeon-hole terms is 
to miss the point in explaining how movement meanings interact and build. 
The transference of meaning is not a necessary consequence of contrast 
alone. "Diaphoric interaction" as a term implies our awareness of felt 
meaning being shaped, being made vital. "Counterpoint" as a term is of 
course useful, but wholly unsatisfactory in describing why and how and 
what. 
Simile 
The simile, as MacCormac (107) explains, is of the same conceptual 
fabric as the metaphor. (107:240) Conceptually, the simile disappears 
when raised to a higher plane of abstraction. There is very little 
difference between "He is a pig," and "He is like a pig." That is, 
the essential difference between metaphor and simile by definition, is 
that the simile uses the specific words, "like" or "as." MacCormac 
says: 
To say that there is a major conceptual difference between the 
sentences "Han is a wolf" and "Man is like a wolf" is to miss 
the point of how the comparison between the two referents takes 
place. (107:240) 
We would have to be able to recognize counterparts to the words 
"like" or "as" in movement if one were going to make such a transposition. 
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The counterpart does present itself, however, albeit to no particular 
philosophical interest. For instance, envision moments from Nikolais' 
"Kaleidoscope." In conceptualizing a description of the dance, we might 
say the dancers move as though they had plates on their feet (which they 
do), and we then see all felt meanings through the window of such a 
device as plates on the feet. Perhaps another example is in order. 
Envision a dance with the dancers completely hidden inside jersey bags— 
all that is evident is the dancers' "pokes" and "jabs." If we were going 
to follow the simile model point for point in the transposition, we 
should expect to recognize a counterpart to the words "like" or "as." 
The device of putting the dancers in jersey bags could be the word "like," 
or "as." The choreographer has put the dancers in jersey bags, because 
it was the only available device for getting at the felt meaning he was 
trying to achieve. If we were going to verbalize the choreographer's 
intention, he might have said: "The felt meaning I am trying to achieve 
is like dancers moving in jersey bags." We don't normally walk around 
in jersey bags, but seeing dancers in jersey bags forces us into an "as 
though" frame of reference. But the transposition seems to be no more 
than a mere formality, since epiphor also accounts for its philosophical 
description.* Perhaps mention could be made of the various species of 
*Brown (32) feels the distinction between metaphor and simile is 
more than the words "like" and "as." He says "in reality such a distinc­
tion is at best superficial: the difference, both from a literary and 
from a psychological point of view, lies deeper. In the first place 
metaphor has a higher poetic quality. Emotion deliberately holds them 
apart and views them separately. The formal nature of the introductory 
"as" or "like" brings a pause, a slackening, and a certain coldness. 
(32:120) 
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simile which also conceptually disappear. They are apologue, catachresis. 
dissimilitude, fable, homoeosis. hypallage. icon, parabole, paradigma. 
and transferred epithet. 
METONYMY AND SYNECDOCHE 
MacCormac (107) maintains that metonymy and synecdoche are included 
in the very broad concept of metaphor, as Aristotle had conceived meta­
phor. that once one conceptualizes metaphor. metonymy and synecdoche 
again disappear. But they are particularly mentionable here, since the 
devices are already at peak use in the choreographer's world. 
Metonymy is of four species: (1) substituting the cause for the 
effect (speaking of gray hairs when we mean old age); (2) container and 
contents ("Drink your cup, it's time to go."; (3) possessor and the 
thing possessed ("The crime was punished."); and (4) an office or 
occupation and its sign, symbol, or significant accompaniment ("the 
loyal supporters of the throne"). 
Synecdoche is of three species: (1) substitution of the physical 
part for the whole, and vice versa ("All hands on deck."); (2) genus and 
species ("Give us this day our daily bread."); (3) the material and the 
thing made of it ("He kicked the pigskin through the goalposts."). 
(32:149-160) 
The device known as "transposition" in choreography consists of 
substituting the movement of one body part in the theme movement, to 
another part of the body. The parallel is obvious. The interesting 
point to consider is, how does such a device affect felt meanings? In 
literature, the result is very close to metaphor, in that the substitution 
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forces us to envision the entire entity involved. For instance, referring 
to gray hairs instead of old age forces/reminds us that old age is more 
than a concept--one's body changes. The substitution succeeds in making 
the resultant meaning richer. It forces us into an explication (in 
Gendlin's sense) that is both private and instantaneous: "loyal 
supporters of the throne" conjures up felt meanings of a throne (richly 
decorated, perhaps the king himself sitting in it, ruling sedately, wisely), 
as well as the man who is the king (tall stature, keen eyes, eloquent 
speech). 
And so with metonymy and synecdoche of movement: transposition of 
the movement from one body part to the other integrates a number of felt 
meanings, provides unity, and encourages non-verbal richness of semanti­
cal stuff. Burke (34) further brings out that an entire work of art is 
often synecdochic. in that whole blocks of a dance, for instance, are 
infused in other parts of the dance. (34:428) It is also Brown's (32) 
thesis in The World of Imagery that metonymy and synecdoche. among 
other figures, are images most of the time. And thus, one could include 
metonymy and synecdoche in a category of imagery. But the mere cate­
gorizing of the figures is not in order here, although mention of metonymy 
and synecdoche will be made when imagery is considered. 
ALLEGORY, IRONY, PARODY, AND SARCASMUS 
Allegory and irony do not present themselves to transposition in 
non-literal dance, for each is predicated on narrative. Allegory is an 
extended narrative which carries a second meaning along with its surface 
story. Irony (antiphrasis) is similar, except that the underlying 
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meaning is a contrary to the surface meaning, providing very often 
situational tension, which in turn results very often in tragedies. The 
treatment of the two figures is then automatically transferred to narra­
tive dances, that make use of the figure in the same way that literature 
does. 
Sarcasmus. and its sister figure, mycterismus. are both taunts, 
designed to infuriate an adversary—sarcasmus being the more blatant. 
The transposition implies a narrative dance. 
Parody is a figure possible in non-literal as well as dramatic 
dances. It is often called a "spoof on The figure primarily 
works through inexact imitation, where the object of the ridicule is 
imitated to the point of vague recognition, but varied enough to make it 
look silly, futile, or tragic. A prime example of parody is Graham's 
"Acrobats of God," in which the dancer's daily life is brilliantly 
satirized through imitation with variation. It is important to point 
out that a parody very often has integrity of its own. But if the 
object satirized is known at all to the audience, the satire will so 
color the surface integrity of the dance, that the entire dance will be 
seen as a ridiculous version of the object satirized. 
HYPERBOLE 
Hyperbole is simply extreme exaggeration or extreme diminution. 
Being one of the basic factors in most art media, it needs little dis­
cussion here, for exaggeration, augmentation, and diminution are found in 
virtually every medium known to man. In dance, exaggeration produces 
abstraction, for purposes of projection, humor, variation, strength, or 
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bathos. Generally in dance the space of a movement is the exaggerated 
or diminished factor, although accents can be made larger, or smaller, 
as well as dynamics. The technique is so widely in use in the arts that 
it needs no further discussion. 
PUNS 
Pun is the genus—the species vary. The genus is defined as "a 
play on words based on the similarity of sound between two words with 
different meanings." (150:388) There are four species of puns; antana-
clasis, syllepsis, paronomasia, and asteismus. (85:165-167) Joseph (85) 
comments that puns 
. . . have their roots in the logical distinction between the 
various meanings of a word, and depend for their effect on the 
intellectual alertness necessary to perceive the ambiguity. These 
figures may be adapted to comic or to serious purposes. (85:165) 
In the transposition of a pun, a pertinent observation is the dependency 
on the logical distinction between the various meanings of a word. The 
implied point is that there are at least two or more meanings (denotations) 
to a given word. The "sameness" in a pun refers to the homonymic quality 
of some words. 
Humphrey (82) gives an example of the use of a pun with dance— 
although it is the use of language with dance, not the use of the 
structure of language transposed to dance. But her example is worth 
mentioning: 
For example, in a short study in three parts called "Life," each 
section was introduced with words spoken by one of the dancers, and 
then interpreted. They went: "Life Is a Call; Life Is a Flower; 
Life Is a Cauliflower." (82:129) 
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It is questionable, however, that without the accompanying spoken words 
the same punny effect would have resulted. Is it possible to have the 
same effect exclusively with movement? The structure of a pun would seem . 
to indicate a dwelling on the discursive aspects of movement--gesture 
and mimesis. The following transpositions are offered as examples of 
the various species of puns. 
Antanaclasis 
The antanaclatic pun gets its bite from repeating a word which, in 
the repetition, shifts from one meaning to another. (85:165) For 
instance, "They went and told the sexton, and the sexton tolled the 
bell" (150:388), is an antanaclatic pun. Consider Figure 3. The homonym, 
of course, is A's right index finger. The first meaning is the conven-
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tional gesture meaning "Come here;" dancer A is beckoning dancer B to 
approach him. When dancer B arrives, the finger movement no longer 
has the meaning "Come here," but has switched functions to another 
meaning. The second meaning of the finger movement is tickling. The 
finger movement has remained spatially and temporally constant, but 
the meaning has shifted—thus, an antanaclatic pun. 
Syllepsis 
The sylleptic pun "is the use of a word having simultaneously 
two different meanings, although it is not repeated." (85:166) Shake­
speare provides an example: Beatrice says, "If the Prince be too impor­
tant, tell him there is measure in everything, and so dance out the 
answer." (85:166) Figure 4 illustrates a sylleptic pun. Envision an 
arbitrary situation—say a satiric dance on bars and saloons. Suppose 
one dancer were to walk up to the bar and order two packages of cigarettes 
in the manner shown in Figure 4. The gestural homonym is the upheld 
index and middle finger. The first meaning is of course the number "two" 
(the dancer would like two packages of cigarettes). The second meaning 
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Figure 4. Syllepsis 
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of the gesture is the "holding of a cigarette," which is pantomimed 
(suggested by the deflation of the lungs in a characteristic way). The 
specific pattern in space of the fingers did not change, and the two 
meanings were evoked from that pattern—the sylleptic pun. 
Paronomasia 
Paronomasia "differs from antanaclasis in that the words repeated 
are nearly but not precisely alike in sound." (85:166) The example is 
an involved one: 
A farmer had a horse, in whose mane many birds were making nests. 
A veterinarian told the distraught farmer to feed the horse yeast 
every day for a week. It worked. The birds went away, the nests 
fell out, the farmer was happy. Yeast is yeast, and nest is nest, 
but never the mane shall tweet. 
Figure 5 illustrates the paronomatic pun. The first meaning of the finger 
gesture-will be recognized as the "OK" sign, having a relatively homogeneous 
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Figure 5. Paronomasia 
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cluster of connotations and denotations that means "everything is 
acceptable." The second element of the pun is the peeking through the 
"OK" sign as a non-discursive meaning (perhaps a flirtation?). The 
spatial pattern is partially changed, but still has the required 
"homonymic quality," and as such, qualifies as a paronomatic pun. 
Asteismus 
Asteismus is a figure of reply "in which the answerer catches a 
certain word and throws it back to the first speaker with an unexpected 
twist, an unlooked-for meaning." (85:7,167) For example, Pete says, "Do 
you want to take the elevator up instead of walking?" Dan replies, "Just 
for the elevate?" For the transposition, imagine a spoof on authority. 
The circumstance will be in a slum. Suppose that several ghetto imps are 
taunting a policeman until he becomes so distraught that his head wrenches 
itself in an uncontrollable vibratory rotation each time the jokesters 
get one-up on the cop (Figure 6A). Then imagine the imps finally coming 
up to him, intrigued. They start shaking their heads "no," as in Figure 
6B. The first meaning is that of an unnerved cop, a palsy (the rotation 
of the head which is indicative of the upset demeanor of the policeman). 
The second meaning is the act of the imps "disagreeing" with authority— 
which they would be expected to do in such a situation (the rotation of 
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the head to indicate "no"). The homonym is the rotation of the head— 
responded to in an unexpected meaning. In the sense that the spatial 
pattern is not exactly the same, the transposition would also fit into 
the paronomasia matrix. 
But these puns are discursive puns--they depend on the audience's 
knowledge of the two different meanings when they walk into the auditorium. 
Is there such a thing as a non-discursive pun? One step in that direction 
might be the last example. The distraughtness of the cop was established 
as being symbolized by his palsied rotation of the head. A meaning was 
established--whenever he became upset or unnerved, his head would rotate 
uncontrollably. Therefore, the choreographer would have freedom to pun 
copiously on that established meaning. So in a non-discursive pun, 
one must establish a meaning that will be associated with a particular 
movement, very similar to choreographic epiphor. (This would, by the way, 
make it discursively symbolic, which in turn disqualifies it as a non-
discursive pun.) Theoretically, this all sounds fine. But focus on 
several questions perhaps is in order: (1) how long will it take to 
establish a fixed meaning to a movement in a non-discursively symbolic 
dance without beating the audience over the head with endless repetition, 
emphasis, etc.?' and (2) once the "fixed meaning" is established, will 
the audience be able to recognize its definite play on a double meaning, 
and be able to differentiate it from simply another manipulation of 
movement? One would think that the subsequent pun would be confusing, 
too contrived, or simply taken as another manipulation of a previous 
movement. 
Again, the success of a pun depends on the "intellectual alertness 
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necessary to perceive the ambiguity." This would of course also be true 
in dance. For those members of the audience who are alert and perceive 
dance puns, the meaning of the dance will be enriched. For those that 
don't, they still have the "single" meaning (either one) to hold onto. 
The structure of the dance pun is one specific of the more 
broadly-based choreographic device known as "manipulation." But the 
transposition of puns is serviceable in that it points up subtleties of 
manipulative technique. Perhaps knowledge of the dance pun, and how it 
works, is part of a body of refined devices that, after a choreographer 
had mastered the larger "tools" of choreography, he could then tinker 
with choreographic punning. The pedagogical value of the transposed pun 
is the recognition that there are "genres of technique" in the overall 
devices of repetition and manipulation. 
CONCLUSION 
After having dived so deeply into the trivia that a transposition 
must necessarily be, one must once again emerge for a broader look at 
what has happened. What is the point of putting so much time and energy 
into transposing? If such figures as hyperbole, synecdoche and metonymy 
are already in existence in choreographic technique, isn't it simply 
pedantry to enumerate them? How practical is knowing about epiphor and 
diaphor? These questions and others must be answered constantly to 
prevent the entire study from shading into complete confusion. 
Meaning in dance has been studied by many writers, written about 
by a handful, and aspects of it successfully described by the precious 
few. The distinguishing feature of any trope is the changing of meaning. 
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Felt meanings are shaped and welded and stretched and dissolved. In the 
time since dance came under serious aesthetic scrutiny, the problem of how 
movement means, has charmed and defeated countless writers. And in the 
past when writers have considered how an entire dance means, the resultant 
theory has usually—with a cherished few exceptions—spiraled into maple 
syrup: "Dance means, because it is the essence of life" (hand over the 
heart, please); "dance is the image of life!"; "dance is the soul and 
spirit of the universe on wings." And so it goes monotonously: undefined 
terms, loose logic, brazen assumptions, defeated in the locker room. 
By pointing out that there are specific ways that movement combines 
to form meaning, and to shape meaning, we are one step further. If we 
can distinguish between non-literal dance, and dramatic dance, we have 
cut the problem in half. The dance field and its theorists must be 
willing to use available literature, wherever it can be found. If we 
know there are parallels in other arts, we can tap the parallel literature. 
Particularly with the literature on tropes is this true. It tells us 
how certain tropes work. And if we are careful in our thinking, it 
can suggest new ways of thinking about movement, and how .it means, and 
combines. And ao a transposition is so exactly parallel that it doesn't 
even need discussion. We are clarifying the scope of inquiry. The more 
we understand movement from fresh perspectives, the more primed is our 
sensibility to probe ill-defined areas. It is hoped the choreographer 
will recognize that there is more to describing a choreographic technique 
than just "manipulation," or "transposition," or "development." These 
"sumnary" words can actually be broken down, and various techniques of 
achieving manipulation, for instance, can be examined. 
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It is not the purpose of this study to maintain that all meaning 
and changes of meaning in dance are accounted for in this consideration 
of tropes. These transposed tropes, to be sure, are only a hatful. 
Perhaps they could be united into one broad theory. Perhaps another 
theory will deflate them to nothing. But the important thing is they 
can be examined, and criticized, and reworked, and tossed out. "Dance 
is the essence of life" cannot be examined with any degree of accuracy. 
The foregoing transpositions are bite-size inroads to a theory of meaning 
in dance. Bite-size is better than no sandwich at all. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TRANSPOSITIONS: A PROLEGOMENON TO MOVEMENT LOGIC 
The problem addressed in this chapter is the transposition of the 
logical figures of rhetoric, as accounting in part for the non-verbal, 
logical process of choreographing movement in dance. These figures 
include enthymeme. syllogism, and epichiereme. along with various species 
of syllogistic figures. 
DEFINITION OF LOGIC 
The phenomenon to be described is as slippery and ethereal as a 
gnome; just when the treasure is at hand, the picture suddenly clouds, 
and is gone. The kind of logic to be described here is not what one 
uses in logical discourse, where cause and effect relationships are 
often empirically provable, or capable of being diagrammed, or other 
such channels to final validity. Turner (155) describes movement logic 
as "the sense of the articulation and ordering of movement guided by 
neuromuscular skill and kinesthetic awareness; an intuitive sense of move­
ment order." (155:3) The logic referred to here, then, is an intuitive 
logic, and all that can be hoped for at this time is instilling in the 
reader a "felt meaning" for what is being described. 
In criticizing students' work, the teacher must ask very often, 
"Why did you do that movement here? Why do you have this many dancers 
entering at this time? Why do you repeat this phrase here, instead of 
later? What is the arm doing there—it doesn't fit." And these questions 
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find their counterpart in all other media. Why does the artist do 
certain things at certain times? Traditionally, the pat cluster of 
answers were, "for balance," "for transition," "for contrast," "for 
sequence," and the host of others. And very often those are the 
major reasons. But always trotting behind, just out of sight, is 
another reason, subtle and indescribable. It is an intuitive, non-verbal 
reason that can only be reached by the gross description: "The movement 
just seems to fit." This chapter attempts to describe why certain 
things fit, and why others don't. It is this sense of "fitness" which 
comprises choreographic logic. It is the sensing of harmony--or better, 
compatibility--between two felt meanings. 
The logic of movement doesn't confine itself just to dramatic 
dances--where if a movement varies from the discursive "mental libretto," 
then it is illogical. The logic of movement penetrates all dances 
except those which are choreographed completely by chance—if any dances 
are choreographed completely by chance. Yet, even dances by chance 
often have strains of logic in them, often by chance, often in the 
specific way the choreographer planned or handled the "structure" that 
produced the chance. Movement logic also takes into consideration the 
context: scenery, lighting, costumes, number of dancers, as well as the 
movement context. 
DISCUSSION 
We have already noted the elements of gesture and movement, and 
reviewed the pertinent theories. We have noted various examples where 
a certain gesture was not "logically" related to the context in which it 
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was done (a priest sticking out his tongue in a juvenile manner during 
high Mass, or the speaker who fidgets around). It now remains to 
examine logic with movement that cannot be described with words. 
When we see the movement in Figure 7A, we perceive many things— 
it has a rhythmic pattern; certain parts of the body are predominant; 
there is a certain space defined by the body as it moves; there is a 
certain amount of implied space—the arm, the front of the body, etc.; 
and there is a certain dynamic pattern. But as Sheets (138) says, we do 
not perceive these things separately—it is a form-in-the-making, 
evolving in time as well as space and energy. We in essence, "see 
through" the more mundane mechanics of the movement, and see simply the 
"illusion" of the movement as a potential symbol (as Langer would say). 
The movement itself has a cluster of connotations that, if we were to 
enumerate them, it would take pages. But an example of some of them might 
Figure 7. Evolution of a Felt Meaning 
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be: the direction of the movement is first up-ness, then down-ness— 
aspiration and defeat; the arm is our most convenient extender of the 
body—when we want to reach something, the arm is the most available; 
the face is looking at the reaching of the arm, the performer is 
perceiving what he is reaching and jumping for; the stoop at the end 
has an aura of depression (the body curling into itself), of hopeless­
ness; the jump itself has energy—perhaps an expression of strong 
desire; the turn in the air is perhaps an indication of deflected 
aspiration. We might go on guessing what the felt meaning of the 
movement would be, but fully knowing that we are describing some people's 
felt meaning, and brazenly ignoring other people's. Perhaps the felt 
meaning cannot be achieved in words, which are symbols. Perhaps the 
symbol that best describes the felt meaning we experience is the move­
ment itself. We could arbitrarily add contextual items, that would 
articulate, diminish the felt meaning. That is, we could shape the 
felt meaning by adding a context. Suppose we put an orange tree next Co 
the dancer, with an orange just out of reach. This contextual addition 
so colors our perception, that we can perceive nothing but, "He wants 
that orange very badly." Or suppose instead of staring at the floor at 
the end of the movement, his face ends up inches away from a girl's 
face, and she has been lying on the stage all this time. It pushes the 
felt meaning in a completely opposite direction—perhaps flirtation, 
perhaps love, perhaps something else. Make the stage bright red. The 
addition of this one perceptual feature provides a whole different mood 
in which we perceive the movement. Put the dancer in an elastic bag, 
and all is abstracted out except the "pokes" and "puffs" of the bag— 
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dynamics and rhythm and direction. 
Let us add another movement, as in Figure 7B. The movement in 
Figure 7A, by itself, has its own felt meaning—its own aura of conno­
tations. The felt meaning that is symbolized by this movement is capable 
of being shaped, and extended, and refined. By adding the movement of 
Figure 7B on the end of it, we have accomplished several things. We 
have started a forward movement of felt meaning. That is, we discover 
with Figure 7B that our first felt meaning isn't the end of it. We 
aren't through perceiving. It isn't time to reflect yet. There's more--
a point that violently affects our perception of Figure 7A. Because 
instead of the felt meaning of Figure 7A becoming a crystalized, staid 
felt meaning, we must allow that first felt meaning a flexibility. We 
must now be prepared to reshape that first felt meaning. 
Another thing accomplished is a context for Figure 7B. We can 
no longer perceive that movement in an isolated fashion, with its own 
felt meaning, but must perceive Figure 7B .in light of Figure 7A. We 
have begun what Gendlin (72) would call an explication. He says: 
". . . felt meaning, once it is called forth, can itself be prior to 
other symbols that can explicate the felt meaning." (72:106) And then 
we can add another movement, and another, and soon we have an entire 
dance. And what is happening inside each perceiver is: first we have a 
small felt meaning, symbolized by the first movement of the dance. And 
then that felt meaning is altered slightly by the felt meaning of the 
movement following the first. And then say the third movement merely 
adds to our growing, dynamic, shaped felt meaning. And pretty soon we 
have a felt meaning that is the result of an entire dance's-worth of 
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small changes, additions, articulations and growth—a very deeply, 
richly intuited felt meaning. And the last movement of the dance signals 
the moment when we may take the time and attention to reflect, and relish. 
All this of course assumes there were no distractions along the way, 
and that there was a sense of logic throughout. Which brings us to 
the main point of this section--logic. 
Consider the diagram in Figure 8. There are four boxes, which stand 
for four separate movements. Around each box are small shapes (dotted 
lines), which stand for potential felt meanings of that particular move­
ment. The larger shapes (solid lines) are the context in which all felt 
meanings are perceived. The heavy dashed line is the evolving felt meaning 
in each perceiver. Let us suppose that the first movement is the movement 
of Figure 7A. The potential felt meanings of that movement included 
"he wanted an orange very badly" as well as "flirtation." And we must 
say here that the potential felt meanings of any one movement are endless. 
The actual felt meaning of a movement is the felt meaning that exists 
in the actual context. If we change the context, we alter the felt 
meanings. With just the Figure 7A movement, we have a felt meaning that 
is specific to the movement that symbolizes it. By adding the Figure 7B 
movement, we alter the Figure 7A movement, as well as perform the Figure 
7B movement in a context. This abstracts out of our perception other 
would-be contexts (i.e., that he wanted an orange, that he was flirting). 
By virtue of ignoring some potential felt meanings, we have started a 
forward evolution of felt meaning in specific channels, and more important­
ly, in a particular area of felt meaning. We are diminishing the subject 
matter of the felt meaning. It is being articulated, and refined. We 
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Figure 8. Effect of Context on Felt Meaning 
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could return to the felt meaning of "he wanted an orange," but we would 
have to do it soon; otherwise, we would be too far afield in felt 
subject matter. It would appear illogical. 
Notice in Figure 8 that as the evolving felt meaning (in us as 
perceivers) passes through each movement, the felt meanings of one move­
ment shape the context for the felt meanings of the next movement, and 
at the same time exclude potential contexts from consideration. If we 
were to toss in a movement, with felt meanings that were not supportive 
of the semantical direction, we would say, "The movement doesn't fit. It 
isn't logical." And some dances are so refined and subtle in felt 
meanings, that it only requires a slight indiscretion of a movement to 
put the logical flow off key, resulting in what is called "a mediocre 
dance." One finger can distract the flow of felt meaning. One bad 
performance that glosses over the exactness of the space originally 
choreographed, results in comments like, "I've seen that performed by 
such and such a company, and it was spine-chilling. This company just 
doesn't have what it takes." And we say the sensitive dancer is one who 
can sense the logical flow of the movement—as well as the evolution of 
felt meaning. 
The reader will recall Gendlin's (72) sixth order of symbolization— 
relevance. He remarks: "... almost all meaningful symbols require 
the presence, in a person, of many, many relevant meanings or experiences. 
This fact is usually expressed by saying that 'past experience' is 
necessary for understanding." (72:128) The past experience is the 
experience we as audience have had as moving. human beings.We 
should not expect a person who has spent his entire life in an iron lung 
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to have as much of a sense of felt meaning in movement of the human body 
as normally active people. So, in actuality, we have a "presence" of 
felt meaning in us at every waking hour (perhaps even when we're asleep). 
When we climb into the taxi cab, there is a felt-meaning-presence about 
what we are doing, unless we happen to be preoccupied with the felt 
meaning of our son having wrecked the family car that afternoon. But 
assuming that we are not preoccupied, when we are riding in the cab, 
there is a felt meaning of sitting in the cab, perhaps mingled with the 
expectation of attending the dance concert. And the felt meaning 
changes hues, as we pay, buy our ticket, seat ourselves, and the curtain 
opens. Perhaps we have the felt meaning of "expectation," and the felt 
meaning of our own movement experience. But inasmuch as we came to see 
"a dance," we try to mark a line between what JLs the dance, and what is 
not the dance. We block out the person sneezing beside us, if we are 
able. The masking on stage helps us focus our attention, and thus 
exposes our felt meaning presence to, just the dance. When we have 
seen the dance, we have added to our experience one more felt meaning--
one more texture to our ability to intuit kinesthetic felt meanings. 
ENTHYMEME 
In this discussion the logical figure enthymeme is meant to also 
account for its prototypes, which include syllogism, sylloeismus. sorites. 
prosapodosis. epilogue, dialysis, apophasis. aetiologia. and epichiereme. 
The reasoning behind this is that the process of thought is similar in 
all forms; it is just the magnitude, and the discursive assets of the 
specifics that vary. Therefore, once the transposition has been raised 
101 
to a higher plane of abstraction—that is, out of the realm of discourse— 
the constructs tend to merge. The prototypes will be touched upon, 
however, wherever relevant. 
Perusal of enthymeme scholarship reveals certainly one very incon­
trovertible point—people don't agree. From pre-Aristotelian days right 
up through Bitzer (26), the enthymeme has enjoyed an undecided, capricious 
existence. All authors agree, however, that an enthymeme depends on 
syllogistic reasoning. A syllogism is an assertion of a major premise, 
a minor premise, and the casting of an appropriate conclusion. In order 
for a syllogism to be valid, it must have three terms, the middle term 
being distributed at least once. Take for instance, "All members may 
vote. John is a member. Therefore, John may vote." This is a syllogism 
(its dialectical intricacies need no discussion here), a form of reason­
ing in which a conclusion is drawn from two premises, subject to various 
rules of logic. (See Corbett (47) for an excellent analysis.) 
It is important to point out that a syllogism may be formally 
valid, and yet still be false. For instance, "All nouveaux riches eat 
macadamia nuts. John D. Rockefeller is nouveau riche. Therefore, 
John D. Rockefeller eats macadamia nuts." The formal aspects of the 
argument are impenetrable. The fallacy lies in the truth of the major 
premise. For a syllogism to be valid, one must grant the truth of the 
premises. 
Enthymeme has been variously defined. Baldwin (14) argues that the 
essential difference between a syllogism and an enthymeme is in concrete-
ness. (14:13) Cope (46), DeQuincy (cited by Bitzer, 26), and Mudd (118) 
take the position that syllogisms are certain and apodeictic, and 
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enthvmemes have roots in probability. (26:400) McBurney (113) draws 
the difference in formal validity and the probable premises of enthv­
memes. (113:58) Bitzer, in criticizing the theories, notes that 
Baldwin fails to consider that "many syllogisms have particulars as the 
subjects of their conclusion, and many enthymemes have abstract ideas 
as the subjects of their conclusions." (26:403) In opposing Cope, 
DeQuincy, and Mudd, Bitzer quotes Aristotle: "Enthymemes based on Infall­
ible Signs are those which argue from the inevitable and invariable." 
(26:402) McBurney's position that the enthymeme is a formally deficient 
syllogism is dissected by Bitzer, who reminds that many syllogisms are 
also formally deficient. And even though enthymemes have at least one 
proposition omitted, the implicated reasoning may easily be, and often 
is, formally intact. (26:403) 
Bitzer allows the occasional truth of the authors' positions but 
emphasizes that they don't distill the essential difference between the 
two forms. Bitzer's stand of the enthymeme being an elided syllogism 
is stated in a very special sense: 
The enthymeme is a syllogism based on probabilities, signs, and 
examples, whose function is rhetorical persuasion. Its successful 
construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of speaker 
and audience, and this is its essential character. (26:408) 
That is, at least one of the propositions must be provided by the audience. 
For instance, it may take any one of the following forms: "All qualified 
members may vote. He is a qualified member. (Therefore, he may vote.)" 
"(All qualified members may vote.) He is a qualified member. Therefore, 
he may vote." "All qualified members may vote. (He is a qualified mem­
ber.) Therefore, he may vote." In each case, the completion of the 
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syllogistic reasoning depends on the audience filling in one of the 
propositions (those in parentheses) from its common stock of knowledge. 
Therein resides the persuasion. The audience provides one of the 
premises or the conclusion in their own mind--a sort of self-persuasion. 
According to Bitzer, the argument is not completed (and therefore not 
valid) unless they do. Further, when one proposition is not stated, 
fallacious reasoning is less likely to be detected. This obviously 
contributes to the increased likelihood of acceptance by the audience. 
(26:408) Crucial to the completion of enthymematic reasoning is the 
joint effort of the speaker and audience--persuasion being proportionate 
to the degree that an audience will provide the missing proposition to 
complete a syllogism. 
In her excellent article, "The Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, 
and the Enthymeme: A Search for Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," 
Delia (54) explores the cognitive underpinnings of rational conduct. 
Reviewing pertinent research, she states: 
Regardless of the specific formulation, contemporary psychology 
indicates that an individual demonstrates a strong need for and 
striving after a state of harmonious integration within his total 
cognitive system. (54:142) 
The most fertile ground for the persuader is proposing those ideas that 
will be most readily assimilated into the listener's present "appercep­
tive mass." An enthymeme "that is harmonious with basic predispositions 
is often accepted without great regard for the inferential steps leading 
to it." (54:145) In her conclusion, Delia maintains: 
A tendency toward harmony or equilibrium integrates the various 
forces and concepts that comprise the psychological field. The 
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enthymeme builds upon this fundamental tendency and, hence, may be 
seen as the employment of the deductive form in accordance with the 
operation of the natural rational process of consistency maintenance. 
. . .  I t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  logos builds directly upon fundamental 
cognitive processes. But just as surely, ethical and emotional 
proof function within the same psychological system and tight lines 
cannot be drawn between the functioning of the three modes. (54:147) 
Let us examine an enthymeme that will make Delia's position 
evident. The example comes from "Enthymemes: The Story of a Light-
hearted Search," by Aly (6), and will provide the necessary bridge into 
the eventual transposition. Aly writes: 
1 am indebted to the Honorable Thomas Curtis, Republican Repre­
sentative in Congress, from the Second District of Missouri, for 
this specimen. Mr. Curtis told me that some years ago he was in 
Iowa, making speeches in behalf of Senator Bourke Hickenlooper, who 
was a candidate to succeed himself in the United States Senate. 
During one speech in a county seat in southern Iowa, Mr. Curtis 
observed a man in overalls, apparently a son of the Iowa soil, 
listening with more than ordinary attention and occasionally nodding 
his head in agreement with the speaker. Following the approved 
campaign practice to gain name-familiarity, Curtis said, he used the 
name Hickenlooper a good many times. When he had concluded his 
speech and the meeting had adjourned, the attentive farmer rushed 
up to Curtis, and said, "I just want you to know that I'm going to 
vote for your man!" 
"Hell," said Curtis, expansive at learning the power of his per­
suasion, "I'm sure glad to hear it. It isn't always I can convince 
a man with one speech." 
"Oh," said the farmer, "your speech was all right, but that ain't 
what did it. All the time you was talkin1, I was thinkin' about 
that Hickenlooper out on that raft in the middle of the ocean, and 
how he prayed, and how God saved him, and I sez to myself, he's a 
God-fearin' man, and I'm goin' to vote for him." 
"Well, now," said Curtis, "I sure want you to vote for Hicken­
looper, because he is the man for the job. But I am bound to be 
honest and tell you that it wasn't Hickenlooper out on that raft 
in the Pacific Ocean. That was Rickenbacker." 
For a moment the farmer looked downcast, crestfallen, and then his 
spirits rising, he replied, "Oh, shucks! Hickenlooper, Rickenbacker, 
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what the hell's the difference? He's probably a God-fearin' man, 
and I'm going to vote for him anyway." (6:271) 
The first enthymeme involved is: "Hickenlooper is probably a God-fearing 
man." (God-fearing men make good senators.) (Hickenlooper will probably 
make a good senator.) The second enthymeme involved is: (Hickenlooper 
will make a good senator.) (I vote for men who will make good senators.) 
"I am going to vote for Hickenlooper." Now let us cast this enthymeme 
in Gendlin's terms: The felt meaning of the farmer's notion of God­
fearing men also included the felt meaning that "God-fearing men are the 
stuff from which great senators are made." Whether it is an ipso facto 
relationship is not the consideration. The farmer's scheme of "consis­
tency maintenance," apparently, absorbed only "God-fearing men." The 
eventual decision to vote for Hickenlooper was not the result of valid 
reasoning, however formally intact the enthymeme may have been. The 
whole reasoning process articulated on one central felt meaning—fearing 
of God. 
The second example will take us a little further from discursive 
reason. A student is slumped in a chair, lethargically leaning on a 
palm. The teacher says, "John, pay attention." A discursive analogue 
might reason as follows: "Slumping in chairs usually indicates lack of 
involvement. John is slumping in his chair. Therefore, John has a lack 
of involvement." Hence, "John, pay attention." The rhetorical correlate 
is the "fourth-order" enthymeme. where two of the three propositions are 
elided. That is, the only "proposition" that is presented is the visual 
picture of John slumping in a chair--the minor premise. To the degree 
that we possess experience with slumping and seeing others slump when they 
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are uninvolved, we will be persuaded that John is uninvolved. Yet, 
this is not to maintain that this presentational fourth-order enthvmeme 
is demonstrative proof—for slumping is a fallible sign. That is, there 
are other causes of slumping in chairs—perhaps John is a cripple and 
has a tired neck; perhaps John is dead. Although the weight of probability 
Indicates that John is uninvolved, we cannot exclusively reason out 
alternative causes. 
An analytical epicycle is in order. In our experience, we have a 
felt meaning that "slumping in chairs" is associated with the felt meaning 
of "uninvolvement" as manifested by several things: dozing off, day­
dreaming, and doodling, as well as slumping in chairs. Yet the teacher 
didn't verbally repeat to herself the two premises, and conclusion, and 
then say, "John, pay attention." It was a flash perception. The fabric 
of premise and conclusion was incorporated in the felt meaning itself. 
A good test of this thinking would be to go back to an enthymeme in 
discourse: it is a club meeting, and the members are arguing whether 
Duke has the right to vote. Duke's friend slams his hand on the table, 
and stands up: "Duke is a qualified member." The minor premise is 
stated in a provocative context. Very few would mentally go through the 
process: (Qualified members may vote.) "Duke is a qualified member." 
(Therefore, Duke may vote.) We feel instantly the implied reasoning. We 
are members of the club. We know that qualified members may vote. It's 
all part of our felt meaning of being in the club. It is when enthymemes 
are formed into symbols called language that we can examine, reflect, 
and chatter about the validity of reasoning. We can then diagram the 
enthymeme. We can then analyze our reasoning: yes, it is valid—no, it is 
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not valid. But the reasoning nevertheless can occur on a pre-cognitive 
level. 
We have been implying thus far—which now needs stating—that 
reasoning via enthvmeme. once released from the tyranny of word symbols, 
is a pre-cognitive cluster of felt meanings. The relationship of a 
major premise "Qualified members may vote," is a felt meaning in and of 
itself. The symbol and the thing symbolized must not be allowed to 
become confused. When the minor premise/felt meaning is juxtaposed—as 
it were—the two felt meanings may do one of two things: (1) they may 
mesh, to produce a composite felt meaning, valid or invalid; or (2) they 
may so grate on each other that they do not mesh. That is, they may 
not contribute to a consistency of our apperceptive mass--our pool of 
felt meanings gained through years of experience. And we say, "Hey, 
that's not logical'." Only now are we ready to transpose the logical 
construct enthymeme. to dance. 
On the grass-roots level of considering premises, we are dealing 
with felt relationships. And once again, the evolution of the argument 
will proceed through examples. Take for instance, two dancers slowly 
walking onstage, single file, man in front, head erect, woman behind, 
head bowed—a major premise with its own connotations. They stop 
center stage. The woman slowly, numbly, drops to the floor in a pile, 
eyes constantly pensive. The man turns, looks, and leaves. The example 
is not much to go on discursively, but fraught with emotional overtones. 
A primitive approximation may reason this way: "A woman in love is sad 
when her man leaves her. This man is leaving his woman. Therefore, she 
is sad." Or another version may work: "The only way a man may purge 
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the shame of an unfaithful wife is to leave her. This woman obviously 
has been unfaithful. Therefore, the man is leaving her with her shame." 
No matter how many discursive interpretations we try to make stick, the 
movement is what it is. And our inferences will have leverage only in 
proportion to our predispositions, just as in discursive reasoning. Even 
though such a "presentational enthymeme" is flexible, it is not entirely 
amorphous. There are "propositional movements" involved, and the 
relationship between them is essentially enthymematic. Or stated 
another way, the configuration of relationships is primarily cast with 
syllogistic fiber and "persuades" in us an aesthetic response to the 
conclusion, commensurate with our predispositions toward movement 
connotations (i.e., commensurate with our attitudes toward "shame," 
"unfaithfulness," etc., assuming for illustration that those epithets 
are exact synonyms for the implications of the movement). 
Even further complication of the present train of thought is 
necessary. It is prudent to note that not all dance is so "dramatic"— 
not so apt to lend itself to such verbal description. Dance movement 
may be just movement—with no emotional overtones per se. But the fact 
always remains that there will be some residual "meaning" in human 
movement--no matter how dry the emotional well is pumped. And our 
biomechanic and kinesthe tic predispositions involve us as audience in 
logical connections between the clusters of felt meaning (not necessarily 
emotional) that surround human movements. We need an example. 
Consider Figure 9. The man has a movement; the woman starts her 
movement at the accented turn-to-left of the man. Traditionally we 
might call this motivation. Her movement is a series of turns that 
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gradually decrease in speed. Meanwhile, the man repeats his beginning 
movement, but letting it carry into a slide onto the knee, eventually 
ending up sitting on the floor, facing stage right.. He slowly starts 
a back bend from this position, and at the point of inbalance, he 
catches himself with his fingertips, at the same time performing a leg 
gesture—both are accented. This tips off the woman's final fall to 
the floor, which ends in an inbalance. One recognizes immediately a 
relationship between the dancers—but the relationship is all but non-
emotional. The sequence is cool. The relationship is something other 
than emotion. Do we dare say which is the major premise, which the 
minor premise? And then the inevitable, what is the conclusion? Not 
yet. 
The relationship of the dancers is a kinesthetic one. One could 
make a case for a thematic relationship. But we know from the model 
that it isn't enough to be in the same area of subject matter. That is, 
Just because an enthvmeme has for its subject matter horses, for 
example, it does not follow the enthvmeme is "logical." Is the relation­
ship in just the dynamics? Once again, we must sense that there is more 
to the relationship than just the dynamics. Is it the used and implied 
space? No—we can't really pin it on any one factor. There is combined 
relationship. The thematic material, the dynamics, the space, the 
accents—all mesh for a satisfying whole. But now we find ourselves in 
Langer's tertiary realm—the realm where each person's perception is what 
counts, not the secondary features of structure. And one will perceive 
the movement commensurate with his predispositions. The only way open 
now is discussion as a critic might go about it. We could dare to 
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specify the major premise, and the minor premise, and the conclusion. 
But in the doing we would also sacrifice the very conclusion we were 
trying to verbalize. Because the conclusion is a felt meaning, kinesym-
bolized. It would be like trying to verbally describe a Bach fugue— 
only the most gross, wooden approximation is possible. Because the media 
are not translatable. 
He can only say the movement is propositional. We must address 
our felt meaning. As audience we are living the form-in-the-making. Au­
dience and illusion are a global phenomenon. We receive one felt mean­
ing in the man's first phrase, an augmenting felt meaning with the 
woman's first phrase. We are taken back partially to that first felt 
meaning when the man partially repeats his first phrase in the man's 
second phrase. Yet we: are still aware of the woman finishing her first 
phrase--there is residual felt meaning from her phrase juxtaposed with 
the man's second phrase. The man finishes his second phrase--which 
hurls us into the woman's second phrase. We are feeling an evolution 
of felt meaning. We are aware that our evolving felt meaning is 
changing hues, and stretching—a semantical tension. It is our partici­
pation in the sequence—via our evolving felt meaning—that contributes 
to its enthymematic quality. 
That is the core of the kinesthetic enthymeme—"enthymematic." 
The transposition undergoes a metamorphosis. Instead of it being a 
discrete, analyzable, diagramable, construct, it is on the contrary 
"adjectival." It is enthymeMATIC. Not an enthymeme—but enthymematic. 
Our intellectual faculties are operative. But so are our intuitive— 
maybe even emotional—faculties also operative. There is a meshing of 
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felt meanings—commensurate with our kinesthetic dispositions. It is 
a bite-size piece of intuitive logic. The sequence gels—it fits 
together. We haven't wandered into another area of felt meaning without 
first consulting the direction in which we started. Our biomechanic 
and kinesthetic predispositions involve us as audience in logical 
connections between the clusters of feeling that surround the movement. 
The fitting of the "propositions," and the subsequent "conclusive" felt 
meanings interact at a pre-reflective level; a subliminal Integration of 
perceptions; what John Locke called "natural light"—instantaneous cog­
nition. It would be absurd to even try to state the premises discur­
sively. 
And in the few moments it takes to review the reasoning in this 
section of the chapter, we discover that the parallel is there, and real. 
The logical relationships are syllogistic--lust as sound intuitively, as 
a well-cast syllogism is apodeictically. The enthymeme has merely 
become fluid. Instead of relying on our apodeictic sense, as we do in 
discourse, we are now calling on our experience as total human-moving-
beings . 
CONCLUSION 
It is instructive to once again remind ourselves that language, 
which is made of concatenated words, is itself symbolic. Language is 
such a daily tool that we often forget that the word is not the thing 
it stands for. It is merely a convenient symbol. And yet there are 
many things we find very difficult conceptualizing without words--"time," 
"quantity," "logic," "space," "understanding"—the list marches over the 
113 
horizon. But perhaps that is the supreme challenge to aesthetics in 
this century—coping, and conceptualizing in non-mimetic, non-literal, 
non-realistic terms. Certainly, we say, we must be capable of conceiving 
the actual thing (if it is a thing) that the word "time" is supposed to 
symbolize. Is it because language makes conceptualizing and analyzing 
more convenient that we don't use other types of symbols for concep­
tualizing "things?" We can challenge ourselves, by saying, "If a 
certain word exists, then certainly the thing it is supposed to symbolize, 
exists." And then likewise, if the "thing" exists, is it impossible 
to symbolize this "thing" in anything but language? The "thing" is going 
to remain the "thing," regardless of how busily the pathetic creature 
man scurries around trying to symbolize it. 
And so if we know that a logical construct called "syllogism" 
exists, must we say it is impossible for man to conceive it in anything 
but language? Is it going to be anything less than syllogistic, if 
we look at it with our whole being? For certainly research indicates 
that man's reason is as susceptible to "emotional" proof, and ethical 
proof, as it is to "logical" proof. The phenomenologist instructs us 
to look at the phenomenon—not an elided or abstract portion of it. In 
discourse we make the attempt to diminish our thinking to apodeictic 
quantities. But the mere existence of the enthymeme in part denies the 
full course of apodeictic cognition. That is why the enthymeme is per­
suasive. 
We have not yet analyzed the dance enthymeme down to its most 
concrete terms, but the real conquest rests in recognizing its operative 
function in dance. Indeed, the construct would reach to all areas of 
114 
human activity as Aly so pointedly states. We have no other choice but 
to recognize "enthymemetism" in other media of communication. The 
problem to be explored by someone with a fresh eye is that of the "dis­
crete functions" of the non-verbal enthymeme. 
It is relevant to mention a study done by Deutsch (55). She 
conducted a series of experiments studying how we perceive and retain 
auditory information in relation to music. The results of her studies 
suggest "that we have separate memory systems for verbal and nonverbal 
stimuli." (55:89) She further states: "One hypothesis that fits this 
experiment is that verbal and nonverbal (including musical) information 
is processed by different cerebral hemispheres." (55:89) She remarks, 
however, that it appears that non-verbal memory operates in a similar 
fashion to verbal memory. But she adds these are only hypotheses, and 
more research must be done. Perhaps in the near future we will be able 
to conclusively determine how verbal and non-verbal information is 
processed. 
So far, no mention has been made of the related figures: aetio-
logia, apophasis. dialysis, epilogus. prosapodosis, sorites, syllogismus. 
and epichiereme. These are mostly variations of the basic syllogism--
repeated, magnified, or diminished. But syllogistic and enthymematic 
are the keys. Once the various species are abstracted, and are conceived 
in a malleable, fluid sense, fine distinctions drop away like raisins. 
The "logical construct" is essentially the same. We can just as easily 
sense the "logical construction" of an entire dance, composed of smaller 
enthymemes. in the same way we can imagine an entire speech in the form 
of an epichiereme. with many smaller enthymemes. We can easily chain 
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enthymemes together in discourse, as in sorites (If A is B, B is C, C 
is D, and D is F, then A is F.). An art medium would welcome sorites 
with loving arms. 
This is not the first time someone has tried to describe "logic" 
in the arts. Dewey says it is "having an experience," with his flair 
for detailing the qualifications. The phenomenologists say it is 
"addressing the global phenomenon." Copeland says it is the "long line." 
Graham says it is the "spirit of the dance." Kirstein doesn't say. 
H'Doubler says it is the "inner life in an external pattern." And all 
are right in their own context. But just as surely as a syllogism 
doesn't summarize all to be said about reason in discourse, the dance 
enthvmeme must also account for only a small part. But it is a part 
worth reflection. 
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CHAPTER V 
TRANSPOSITIONS: THE PARALLEL STRUCTURES 
The majority of the transpositions in this chapter, it shall be 
discovered, deals directly with cra£t—of poetry and dance. Most are 
exact transpositions. Perhaps the only difference in the repertoire of 
devices in the two media is that in literature it is broken down into 
more names and species. The title of the chapter grows out of the 
certainly remarkable technical similarity of the two media—thus, parallel 
structures. 
FIGURES OF REPETITION 
Repetition is repetition. Both media must utilize the device with 
sensitivity, but dance is the more free to do so. The orthographical 
figures of repetition deal with the repetition of specific letters, the 
remainder describe the repetition of words. Both media are familiar 
with exact repetition, as well as repetition with variation. The only 
figure worth passing comment is stichomythia. which is dialogue consist­
ing of single lines spoken alternately by two characters, and characterized 
by repetitive patterns and antithesis. The device of course in dance is 
called antiphony, although we don't associate antiphony with repetition 
so much. 
RHYTHM AND TEMPO 
Although some figures of repetition contribute to the rhythm and 
tempo of poetry, most of the figures having to do with rhythm and tempo 
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involve the use or elision of conjunctive particles—unique to language. 
Worth mentioning, however, are isocolon and metabasis. Metabasis is 
merely a transitional word or phrase between two larger segments, as 
two paragraphs. We recognize transition as important to dance too. 
Isocolon is the figure in which several phrases of equal length have 
corresponding or similar structure. For instance, "Your reasons at 
dinner have been sharp and sententious, pleasant without scurrility, 
witty without affection, and strange without heresy." The counterpart 
in dance would be, for instance, several successive phrases, each with 
its different movement, but repetition of the same rhythm, direction, 
general spatial pattern, or dynamic quality of movement. The device 
is certainly known in dance. 
GRAMMATICAL EXCHANGE 
The choreographic device known as "transposition" is performing 
the movement of one body part with another body part. In literature, 
these figures take many forms—exchanging one letter for another; 
exchanging of cases, persons, genders, numbers, tense, or moods; and 
the substitution of one part of speech for another. It is interesting 
to note that the device in both media produces considerable semantic 
tension. But the device in literature is even more effective, for the 
tension is derived from "misusing!' the language—that is, going against 
established conventions of syntax and grammar, thus jolting the reader 
into particular attention. The same happens in dance—but missing the 
extreme shock value. For instance, a movement most expeditiously per­
formed by an arm, can be rendered comical by performing it with a leg, etc. 
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FIGURES THROUGH DISORDER 
Hyperbaton is the generic term for the figures that work 
through disorder. For instance, in chiasmus. one reverses the order of 
something said, as in Henry David Thoreau's remark: "I am wont to think 
that men are not so much the keepers of herds as herds are the keepers 
of men." In dance the device is called manipulation, where, for instance, 
a theme phrase is first analyzed to determine its separate movements, 
and then reordered to give a different view of the theme. As in chiasmus. 
so also the felt meaning of the reordering of movement must necessarily 
be changed, but with the echo of repetition. 
FIGURES OF ADDITION AND OMISSION 
In choreography, addition generally means addition of new 
material—or what we call development of material. Omission of course 
is removing material. The figures that relate are all orthographic, 
and fall under the rubric metaplasmus. They add, subtract, or vary 
the length of a syllable, or letter. The addition or omission of material 
in dance usually is predicated on theme movement. Otherwise, how are we 
to know we are subtracting from, or adding to? In dance, however, the 
accomplishment is one of tampering with the felt meaning. This is gener­
ally not predominant in verse. Usually these figures expedite prosodlc 
aims of the poet. Of mention are diastole and systole, or the lengthening 
of a short syllable (the stressing of an unstressed syllable), and the 
shortening of a long syllable (the removal of stress from a stressed syl­
lable) . Again the result in verse is metrical polish, whereas in dance, 
we recognize these as augmentary devices, and diminution, a time function. 
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FIGURES OF DIVISION 
Of the ten figures of division, five describe the actual division 
of discourse into various and selected parts for particular emphasis. 
The counterpart in dance is breaking up, for instance, a theme movement 
into its various components, for a better look at the movement. Several 
divide in special ways. Epiphonema. or the ending of a piece with a 
sharp or sage comment, has its counterpart in the "good ending," or 
maybe the "surprise ending." Humphrey says a good ending is half the 
success of a dance. The transfer is obvious. Propositio, or a thumb­
nail introduction to the discourse at hand, has its counterpart in the 
statement of the theme, at the beginning of a dance based on theme 
movement. The statement of the theme is, essentially, a thumbnail 
sketch of what will be "discussed" in the dance. Synathroesmus is a 
recapitulation at the end of a piece of discourse of the major points 
of the speech. In dance, very often this is a restatement of the theme 
movement—with or without variation. Restrictlo is an "afterword," 
a post script. In dance, as in music, this may be the coda at the end 
of a piece, presumably incorporating thematic movement, or movement from 
the theme. 
FIGURES OF COMPARISON 
Figures of comparison arrange discourse in terms of greater to 
lesser, vice versa, or some variation thereof. For instance, catacos-
mesis is the ordering of words from greatest to least in dignity. These 
figures point out the degrees in things. The parallel in dance is 
presenting degrees in any of a movement's structural features. The mind 
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fans out with possibilities in thinking of dance. Several dancers could 
be doing the same movement, but at varying speeds, or with varying spatial 
use. One could utilize the various heighth of dancers to achieve 
feelings of "greater and lesser." The alternatives are broad, limited 
only by the choreographer's imagination. 
FIGURES OF CONTRAST 
The figures of contrast manifest themselves orthographically, 
grammatically, schematically, and cognitively. Indeed, contrast is the 
juxtaposition of any two opposite things. Opposition in movement is 
essentially contrast. Slow against fast is contrast. So are high and 
low, successional-oppositional, soft and hard, 3-4 and 4-4. Contrast 
in dance is of course a basic tenet in choreography. 
SENSE IMAGERY 
This section of the chapter is more or less a catch-all of 
relatively diverse figures that, when transposed, conglomerate neatly 
under the rubric, sense imagery. Thrall and others (150) point out that 
. . .  a n  i m a g e  i s  a  l i t e r a l  a n d  c o n c r e t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  a  s e n s o r y  
experience or of an object that can be known by one or more of the 
senses. It functions, as I. A. Richards has pointed out, by repre­
senting a sensation through the process of being a "relict" of an 
already known sensation. The image is one of the distinctive 
elements of the "language of art," the means by which experience in its 
richness and emotional complexity is communicated .... (150:232) 
Since dance is closer to structural reality than is language, obviously 
an audience goes to the theatre for an image. That is, the very nature 
of dance is an image—a visual one. (It can be an auditory one too, but 
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this impinges on the proper realm of music, which will intermittently 
become pertinent to the discussion.) Ignoring for the time those 
dances in which the performers are encased in various shapes (such as 
in Nikolais' works), dance is primarily an image of the human body, 
moving. The figures that transpose as images in dance are paroemia 
(an adage or proverb), and allusion. These are devices of referring to 
a saying of popular origin, or alluding to a presumably familiar person 
or thing. The counterpart in dance of course is limited to the body-
as-symbol, but it works in exactly the same way, accomplishing the same 
thing as an adage, proverb, or an allusion does in literature. With this 
in mind, the following discussion will focus on approaches to the choreo­
graphic image: body-images, non-human images, technical images, and 
non-visual images. 
Body Imagery 
Qualities found in images are particularity, concreteness, and 
appeal to sensuous experience or memory. (150:233) One of the basic 
ideas in the communication of dance is that the audience will kineconceive 
the kinestructs as kinesymbols. Commensurate with the success of 
kineconception, the dance taps the vast source of the audience's personal 
experience, thus enriching the meaning of the dance. Yet there is a 
distinction hidden here that this writer has seen performed with earth-
shaking and affective clarity. Suppose the body-image were viewed not 
as the image of a human body performing non-discursively expressive theme 
movement, but as the human body performing non-discursively expressive 
movement with the added enrichment of a discursive body symbol (woven 
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into the fabric of design) that recalls in our memory an image we have 
seen of other human bodies (perhaps famous) performing that same move­
ment. So for those who have had the previous experience with the 
hypothetical other human bodies performing the movement, all the conno­
tations associated with the previous experience will be recalled and 
assimilated into the fiber of meaning in the dance. The concept is not 
as difficult as its description. Take for instance Figures 10 and 11. 
Figure 10 is of course Rodin's "Thinker," and Figure 11 is an image of 
the five marines trying to raise the flag at Iwo Jima. Notice how when 
the "images" are figured out what a gush of meaning, resplendent with 
connotations, surges forth. One need only observe Taylor's "From Sea 
to Shining Sea," to discover what can be done with images. Taylor made 
use of images in an obvious way, costumed and pantomimed to give the 
intended effect, as in George Washington crossing the Delaware. But 
what marvelous effects the dance image can have when it just happens 
to coincide with the theme movement of the dance. The image pops forth 
with zeal, and for those audience members who have had experience with 
the image, the meaning is enriched ten-fold (for those members who have 
not had the experience with the image, they still have the theme movement 
with which to be interested). Logically, however, the image should relate 
to the overall felt meaning that is evolving in the dance. 
It is not necessary for the image to be a famous one. For 
instance, "The Brood," by Kuch, explores the heartaches of war. When 
the male dancers suddenly emerge doing a military "goose step," all the 
brutality of the Nazi war machine is recalled with incisive, caustic 
effect. Yet, the dance did not depend on the audience's recognizing that 
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image for its meaning. Images abound in everyday life—Mercury, Statue 
of Liberty, taking a shower, Michelangelo's "Pieta," swatting a mosquito, 
Buddha, and on and on through every cranny of life. 
Psychologists tell us that under various conditions of an excited 
sensorium the body will move in relatively predictable patterns (i.e., 
"bowed over with grief," indicates that situation where the flexor 
muscles of the body dominate the extensors). The melodrama, in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, made extensive use of these more-
or-less stereotyped postures of the body. Even these natural—now 
almost cliched—patterns of movement can be an image all in itself, 
conjuring tumbles of meaning from our own experience as a humanmovingbeing. 
Non-Human Imagery 
Just as the body-image is capable of making the viewer recall 
past experience with a particular human shape, so is the body capable 
of making images that recall non-human images. For instance, the sudden 
emergence of an image of a swastika in "The Brood," which was artfully 
and organically assimilated into the design of the composition, further en­
hanced the gore and cruelty of the war theme. It was not contrived— 
but fully incorporated into the design as a whole. So for those who knew 
what a swastika connoted (in relation to the Second World War), how 
rich and powerful the dance became! Another example is in Limon's "The 
Traitor," dealing with the last days of Christ. At one point Christ is 
dragging another dancer as a burden—non-discursively symbolic in its own 
right—and yet suddenly the image of Christ bearing the cross leaps out 
with sudden thrust. (Actually this is a combination of body-image and 
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non-human image.) 
The figures pathetic fallacy and personification transpose as 
non-human images in a special sense. Pathetic fallacy is the assigning 
of a human characteristic to an unhuman object, (as "the beans were 
impatient to be hoed"). Personification is basically the same thing. 
Nikolais' use of dancers enclosed in various movable shapes conjures 
non-discursive images, which become enriched in their own right--in as 
much as they are kineconceived as kinesymbols. In literature the device 
seems to animate the inanimate objects. In dance, the process is some­
what in reverse—it makes the human body partially inanimate, emphasizing 
body masses moving in organic, human-like rhythms. It will also be 
recognized that diaphor is operative in that we are being forced to 
shape our felt meanings through the lens of total abstraction. There 
are a million and one ways to make the body appear as a non-human object. 
The idea is not new, as such, for dancers have been dressing up like 
animals since the stone age, and ballet still finds it necessary to use 
such devices, such as tin-soldiers ("The Nutcracker"); puppets ("Petrusch-
ka"); expiring swans ("Swan Lake"); and a bevy of other imitations. The 
newness of the transposition is its workability, its broader application 
to life, commensurate with the artistic spirit of the times. 
Technical Imagery 
Costuming also has the ability to call up images, as for instance, 
"I am wearing my hair tonight as Jocasta . . . ." Stage sets may call 
up images depending on use, such as the shape used in "Acrobats of God," 
where the image of dancers standing on a mirror (with their reflection 
evident in other dancers under them) became a humorous image. Or the 
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"marriage" bed of Oedipus and Jocasta in "Night Journey," which has 
phallic and vaginal images, as well as the male and female pelvic 
girdles—graphically screaming the themes threading through the dance. 
As mentioned earlier, dancers may imitate shapes on stage as part of the 
stage set--which recalls the connotations of the similarly-shaped object. 
Non-Visual Imagery 
Is dance capable of expressing images that appeal to other senses? 
Can a dance image, for instance, recall an olfactory experience in the 
audience? In the very asking only a paucity of images immediately occurs 
to the writer—perhaps indicating the poverty of "other-sense" images as 
source material. Figure 12 might be an example of an olfactory image. 
Even though this is also visual, there is a certain olfactory appeal, 
which might recall in the audience's memory their experience with the 
same. Figure 13 might have a gustatory appeal. Tactile images are 
probably the more common for the dancer's realm is a tactile experience. 
Figure 14 would hopefully have a tactile, sensuous quality. And since 
music provides the primary source for auditory images, Figure 15 seems 
to be one of the few, lonely auditory images that the dancer could 
devise without actually making sounds with his body (through speaking, 
or otherwise). And then, the dancer is always free to speak in images, 
or make articulated sounds that might recall an auditory image. 
Onomatopoeia is the use of words whose sounds seem to express or 
reinforce their meanings—like "hiss," "bang," and "bowwow." On the 
thicker end of the stick are words whose meanings jar, or jolt against 
the meanings the poet is trying to achieve—thus selective diction in 
poetry. And just as in dance, when the dancer makes a "thud," in 
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landing from a leap, the sound distracts from our concentration on the 
illusion. But just as surely "thuds," "stomps," "slaps," and other sounds 
that the body can make outside of speaking may be effectively employed 
to reinforce the evolution of the felt meaning in the dance, as for 
instance clapping in a dance in the jazz idiom. 
Last in the consideration of imagery is apostrophe, in which a 
person not present or a personified abstraction is addressed in discourse, 
as when Prometheus asks Mother Garth to witness his injustice. The 
transposition of this figure throws us directly into the rather sticky 
subject of focus in dance. Rarely, if at all, does the literature on 
dance really discuss the repercussions of focus—aesthetically or 
choreographically. In actuality focus is central to the choreographic 
sensibility. "Focus" in dance generally means where the dancer is 
looking, or directing his face, although not always. 
Reflect on focus. When we interact with others, say in the snack 
bar, the articulating point of address is eye contact. We sense when 
our friend is embarrassed by noticing the movement of his eyes--our friend 
doesn't look at us, but down. The most inconspicuous twitch of the eye 
can cause us to suspect, reject, likfe, fear, or hate. The eyes are set 
in the face. And if someone turns his face from us while we are speaking 
to them, we ask, "What's wrong? What do you see?" We interact via face, 
facial expression, and eyes. The volume of research in psychology on 
facial expression alone makes one weary. Yes, the hands are expressive, 
and posture, and shoulders—but it is the face we look at to perceive 
subtleties. And it's no wonder from all the minute muscle groups in the 
face alone. 
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There are three broad areas in dance in which focus is operative, 
each in a slightly different way. The first is "no focus," or "inward 
focus." Focus is such a powerful director of the audience's attention 
that sometimes it can ruin a dance by distracting the audience's atten­
tion from the movement. And so the "no focus" is a "glazed expression," 
where all potential indicators of meaning on the face are kept still— 
eyes, mouth, eyebrows and cheeks. It is the effort to minimize the 
power of the face, so that movement designs may take over. This is 
where the head becomes an appendage of the body, rather than the sine 
qua non of expression. 
The opposite c£ that of course is "focus," manifesting itself in 
various degrees. The dancer may merely turn his head, which directs 
our attention in the same direction in which he turned it, or he may 
actually look (there is a difference) at a certain thing with all the 
nuances that looking includes (i.e., actually perceiving something). 
But the thin dangerous line here can make the difference between break­
ing the illusion, and continuing the illusion of the dance. If the 
dancer looks at something with too many indicators on his face, we 
become aware of the dancer as John Doe the person, perceiving in a 
very real way. And if the level of emotional abstraction of the dance 
does not allow such real perceiving, the illusion is severed. If it is 
a pantomime, we expect the realness. The face is a very sensitive 
indicator of the level of emotional abstraction of a dance. 
Also considered in the broad area of focus, is the indicated space. 
If in a solo dance the dancer looks stage right, our perceiving is 
weighted to that side of the stage, and stage left is completely obliterated. 
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There are some types of dances which revolve entirely around focus 
in a particular direction (for instance in a dance on fear, continual 
focus in one direction implies the cause of the dancer's fear). 
And so we perceive the entire dance JLn relation to that object of focus. 
And more important, we expect the dancer to move in a way that realizes 
this. That is, we become aware of the dancer's relationship to his 
imaginary world of moving--an awareness that deeply affects choreo­
graphing movement. 
Related to indicating space, focus also shapes space. Connected 
to the idea of the face being the most sensitive indicator of the body, 
is the idea that the entire front of the body is more vital, more sensi­
tive, than the back side. So not only does the face imply space, but 
the front of the body does too. And the movement of the body varies this 
front. So, more than an implier of space, the front of the body is a 
shaper of space. When we curl up in a ball, the audience's focus has 
nowhere to go but to the dancer. But have the dancer stretch out, and 
twist, and notice what is included in the dance then—more space, and 
articulated space. Other body parts do this too, as in pointing, but 
the overall foundation of space in dance is predicated on frontness and 
backness of the human body. The choreographer ignores focus at the 
peril of having no illusion at all. 
Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that body-images and non-human images 
are a rich source for choreography, and as such have been tapped by 
various choreographers. Since the subject of sense imagery is so varied, 
the teaching of it would be facilitated by such a break-down of terms, 
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providing convenient "handles" for discussion as well as stimuli for 
ideas. A secondary advantage of recognizing sense imagery with more 
specific terminology is that it links up concepts of dance imagery 
with general literature on imagery, and possibly literature on "symbols 
in art." 
MISCELLANEOUS FIGURES 
This section considers figures that don't seem to fit under any 
of the previous subheadings, but are important. These figures are 
aposiopesis and schematismus. Aposiopesis is the breaking off without 
finishing the thought or a sentence. For instance, "Johnny, if you 
don't mow that lawn right this minute, I'll, I'll . . . ."is aposiopesis. 
Usually it implies that the speaker is so fraught with emotion or involve­
ment, that words simply fail him. The counterpart in dance is an entire 
style of movement—fall and recovery. Good choreographers know that a 
suspension in movement, if predicated on a previous building of dynamics, 
can be breathtaking. Aposiopesis is also manifested in more specific 
movements, perhaps even with the same effect. For instance, in 
stretching the arm, if the stretch doesn't come from the shoulder too, 
we feel an incompleteness about it. The use of incomplete movement in 
the impressionist idiom is predicated on this very device. Schematismus 
is a subtle implication of something without ever stating it--most dances 
do this. 
VICES OF LANGUAGE 
Practically any figure can be used to the point of vice, but 
there are specific figures that are considered vices. When they are 
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used intentionally, that is a different matter. It shall be discovered 
that the vices of language and the vices of dance are incredibly similar. 
Acyron is impropriety, as in "0 villain! thou wilt be condemn'd into 
everlasting redemption for this." For impropriety in dance, refer to the 
chapter on movement logic. Aschematiston is a lack of figures—in dance 
this is a lack of development or manipulation. Barbarismus is mis-pronun-
ciation of words. The counterpart in dance is misperformance of movement. 
Bomphiologia is bombastic speech. Bomphiologia in dance is virtuosity 
without integrity to the form. Cacemphaton is foul speech. Does this vice 
transpose to mean a pornographic dance? Gacosvntheton is objectionable 
word order. Objectionable movement order can easily interfere with our 
evolving felt meaning. Cacozelia is affected diction, and soraismus is 
the use of foreign words as an affectation. All dance teachers have 
seen the student who sticks in little ballet steps they learned at the 
neighborhood studio, not because the steps fit, but because they want 
to show everyone they can perform them. And it's not only students of 
ballet who commit this felony. Homiologia is monotony—death also for 
dances. Superfluity is manifested in perissologia. periergia, and parel-
con. Un-needed movements cloud the dance illusion as well. Redundancy 
is the error committed in tautologia and pleonasmus. Unnecessary repeti­
tion in dance is just as deadly. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has treated many figures, and at the very least 
pointed out the remarkable similarity in the actual craft of the two 
media. Perhaps it has done no more than illustrate that the relationship 
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of the two media i8 indeed more than at first is evident. One might 
even extend the implication, and say the interrelationships of the arts 
are deeper than at first appears. If it had been appropriate to this 
paper, the chapter could have included the other fine arts as well. 
Maybe the gulf between discursive symbolism and non-discursive symbolism 
is not so wide after all. Although Langer is probably correct in the 
bedrock differences she does describe, critical reflection on those 
differences is at least worthwhile. But the deceiving thing about 
lumping all symbolism into two pigeon holes--discursive and non-discur­
sive—is that it also implies different processes. And that does not 
seem correct. 
134 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The days are past when the theoretical nature ot dance could be 
summarized with a deep sigh and a sweep of the hand. With the growth 
of knowledge in the twentieth century, and the growing volume of reliable 
research on the psychological and somatic nature of man, it is increas­
ingly difficult to ignore the development of a tight, irreducible theory 
of dance. Everywhere graduate schools and curriculum committees are 
asking, "But where are the volumes of research on dance aesthetics?" 
And the search is on. And the shock begins. There is little—compared 
to the centuries of amassed literature in aesthetics relating to other 
media. A few meagre pages and footnotes are generally allotted to the 
mention of dance in contemporary aesthetic textbooks. The horde of 
inspirational literature on dance is so overbearing that the articles 
with integrity are all but buried. Teachers and students, departments 
and committees alike are in need of a unifying body of theory--a philoso­
phical structure within which dance education and dance theory can 
develop. This study, then, addressed itself to the following problem. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this study was to explore selected literary and 
rhetorical constructs as philosophical models for describing the aesthetic 
nature of dance; techniques of choreography; and the theory of choreography. 
The paper was essentially heuristic—could the various figures of rhetoric 
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and literature provide new channels of thought in which to pursue a 
tight philosophy and pedagogy of dance? Would there be processes in 
both media that would be essentially the same, but that dance would 
not yet have articulated in its literature? 
A pilot study was conducted in the problem, in which several 
valid findings indicated the larger effort. For instance, aposiopesis 
is a failing to complete a statement, generally in a speech. One 
normally associates this device with moments of suspense or high tension. 
The implication is that the doer of the action (speaker or actor) is so 
fraught with involvement and emotion that words will no longer come. 
Aposiopesis is the model. The choreographic transposition would be as 
follows, if we were to trace our thinking: (1) the model is failure to 
complete a statement at a moment of high tension, usually resulting in a 
particular response from the audience. (2) Could a suspension in move­
ment, predicated on an existing climax, also elicit a similar response 
from a dance audience? As this transposition is one of the more obvious, 
the answer is yes, as Humphrey would testify. 
The delimitations of the study included not reviewing the entire 
history of figurative language with its myriad of eddies, as the majority 
of the figures were crystallized before the middle ages. Subspecies of 
figures were generally ignored, since in the necessary abstraction process 
(in order to transpose the application of the figures), most would 
disappear anyway. The figures were regarded as malleable models, in that 
if the model were changed slightly to provide an insight into dance, 
then fidelity to the original figure was forsaken. Analogies must make 
some adjustments. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The substructure for the philosophical frame in which the study 
was conducted was Langer's (98,99,100) distinction between "presentational" 
and "discursive" symbolism--dance being of the former, language the 
latter. Langer points out that the essential differences between dis­
cursive and presentational symbolism are (1) presentational symbolism is 
not translatable; (2) presentational symbolism does not allow of defini­
tions within its own system; and (3) presentational symbolism cannot 
directly convey generalities. (99:89) 
Feeding into these basic assumptions was Gendlin's (72) theory 
of symbolism, based on felt meanings. He states: 
Besides logical schemes and sense perception we have come to recog­
nize that there is also a powerful felt dimension of experience 
that is prelogical, and that functions importantly in what we think, 
what we perceive, and how we behave. (72:1) 
He proceeds to develop the theory into seven modes of symbolism that are 
irreducible with each other. The concept of felt meaning, then, was 
the common ground in which the actual transpositions took place. That 
is, the terms of both media were abstracted to coincide in the higher 
plane of "felt meanings." 
To further delimit what was being talked about in dance, Sheets' 
(138) exposition on the phenomenal nature of dance was incorporated 
into the thinking throughout. That is, dance is a global phenomenon, 
and a form-in-the-making. What we as audience see is not the dancers 
themselves, but the dynamic illusion. She states: 
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Q)ancql is the creation of an illusion of force which is spatially 
unified and temporally continuous; the illusion is created and sus­
tained by a form-in-the-making which is itself spatially unified 
and temporally continuous; the form-in-the-making is created and 
presented through movement which appears as a revelation of force; 
and finally, the actual components of force which underlie the 
illusion of force are plastic, and as such, are transformed into 
qualities of movement as a revelation of force. (138:57) 
The great wealth of research in psychology on the movement-mean­
ing relationship was under the auspices of a fourth theory totally 
consistent with the above three—the kinestruct-kinescept-kinesymbol 
syndrome of Ellfeldt and Metheny (60,116). They state: 
The kinescepts of similar kinestructs may thus have very different 
emotional-intellectual import as kinesymbols for different people, 
depending upon the meanings, both obvious and subtle, in the situa­
tions in which they were experienced. (60:271) 
The composite power of these four theories left no doubt as to what the 
philosophical limits were. The theories of Sheets and Ellfeldt-Metheny 
are outgrowths of Langerian doctrine, and the marriage of Langer and 
Gendlin is at the very least, philosophically sound. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A review of the pertinent literature was conducted in four areas: 
(1) gesture-meaning relationship; (2) figurative language; (3) parallel 
literature, or research partially related to the problem of this study; 
and (4) aesthetics. 
It was concluded that gesture is movement of the human body which 
serves the purpose of the communication of a discursive or non-discursive 
meaning (whether communication was intended or not). Gesture usually 
excludes movement of those muscles responsible for speech (although 
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illogically). Gesture is characterized by fluency, continuity, temporal 
flexibility, spatial inflexibility, and spatial pattern. Factors which 
may influence meaning are part of the body involved; simultaneity; 
the type of motion (elliptical, lineal, sinuous, etc.); the speed (tempo) 
and force (dynamics) of the movement; the involvement of large or small 
muscle groups; personal physicality; personal experience; state of mind; 
instinct; the functions of symbol, sign, analogy, and autism; social 
situations; physical environment; cultural and sub-cultural determinants. 
These movements may be communicated to the perceiver visually, audi­
torily, tactily, and less frequently, olfactorily. 
In reviewing the literature on 2500 years of figurative language, 
the peaks in its development were concentrated upon: the classical period, 
the Renaissance, and the contemporary literature on various figures. The 
term "figure of speech" is a generic one, reducing to, tropes, or "the 
transference of meaning from the natural one to another;" and figures of 
speech and thought, or patterns of language "removed from the common 
and ordinary." (104:219) Over 250 figures were identified, categorized, 
and analyzed in the course of this study. 
In reviewing the works that parallel or relate directly to the 
problem in this study, it was concluded that little existed. Scattered 
references throughout the dance literature indicate this kind of a study, 
but never go beyond merely implying. For instance, numerous sources 
refer to dance as "a metaphor." But the allusion is generally inspira­
tional, and absolutely fails to address the actual transposition squarely. 
In fact, the analogy of dance and language is not novel at all—but in 
all instances, the analogy is a cursory purpose-of-the-moment. 
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The review of literature on aesthetics concentrated on sources 
within the dance field--the three most important of which were used. 
Yet the consideration extended to the philosophy of the Bauhaus, the 
thoughts of Graham, Humphrey, Wigman, Cohen, Delsarte, Laban, Cunningham, 
Hawkins, Louis, Taylor, and Turner. It was concluded that they were 
merely thoughts—the terms in which they were cast generally not being 
discrete and limited enough to be of service in an analysis. The reader 
may refer to the "Theoretical Framework" at the beginning of this 
chapter, or the "Aesthetics" section in Chapter II. 
THE TRANSPOSITIONS 
The more inventive sections of the paper were comprised of three 
chapters titled "Tropes," "A Prolegomenon to Movement Logic," and "The 
Parallel Structures." 
Tropes 
Metaphor received the greatest concentration, for it remains the 
most philosophically interesting, as well as the most thoroughly discussed 
figure in the journals. Wheelwright (157) first introduced the idea of 
metaphor being broken into two broad species—epiphor and diaphor. Epiphor 
involves the transference of meaning in one direction. For example, "The 
man is a pig," is an epiphor. Connotations of "pig" are transferred to 
our concept of "the man," and the resultant figurative meaning resolves 
the apparent literal paradox of the statement. The man is not actually 
a pig. The counterpart in dance is when transference of meaning is in 
one direction, and generally more prominent in pantomimic or dramatically 
approached dance. The example given was the following: two mimes meet 
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each other on stage. One extends his hand as if to shake hands. The 
other mime places his foot in the first mime's hand, and they proceed 
to "shake hands." They aren't actually "shaking hands;" instead, 
connotations of "foot" are transferred to the whole meaning of what a 
"handshake" is, with a resultant twist of meaning. 
Diaphor is the juxtaposition of two meaningful elements in which 
the transference is in two directions—an interaction of connotations. 
The example cited was provided by Wheelwright (157): 
My country 'tis of thee, 
Sweet land of liberty, 
Higgledy-piggledy my black hen. 
(157:78) 
The transference is mutual, enhancing our concept of neither element 
alone (the first two lines being one element), but forming an entirely 
new meaning. Choreographic diaphor is the juxtaposition of two movements 
that interact. That is, we sense a juxtaposition without any other 
reason but to force us to make the kinesthetic, felt-meaningful connection 
between the two. The juxtaposed elements of movement have no reason for 
being related other than the creation of the new felt meaning—the result 
of the juxtaposition. 
Other figures transposed under the heading of tropes were simile. 
metonymy. synecdoche. allegory, irony, parody. sarcasmus. hyperbole. 
antanaclasis. syllepsis, paronomasia. and asteismus. None have the 
impact, however, that a developed theory of dance metaphor would have. 
A Prolegomenon to Movement Logic 
Movement logic as used in this chapter was defined as propriety, 
in relation to the evolution of the felt meaning that is symbolized by 
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the dance. It is the point of interest when teachers say, "That movement 
doesn't fit." The logical construct enthymeme was transposed to dance 
predominantly through examples. An enthymeme is an elided syllogism. 
where the audience provides the missing premise(s) or conclusion. 
For instance, the following is an enthymeme; "All qualified members 
may vote." (John is a qualified member.) "Therefore, John may vote." 
If the speaker makes only those statements in quotation marks, then we 
accept or reject those statements, proportional to our willingness to 
provide the statement in parentheses. An enthymeme may have other 
variations, but that is the basic idea. 
The idea was then developed that "logical relationships" as 
manifested in discourse are essentially felt meanings, just as are the 
propositions that form the premises. That is, reason is capable of 
functioning on a pre-cognitive level. It is only when we don't completely 
understand the structuring of that felt meaning of logical relationship, 
that we diagram a syllogism, or try to analyze it extensively. 
Proceeding from this discovery, it was then possible to identify 
enthymematic operatives in movement logic. When a movement doesn't fit 
in dance, the reason was suggested that the "propositional" movements 
didn't indicate the movement that didn't "fit." That is, the felt 
meaning of the movements preceeding the illfitting movement did not 
mesh in a way that would "logically" flow to the felt meaning of the 
illfitting movement. The transposition, it was concluded, was tenable 
enough to warrant further reflection. The reader is referred to pp. 112-
115, at the end of Chapter IV, for further discussion of this conclusion. 
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The Parallel Structures 
The majority of the figures analyzed for transposition fell in the 
consideration of this chapter. And the majority of the figures considered 
were discovered to parallel the same processes found in dance. It was 
deemed unnecessary in most cases to ennumerate all the specific figures 
if the generic class was neatly and efficiently transposable to dance. 
The classes of figures found to parallel dance were figures involving 
(1) repetition, paralleling devices of repetition in dance; (2) rhythm 
and tempo, with specific figures paralleling transition in dance, and 
several phrases of movement in dance with one or two structurally 
similar features; (3) grammatical exchange, paralleling the device of 
choreographic "transposition" in dance; (4) figures of disorder, paral­
leling the device of manipulation in dance; (5) figures of addition and 
omission, paralleling the breaking up of theme movement; (6) figures of 
division, also paralleling the division of theme movement; (7) figures 
of comparison, paralleling degrees in structural elements of movement, as 
rhythm, space, height, speed, etc.; (8) figures of contrast, paralleling 
the basic tenet of contrast in dance; (9) vices of language, paralleling 
potential blunders a choreographer can commit; and (10) miscellaneous 
figures. 
Of particular mention from this chapter is the transposition of 
sense imagery, a catch-all heading for a number of figures which trans­
pose as images in dance. There are four types of images in dance: (1) 
body-imagery; (2) non-human imagery; (3) technical imagery; and (4) non-
visual Imagery. Body-imagery is the imitation of an experience-recalling 
design with bodies—as Rodin's "Thinker"—that conjures felt meanings 
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above and beyond the immediate kinesthetic one of the movement. Non-
human imagery is the imitation of non-human objects, as a swastika formed 
with two dancers' arms. Technical imagery includes making the body 
appear as something other than a human body, wholly or partially, as in a 
number of Nikolais' works. Examples of non-visual sense impressions were 
difficult to find, other than actually making sounds with the mouth, 
feet, hands, etc., to conjure up experienced impression. 
CONCLUSION 
There are two extremes in developing a technology of anything: 
pedantry and paucity. Literature hit rock-pedantry during the Renais­
sance. Dance, however, is still searching--for terminology, for water­
tight theories, for a standing in the community of the arts. The dance 
medium as academic discipline is just recently becoming recognized, 
compared to the other media. Generally, aesthetes don't quite know how 
to cope with dance, except for the selected few. And yet it is certainly 
the oldest art. Again, it has been only recently that "theories" of dance 
have been superceded by other theories—a cycle observable in other arts 
for centuries. The reason may be that researchers are just discovering 
that the dance illusion is, in fact, reducible to more defined terms. 
That is exactly the point where this study begins. 
This study was heuristic. It was a polite request for literary 
theory to please take us by the hand and lead us into our medium. The 
first criticism is, "Those foreign words defeat the purpose of the 
study." They defeat the purpose of the study if the only thing wanted 
is a terminology. "Homoioteleuton" is about as handy as a glob of jelly 
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pn a watch crystal. But the terms have meaning—structure, relationships, 
ideas, qualities, insights. The most important point to be made is that 
we may discard those terms as soon as we like. With this in mind, the 
following conclusions were warranted. 
1. Transpos it ions 
Out of the barrel have emerged at least five solid, philosophically 
interesting, transpositions: epiphor, diaphor, enthymeme, imagery, and 
apostrophe. Each in their way could be the basis for an aesthetic of 
dance. Each has a supportive literature. Each wreaks violent implica­
tions for dance theory. And most important, each puts dance in the 
academic center of the arts. Any one of these transpositions could 
accomplish these things alone. And yet, on the more mundane level of 
day-to-day communication, each expresses succinctly its own simple 
process. They don't have the shock effect of an "aposiopesis," or a 
"perissologia." They are practical. 
Each is a new concept in dance—a workable concept. And that 
particularly applies to enthymeme. Langer proposed several differences 
between presentational and discursive symbolism. It was such a novel 
concept, that people were willing to live with that as the last word. 
Yet the novelty obscured an unstated truth: The processes of the two 
types of symbolism may be similar. And once that is admitted, heurism 
descends like lightning. It opens a whole new section of the library 
to dance researchers. 
This is not to ignore the other transpositions that were success­
ful, and that gave dance theory a micro-insight. They all are valuable 
too, whether we start using the terms or not. Once we recognize what 
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the process is, we have verbalized it, thereby making it examinable. 
We examine with language as our tool in the classroom. We expedite 
matters with language. We can gesticulate all we want, and trail off 
with a vague sigh, but it still remains that the most efficient way to 
denotate, is through language. 
And then there are all the transpositions that, once they are made, 
we discover that we are already familiar with the same processes in dance. 
Not only does that reinforce our sense for the processes, but we begin 
to feel more solid in them theoretically. That is, we find that dance 
is really not such a sore thumb after all in the fine arts. It draws 
dance closer academically to the arena of fine arts—even in the face 
of skeptics. And since dancers are notoriously non-verbal, a process in 
dance that is so familiar to the dancer is assumed to be known by every-
one--because dancers think that way. But when it comes to discussing, 
we once again search for terminology. 
It must be stated finally, that reducing choreography or aesthetics 
to a list of devices and gimmicks is far from the purpose of this study. 
But there will always be people, less imaginative, who hang onto a hatful 
of devices to mitigate a dull creativity. (In this respect, a mouthful 
of "synathroesmus" discourages such a tendency.) But it will be the 
thinkers and serious researchers who will be able to grasp the ham, and 
leave the cloves. 
2. The Interrelationship of the Arts 
Admittedly one of the more interesting and challenging problems 
in aesthetics is the interrelationship of the arts. We ask, "Is it 
possible to develop a general theory of aesthetics that efficiently 
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accounts for all the media, and the varying degrees of quality in each 
medium?" Croce tried. Dewey tried. Hospers tried. Langer tried. 
Many theorists have coped with the problem, rooting the theory in one or 
two basic concepts. And most have succeeded in one or two respects. 
But all fail in accurately including dance to the level of specificity 
that other media are included. 
And so this study indicates a new approach—comparing semantical 
processes in the various media and the various ways in which each medium 
acts as a symbol. There are several advantages to this approach. The 
first is that when aesthetics is based on an irreducible theory of 
symbolism, it forces the theories to account for the substrata of felt 
meanings, rather than endlessly making adjustments in terminology because 
of different symbols (i.e., letters, paint, movement, sound, stone, etc.). 
Secondly, and most important, this approach allows aesthetes to cope 
with the mixing of the media in a coherent way. Traditionally the 
theorist was able to deliniate painting, music, sculpture, dance, drama, 
and architecture as fine arts. It was easy—just look at the medium 
and that told everything. But today, there are musical paintings, sculp­
tural dances, painted sculptures. Approaching the problems of aesthetics 
from a point of view that considers processes, and not product, the theo­
rist can once again work with universal terms. 
3. Reducibles in Movement Semantics 
This study has clearly shown that dance can be analyzed with 
specific terms. The literature on the movement-meaning relationship is 
vast, and provides excellent material for documenting hitherto intuited 
impressions. The literature encountered in the course of this study 
( 
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touches virtually every aspect of meaning with which dance as art is 
concerned. All this has implications. 
Once it is admitted that the medium, and its theory, can be 
described in limited terms, this opens up channels for pedagogy. 
Composition classes can be organized on very specific lines—rather than 
the traditional "give me some movement, and I'll tell you where you're 
wrong." Rather, as is done now in the rare composition class, one can 
say, "there are certain techniques and processes that are available to 
the choreographer. One is . . . ." 
With such reducibles in movement and the terms of movement, it is 
possible to correlate theory classes with technique and composition clas­
ses. Again it is the rare curriculum that, in a corporate effort, can 
connect what is learned in one class with what is learned in another 
class. "Susie, you have not completely grasped the felt meaning of the 
movement. Remember how that can affect the entire illusion?" Discrete 
terms then become the tool for comparing styles of choreography, theories 
of movement, mixed-media presentations, with dance. 
4. Terminology 
Not only has this study shown that the terminology suggested by 
such writers as Ellfeldt, Metheny, Langer, Gendlin, Birdwhistell, and 
others, is workable, but the study has introduced new terms with which 
dance can be discursively considered. We have shown how dance metaphor 
works. The term is useful and widespread in its application. We can 
talk about dance puns, and know what we're talking about. We can refer 
to enthymeme and symbolize hours of description. We are better armed. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Many channels of thought were suggested in the execution of this 
study that were not within the limitations of the effort. The following 
recommendations would carry out the implications encountered in this 
study. 
1. With the enormous amount of literature on the gesture-meaning 
relationship, an entire theory of "kinesthetic perception" could be 
written, similar to Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception. It would be 
a great service to the dance field to have a work that pulled all this 
material together, and made specific conclusions, and explored the 
implications of such a body of knowledge. 
2. An entire aesthetic could be based on a combination of epiphor. 
diaphor. enthymeme. imagery, and apostrophe. Ideally, the aesthetic 
would utilize the combination of the five, although an aesthetic could 
be developed out of each one separately. Such a study would utilize 
the pertinent literature on those five constructs, with plenty of room 
for first-time philosophizing. It would be particularly interesting 
to explore all the research in the philosophy of thinking, and perhaps 
evolve the theory of the dance enthymeme to a more specific. 
3. Related to this would be tracing the implications of epiphor. 
diaphor. enthymeme. imagery, and apostrophe through all the media. The 
results would certainly be interesting, and would perhaps indicate a 
much larger consideration. A work for comparison might be Munro's The 
Arts and Their Interrelations. 
4. A study could be done comparing two composition classes, one 
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using selected teras from this study as teaching tools, and the other 
in the traditional fashion. It would be interesting to find out which 
class was considered to be the more successful. 
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APPENDIX 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
(The predominant sources in compiling this glossary were Joseph (85), 
Sonnino (140), and Taylor (149).) 
Aetiologia: An enthymeme with the conclusion stated first, supported by 
the major or minor premise. 
Allegory: An extended narrative which carries a second meaning along 
with its surface story. 
Alliteration: The close repetition of consonant sounds. 
Amplification: The generic term for stylistic or expository expansion 
in language. 
Anacoenosis: An appeal by the speaker to the listeners for their advice. 
Anaphora: The repetition of words at the beginning of several successive 
sentences, clauses, or phrases. 
Anastrophe: The inversion of normal word order, usually to create 
suspense: "Blessed are the meek." 
Anoiconometon: The faulty arrangement of words; a vice. 
Antanaclasis: A pun. In the repetition of the homonym, the homonym 
shifts from one of its meanings to another. 
Antiphrasis: Irony. 
Antithesis: Contrasting ideas are expressed within a balanced grammati­
cal structure: "Worth makes the man, and want of it, the fellow." 
Antonomasia: The substitution of a proper name for a quality associated 
with it; or using a descriptive phrase for a proper name. 
Apophasis: In rhetoric, one rejects all alternatives to a solution 
except one. 
Apophthegm: A proverb. 
Aposiopesis: A breaking off without finishing a thought, which usually 
results in suspense. 
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Apostrophe: A person not present or a personified abstraction is 
addressed. 
Aschematiston: A lack of figures; bland style. 
Assonance: The repetition of vowel sounds. 
Asteismus: A pun. The answerer catches a certain word, and using it 
as a homonym, replies with a different meaning of the same word. 
Asyndeton: The omission of conjunctions between clauses. 
Barbarismus: The mispronunciation of words; a vice of language. 
Bomphiologia: Bombastic speech. 
Cacemphaton: Using vulgar or foul speech, or unpleasant combinations of 
sounds; a vice. 
Cacosyntheton: The use of objectionable word order; a vice. 
Cacozelia: Affected diction. 
Catachresis: The borrowing of the name of one thing to express another, 
which has either no proper name of its own, or, if it has, promotes 
surprise. ("Orange" may have originally applied to the color by 
catachresis, but now denotes the color just as properly as the 
fruit.) 
Catacosmesis: The ordering of words from greatest to least in dignity. 
Chiasmus: The reversal in word order, which results in reversal of 
meaning: "I am wont to think that men are not so much the keepers 
of herds as herds are the keepers of men." (Thoreau) 
Clausula: An unexpected.conclusion. 
Climax: Carrying the same kind of repetition through three or more 
successive clauses ("Saturday's tasks: From the lawn-mowing to 
the garage sweeping; from the garage to the front walk; and from the 
front walk to the ball park, where we'll all watch the game!"). 
Comparatio: Like things are compared among themselves, to bring out 
fine distinctions. 
Dialysis: Dilemma. 
Diastole: The lengthening of a short syllable or the stressing of an 
unstressed syllable. 
Dispositio: One of the five classical divisions of rhetoric—the arrang­
ing of material. 
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Dissimilitude: The comparison of diverse things to bring out gross 
distinctions: "The horse has the stable, the pig his sty, but 
where am I to go?" 
Elocutio: One of the five classical divisions of rhetoric--the reducing 
of gathered material to the specific language to be used in 
presentation; the writing of the presentation. 
Emphasis: Substituting an abstraction or universal for a concrete word. 
Enthymeme: An elided syllogism, where one or two of the premises or 
conclusion is missing, and dependent on the audience providing 
that missing statement, through sympathy with the speaker. 
Epanalepsis: Repetition of the same word(s) at the beginning and end of 
a clause or sentence. 
Epanorthosis: A retraction or a recalling of what we have already spoken. 
Epergesis: Interruption to impose a word in apposition, as added inter­
pretation. 
Epexergasia: The dwelling on a point, for emphasis. 
Epicheirema (epicheireme): Structuring a speech on a syllogism, whereby 
the various parts of a speech are an exposition of the premises and 
conclusion. 
Epilogus: A hypothetical syllogism: If A is B, and B is C, then A is C. 
Epiphonema: Ending a speech or literary work with a sharp or sage comment. 
Epistrophe: The ending of successive clauses or sentences with the same 
word or words: "Are we going to win our home-coming game? You bet1. 
Are we going to beat them badly? You bet!" 
Example: The citation of a specific instance or concrete example of an 
assertion. 
Exergasia: The repetition of the same sentence or idea, each time in a 
different way. 
Fable: A fictitious narrative. 
Figurative Language: Stylistically embellished language. 
Figures of Speech: Stylistic devices that remove language "from the 
common and ordinary." 
Figures of Thought: Stylistic devices that remove language "from the 
common and ordinary," generally having to do with presentation of 
ideas. 
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Gnome: A notable saying, "declaring with apt brevity moral doctrine 
approved by the judgement of all men." 
Hiatus: The elision of a consonant sound, resulting in two vowel sounds 
together. 
Homiologia: Monotony; a vice. 
Homoeoptoton: A figure of repetition, peculiarly not possible in English, 
but rather in Greek or Latin. 
Homoeosis: A simile. 
Homoeoteleuton: The repetition of a like syllabic ending, as the -ly 
in: "How hastily I ate; how quickly I swallowed; how sleeplessly 
I spent the night!" 
Hypallage: Similar to catachresis. 
Hyperbaton: The generic term for a number of figures that work through 
disorder. 
Hyperbole: Deliberate exaggeration:. "They were packed in the bus like 
sardines." 
Hypotyposis: A detailed, rich description, with the end of informing; a 
generic term. 
Hysterologia: A phrase is injected between a preposition and its object, 
and the preposition is thereby joined to the verb that precedes it: 
"I typed with as much speed as I could, the paper that was due the 
next morning." 
Hysteron Froteron: A disorder of the time elements, when describing 
something. "Did they bury your father? Is he dead?" 
Icon: A species of simile--the comparison of one person with another, 
form with form, or quality with quality. 
Imagery: The use of language to represent concretely and descriptively 
things, actions, or even abstract ideas. 
Inventio: One of the five classical divisions of rhetoric--the gathering 
of material. 
Irony: A meaning is expressed contrary to the stated or surface meaning. 
Isocolon: Several successive clauses or phrases of equal length and 
usually of corresponding structure. 
Maxim: A saying of proverbial nature; a proverb; a truth. 
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Meiosls: Understatement. 
Memoria: One of the £ive classical divisions of rhetoric—the memorizing 
of the presentation. 
Metabasis: The generic term for transition. 
Metalepsis: A present effect by a remote cause: "Why is he mean? He 
comes from the McGregor blood line, that's why." 
Metaphor: The juxtaposition of two words or phrases, that when read 
literally, produces absurdity; but when read figuratively, makes 
sense: "He has a goober instead of a brain." 
Metonymy: The name of some object or idea is substituted for another to 
which it has some relation: "He has a good heart." 
Mycterismus: A wrenching facial expression to support a rhetorical 
point. 
Noema: Deliberate obscurity; the obscurity of the sense lies not in a 
single word, but in an entire speech very subtle and dark. 
Onomatopoeia: The use of words whose sounds reinforce their meaning. 
Parabole: A species of simile, in which one thing is compared with 
another, to which it logically bears a resemblance. 
Paradigma: A species of simile, in which the thing compared is in 
reality an example of the object of comparison. 
Parelcon: The addition of a superfluous word, such as "that" in the 
following: "When that I call, I pray yee be ready." 
Parenthesis: The interruption of a sentence to inject words. 
Parison: See isocolon. 
Parody: A literary work in which the style of an author or work is closely 
imitated for comic effect or in ridicule. 
Paronomasia: A pun. Two words are used in the same utterance, where the 
two words are spelled differently but pronounced the same; or 
spelled and pronounced similarly, but containing different meanings. 
Pathetic Fallacy: The assigning of a human characteristic to an unhuman 
object. 
Periergia: Superfluity in attempting to seem fine or eloquent in 
expression; a vice. 
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Periphrasis: The use of many words to express something which could be 
put very briefly. 
Perissologia: The addition of a superfluous phrase or clause, which adds 
nothing to the sense: "I will two your car behind mine." 
Personification: Inanimate objects or abstract ideas are endowed with 
human qualities or actions. 
Pleonasmus: Unnecessary repetition; redundancy. 
Polyptoton: The repetition of a word in many different tones, inflections, 
or cases: "Death, thou shalt die." 
Polysyndeton: The use of more conjunctive particles than is needed. 
Pragmatographia: Species of hypotyposis; a vivid representation of a 
fictitious action, as of a battle. 
Pronuntiatio: One of the five classical divisions of rhetoric--the 
delivery of the material. 
Propositio: A short precis of matters to be discussed; an introductory 
summary. 
Prosapodosis: The methodic rejection of alternatives to arrive at a 
conclusion: "He's not my partner; he's not an acquaintance; he's 
certainly not my friend; he must be my enemy." 
Prosopopoeia: Describing good and bad qualities, or passions, or appetites 
of human nature as though they were real and distinct persons. 
Proverb: A short pithy saying that summarily expresses some obvious 
truth or familiar experience. 
Pun: A play on words. See Antanaclasis, asteismus, paronomasia, and 
syllepsis. 
Restrictio: An afterword. 
Rhythm: The order of strong and weak elements in the flow of language. 
Sarcasmus: A bitter taunt, or an open mock of an adversary. 
Sardismos: The indiscriminate use of several different dialects, mean 
words with grand, old with new, or poetic with colloquial. 
Schematismus: The subtle implication of something without ever stating 
it. 
Sententia: The generic term for "striking thought," such as proverbs or 
maxims. 
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Simile: A comparison using the words "like" or "as." "She floated on 
a cloud of ecstasy like a Halloween apple in a galvanized tub." 
Solecismus: The misuse of cases, genders, or tenses; a vice. 
Soraismus: The affected use of foreign phrases or words; a vice. 
Sorites: A chain of enthymemes, in which the conclusion of one 
enthymeme forms a premise for another enthymeme. 
Stichomythia: Dialogue, consisting of single lines spoken alternately. 
Syllepsis: A pun. A word which serves two or more other words, but 
agrees grammatically with only the nearest, with a resultant shift 
in meaning, is a sylleptic pun: "He took her to dinner and seriously." 
Syllogism: A logical construct in which a conclusion is drawn from the 
statement of a major and minor premise. 
Syllogismus: An implied syllogism from a single proposition; an enthy­
meme. 
Synathroesmus: A gathering together of diverse points in a summary for 
emphasis. 
Synecdoche: The name of some object or idea is substituted for another 
to which it bears the relation of part or whole: "Dad, may 1 have 
the keys tonight?" 
Systole: The shortening of a long syllable or the removal of stress from 
a stressed syllable. 
Tautologia (tautology): A wearisome repetition of the same thing in 
different words or in the same words; a vice. 
Tmesis: The separation of a compound word by the insertion of another 
word between its two parts: "Absoblastedlutely!" 
Transferred Epithet: Similar to catachresis. 
Transplacement: Excessive repetition of words. 
Trope: A stylistic device causing a transfer of meaning of a word, 
phrase, or idea from the natural one to another, usually with 
attendant poetic tension. 
Zeugma: The use of one word to modify or govern two or more words, 
usually in a different sense: "She opened her mouth and thus a can 
of worms." 
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enthymeme, 4, 5, 26, 30, 33, 92, 
100-112, 113, 114, 115, 141, 144, 
147, 148 
"Enthymemes: The Story of a Light-
hearted Search," 104 
epagoge, 49 
epanalepsis, 33 
epergesis, 5 
epexergasia, 30, 33 
epicheirema (epicheireme), 33, 100, 
114 
epilogos, 30, 100, 114 
epiphonema, 33, 119 
epiphor, 65, 66, 70-74, 76, 79, 88, 
89, 139, 144, 148 
choreographic epiphor, 70-74, 76, 
88, 139 
epiphora, 49 
epistrophe, 27, 49 
Epitome troporum ac Schematum, 42, 
48 
epizeuxis, 48 
Erasmus, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47 
ethical proof, 113 
example, 30, 37, 102 
exclamation, 43, 45 
exergasia, 33 
experience, 15, 21, 23, 105, 106, 
112, 115, 121, 122, 124, 138 
past experience, 15, 23, 99, 
112, 124, 138 
Experiencing and the Creation of 
Meaning. 7, 54 
seven modes of symbolism, 54-59, 
136 
explication, 55, 56, 75, 81, 96 
fable, 79 
fall and recovery, 60, 131 
Feldman, 21 
felt meaning, 55-59, 73, 74, 75, 76, 
78, 79, 80, 81, 90, 93, 95, 96, 97, 
98, 99, 100, 105, 106, 107, 108, 
111, 112, 118, 122, 125, 128, 132, 
136, 140, 141, 146, 147 
Fenner, 45 
figurative language, 10, 11, 23, 24-
49, 137 
in antiquity, 24-38 
in the Renaissance, 38-49 
figure of speech, 24, 25, 30, 32, 
34, 36, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 138 
figure of thought, 25, 30, 32, 34, 
37, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 138 
figurists, 43 
focus, 128-130 
no focus, inward focus, 129 
form-in-the-making, 54, 74, 75, 94, 
111, 136 
171 
Fortunatianus, 49 
Foundaclon of Rhetorike. The. 44 
Frank, 21 
Fraunce, 45 
Frijda, 21 
"From Sea to Shining Sea," 122 
Garden of Eloquence. The. 46, 47 
Geldard, 21 
Gendlin, 7, 52, 54-59, 74, 75, 81, 
96, 99, 105, 136, 137, 147 
seven modes of symbolism, 54-59, 
136 
gesture, 9, 11, 13-23, 61, 68, 69, 
70, 84, 85, 86, 93, 137-138 
as kinescept, 14 
as kinestruct, 12-14 
as kinesymbol, 14-22 
as micro-counterpart of dance, 9 
as "quasi-language," 17 
as sign, 18, 23 
as symbol, 18, 23 
autistic gestures, 68, 69, 138 
characteristics of, 22-23, 137-
138 
conventional, 16 
cultural determinants, 19, 21, 
138 
descriptive-demonstrative, 16 
emotional gesture, 19, 20 
emphatic, 16 
instinct, 21, 23 
gesture-meaning relationship, 10, 
11-23, 137-138, 146, 148 
elocutionist's view of, 16 
in theatre and speech, 15-16 
global phenomenon, 111, 115, 136 
gnome, 33 
Gorgianic figures, 26, 37 
Gorgianic style, 26, see grand style 
Gorgias, 3, 25, 26, 43 
Gower, 47 
Graham, 59, 60, 82, 115, 139 
Grammar of the Art of Dancing. 51 
grammatical exchange, figures of, 
117, 142 
grand style (Gorgianic style), 26, 
28, 29, 31, 36 
faulty counterpart, 36 
graunting, 45 
gustatory image, 126, 127 
Hawkins, 59, 62, 139 
H'Doubler, 59, 60, 61, 115 
structural features of form, 61 
heuristic, 51, 134, 143, 144 
hiatus, 36 
homiologia, 132 
homoeosis, 79 
homoioptoton, 26, 37 
homioteleuton, 26, 27, 143 
homonym, 83, 85, 87, 88 
Horace, 47 
Hoskyns, 45 
Hospers, 146 
Hubbell, 28 
Humphrey, 3, 59, 60, 83, 119, 135, 
139 
Hutchinson, 13, 50 
hypallage, 5, 30, 63, 79 
hyperbaton, 5, 35, 37, 118 
hyperbole, 27, 33, 37, 48, 63, 
82, 89, 140 
hypophora, 37 
hypostrophe, 49 
hysterologia, 5 
hysteron proteron, 5 
icon, 79 
illusion, dance as, 53, 54, 94, 111, 
128, 129, 130, 143, 147 
illusion of force, 54, 136, 137 
imagery, 4, 36, 81, 120-128, 130, 
131, 142-143, 144, 148 
body-image, 121-124, 130, 142 
non-human image, 121, 124-125, 
130, 142, 143 
non-visual image, 121, 126-128, 
142, 143 
technical image, 121, 125, 126, 
142, 143 
impressionist idiom, 131 
impropriety, 132 
immutatio, 49 
infallible signs, 102 
Institutiones Oratoriae, 42, 43, 45 
Institutlones rhetoricae. 41 
InBtitutio Oratoria. 40 
interrelationships of the arts, 145 
The Arts and Their Interrelations. 
50, 148 
inventio, 42 
inversio, 49 
172 
irony, 30, 63, 81, 140 
isocolon, 26, 27, 117 
Isocrates, 26, 43 
Iwo Jima, 122, 127 
jazz, 128 
Joseph, 43, 46, 83 
"Kaleidoscope," 79 
Kennedy, 28 
kines, 13, 14 
klnescept, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 20, 
121, 125, 137 
kinesics, 12-13 
Kinesics and Context, 13 
kinesthetic, 73, 100, 108, 110, 111, 
112, 140 
experience, 15 
perception, 7, 15, 148 
pre-dispositions, 108, 110, 112 
sensorium, 14 
kinestruct, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 20, 121, 137 
kinesymbol, 7, 8, 11, 15, 20, 73, 
74, 111, 121, 125, 137 
KLrstein, 51, 115 
Kline and Johannsen, 20 
Krout, 19 
Kuch, 122 
Laban, 13, 139 
LaBarre, 22 
Landis, 20 
Langer, 6-7, 15, 52, 53, 61, 75, 94, 
110, 133, 136, 137, 144, 146, 147 
language of the deaf and dumb, 17, 
68 
Late Empire, 40 
Latin handbooks, 40-43 
Lawiers Logike, The, 45 
Lawrence, 13 
Lawson, 16, 
Lever, 44 
Limon, 124 
literal, 8, 9 
logic, 26, 29, 30, 92, 93, 97, 99, 
100, 101, 107, 108, 110, 112, 113, 
114, 115, 136, 139, 140, 141 
definition, 92 
movement logic, 92, 93, 97, 99, 
112 
"Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory 
and the Enthymeme: A Search for 
Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," 
103 
Longinus, 24, 34-36 
five precepts for sublime style, 
35 
in comparison with Cicero, Aris­
totle, Quintilian, 35 
long line, 115 
loud lier, 48 
Lupus, 49 
Lynn and Lynn, 21 
MacCormac, 73, 74,-78, 80 
Malory, 40 
manipulation, 88, 89, 90, 118, 132, 
142 
Maver, 21 
maxim, 30, 37 
McBurney, 102 
McLuhan, 51 
"Mead's Social Psychology," 18 
meioais, 30 
Melanchthon, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46 
melodrama, 124 
Meltzer, 18 
memoria, 42 
metabasis, 117 
metabole, 49 
metalepsis, 63 
meta-metaphor, 51 
metaphor, 4, 27, 28, 30, 33, 34, 
37, 50, 51, 55, 57, 58, 63-67, 
69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 79, 80, 
138, 139, 140, 147 
analogical view, 65-66 
comparison view, 65-66 
choreographic diaphor, 74-78, 140 
choreographic epiphor, 70-74, 76, 
88, 139 
diaphor, 66, 74-78, 89, 125, 139, 
140, 144, 148 
epiphor, 65, 66,70-74, 76, 79, 88, 
89, 139, 144, 148 
interaction view, 66-70, 140 
substitution view, 64-65 
tenor, 65, 66 
vehicle, 65, 66 
Metaphor and Meaning. 51 
Metaphor and Reality. 51 
metaplasmus, 118 
Metheny, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 
53, 137, 147 
metonymy, 30, 34, 37, 63, 80-81, 89, 
140 
173 
mlcro-kinesics, 7, 13 
Middle Ages, 38, 39, 40 
middle style, 26, 28, 36 
faulty counterpart, 36 
Milton, 40 
mingle-mangle, 48 
minification, 33 
mixed-media, 146 
model, 3, 135 
More, 40 
Mosellanus, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47 
Movement and Meaning. 12 
"Movement and Meaning: Development 
of a General Theory," 7 
Movement and Metaphor. 51 
movement-meaning relationship, see 
gesture-meaning relationship 
movement normality, 68, 69, 70, 73 
Mudd, 101, 102 
Munro, 50, 148 
mycterismus, 30, 82 
neuromuscular sensae, 14, 15 
"Night Journey," 126 
Nikolais, 62, 79, 121, 125, 143 
noema, 33 
nondiscursive symbolism, see sym­
bolism 
non-human image, 121, 124-125, 130, 
142, 143 
non-literal, 8, 9, 62, 82, 113 
definition, 8 
dance, 62, 81, 82, 90 
non-verbal communication, 16, 81 
non-visual image, 121, 126-128, 
142, 143 
normality, see movement normality 
"Nutcracker, The," 125 
olfactory image, 21, 126, 127 
omission, figures of, 30, 118, 142 
onomatopoeia, 63, 126 
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